Responsibility Sharing for Refugees in the Middle East and North Africa
Responsibility Sharing for Refugees in the Middle East and North Africa:

Perspectives from Policymakers, Stakeholders, Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons

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Public debates and policy-making on asylum reached a peak towards the end of 2015, during a refugee crisis which saw hundreds of thousands of refugees cross the Mediterranean Sea. The urgent need for a better management of refugee reception led to a UN High Level Meeting in New York in 2016. The meeting did not reach a Global Compact on Responsibility-Sharing for Refugees that had been proposed by the UN Secretary General. The New York Declaration committed to negotiate such a document for adoption at a summit in 2018.

The debate about responsibility sharing is not a newcomer in international relations. The way in which refugees are distributed among countries in times of conflict has been discussed since, at least, the 1930s. However, this has been predominantly discussed from a South-North migration perspective, and other regions that have been traditionally receptors of refugee have received less attention. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region hosts a considerable amount of refugees which is exponentially larger than the ones received in Europe.

In view of the coming Global Compact that will be produced during the High Level Meeting in New York, 2018, this Delmi report aims to contribute with the necessary knowledge about the situation of refugees, IDPs and the receiving countries in the Middle East and North Africa region. The report, rich in empirical material, looks at responsibility-sharing in the MENA region from a number of different perspectives, examining perceptions at several levels (policy, operational and lived experience) from the perspective of host country governments, other host country stakeholders, donor governments, service providers and, most importantly, the refugees and internally displace people themselves.

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External reviewers of the report have been Annika Rabo, Professor at the Department of Social Anthropology, Stockholm University and Rebecca Thornburn Stern, Senior Lecturer and Associate Professor in International Law, Uppsala University. The work on this report has been followed by Alexandra Wilton Wahren, member of Delmi’s Board of Directors, as well as Head of the Unit for Migration Law at the Ministry of Justice. At Delmi’s Office, the Delegation Secretaries Constanza Vera-Larrucea, Henrik Malm Lindberg, Anton Ahlén and Monica Svantesson have contributed to the review. As usual in the Delmi context, the authors are responsible for the content, results and policy recommendations in the report. Results and conclusions from this study were presented and discussed at a seminar in the Swedish Permanent Mission in Geneva on September 25th 2017.

This is the first of three Delmi-reports on responsibility sharing, under the thematic of Institutions and Legal Frameworks. The forthcoming reports within the topic are on the future of CEAS in light of the refugee crisis of 15/16 by Bernd Parusel and Jan Schneider, and refugees and global responsibility-sharing by Alexander Betts.

Stockholm, September 2017

Joakim Palme, Kristof Tamas,
Delmi Chair Head of Delmi Secretariat
Sammanfattning

Summary

This Delmi report focuses on responsibility sharing for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region. Since the large-scale displacement of Palestinian refugees in 1948, millions of refugees and have fled from and been hosted in the MENA countries. In the New York Declaration adopted at the High Level Meeting Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants on 19 September 2016, governments reaffirmed their commitment to the notion of responsibility-sharing. However, the High Level Meeting did not arrive at a Global Compact on Responsibility-Sharing for Refugees, leaving its negotiation for a second summit to take place in 2018. Better understanding the perspectives of governments, stakeholders and refugees in the MENA region as to the meaning and component of such a compact may help ensure greater success in crafting an effective agreement. This qualitative study is based on multi-level analyses of the perspectives of policymakers, other stakeholders, and refugees and IDPs. It identifies seven areas requiring greater international cooperation: efforts to address the underlying causes of displacement within and across borders; efforts to find durable solutions, including resettlement of refugees from host countries to third countries; initiatives to identify and implement intermediate solutions, including greater focus on livelihoods and education; initiatives to enhance legal and physical protection; innovative approaches to the financing of programs for refugees, IDPs and the communities in which they reside; operational improvements to aid programs; and technical assistance and training for host countries, local organizations, and diaspora- and refugee-led organizations.
# Table of Contents

Sammanfattning ........................................................................................................... 5
Summary ......................................................................................................................... 6
Definition of Terms .......................................................................................................... 11
1. Introduction and Aims ................................................................................................. 13
2. Methodology ................................................................................................................. 21
   2.1 Literature and Policy Document Review ................................................................. 22
   2.2 Policy Maker Perspectives ....................................................................................... 22
   2.3 Stakeholder Interviews ............................................................................................ 22
   2.4 Refugee and IDP Perspectives ............................................................................... 24
3. Survey of the field: Notions of Responsibility-Sharing .............................................. 27
   3.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 27
   3.2 Why Refugee Responsibility-Sharing? .................................................................... 27
   3.3 Why is Responsibility-Sharing So Difficult? ............................................................. 34
   3.4 Principal forms of solidarity/responsibility sharing for refugees and displaced persons ........................................................................................................... 39
4. Policy Perspectives on Responsibility-Sharing in the MENA Region .................... 43
   4.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 43
   4.2 Financial Aid ........................................................................................................... 47
   4.3 Causes of Refugee Movements .............................................................................. 49
   4.4 Solutions .................................................................................................................. 52
   4.5 Education, Technical Assistance and Training ....................................................... 53
   4.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 54
5. Operational Perspectives on Responsibility-Sharing in the MENA Region ............ 57
   5.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 57
   5.2 Major Thematic Challenges .................................................................................... 58
   5.3 Major Policy, Institutional and Funding Challenges ................................................ 67
   5.4 Enhancing Responsibility-Sharing ......................................................................... 75
   5.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 77
6. Refugee and IDP Perspectives on Responsibility-Sharing in the MENA........... 79
   6.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 79
   6.2 Thematic Issues.................................................................................................. 79
   6.3 Interactions between the Displaced and Host Communities – A Case Study of Social Cohesion among Iraqi IDPs................................. 93
   6.4 Institutional Challenges ................................................................................. 97
   6.5 Enhancing Responsibility-Sharing................................................................. 99
   6.6 Conclusion .......................................................................................................101
7. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations................................................. 103
   7.1 Address the underlying causes of displacement................................. 104
   7.2 Promote resettlement of refugees............................................................... 106
   7.3 Promote greater self-sufficiency for refugees through development initiatives .......................................................................................... 106
   7.4 Address ongoing protection problems facing refugees and IDPs, using a combination of resources ......................................................... 109
   7.5 Provide timely, appropriate and adequate financing......................... 111
   7.6 Make operational improvements in aid programs................................. 113
   7.7 Provide technical assistance and training to build the capacity of local actors ........................................................................................................ 114
   7.8 Conclusion .......................................................................................................114
8. References............................................................................................................. 117
   Appendix A: MENA Country Profiles............................................................... 131
   Appendix B: UNHCR and UNRWA................................................................. 145
   Appendix C: Stakeholder Interview Guide .................................................... 151
   Appendix D: Fieldwork Description: Refugee and IDPs Interviews .... 155
   Appendix E: Fieldwork description: IDPs in Iraq ........................................ 163
   List of previous publications............................................................................ 169
Figures and tables

**Figure 3.1** Number of Refugees in Host Countries, end of 2015 ............ 31

**Figure 3.2** Refugees in Major Host Countries per US$1 GDP per capita, end of 2015 ................................................................................................................ 32

**Figure A.1** UNHCR Registered Refugees in Egypt, August 2016 ............ 132

**Table A.1** People of Concern Registered with UNHCR, Jordan Sept 2016 135

**Table A.2** Refugees in Lebanon, 2016 .................................................. 137

**Table A.3** Non-Syrian Refugees in Turkey ............................................ 140

**Table B.1** UNHCR Staff Details by Country ......................................... 146

**Table D.1** Refugee Interviews in Jordan and Lebanon by Country of Origin and Gender .................................................................................................... 157

**Table E.1** Casebook Rounds 1 and 2 of IOM-Georgetown Joint Study of Internal Displacement and Durable Solutions in Iraq ......................... 166
Definition of Terms

**Asylum Seeker** – A person seeking safety from harm or persecution in a country other than his or her own while awaiting a decision on the application for refugee status under relevant international and national instruments (IOM 2011).

**Early Warning Systems** – An open system of hazard monitoring, forecasting and prediction, disaster risk assessment, communication and preparedness activities systems and processes that assist governments, businesses, and communities with taking prompt action to reduce risks in advance of disasters and other hazardous events (UNISDR 2007).

**Forced Migration** – Coerced migratory movement due to factors including threats to life and livelihood, whether from human-made causes, such as persecution, or natural causes, such as environmental disasters or development projects (IOM 2011).

**Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)** – Persons or groups of persons who have been forced to flee their homes or places of habitual residence, usually as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, generalized violence, human rights violations, or natural or human-made disasters, who have not crossed a state border (IOM 2011).

**International refugee regime** – A set of policies and procedures that endeavours to protect asylum seekers and those recognized as refugees under the relevant instruments (UNHCR 2001).

**International Solidarity** – A concept that encourages states to observe the same standards of refugee protection and commit to their asylum and non-refoulement responsibilities. This concept of solidarity aims to ensure that one state does not bear burdens disproportionately in the international refugee regime (UNHCR 1988).

**Irregular Migration** – Movement that takes place outside the regular norms of the sending, transit, and receiving countries. This type of migration has been previously described as “illegal” (IOM 2011).
Local integration – Intended for persons that cannot return to their countries of origin, this type of durable solution calls for their adaptation and acceptance in their current host country, which is usually the country of asylum. Often, this process concludes with the acquisition of nationality of the country of asylum (UNHCR 2003).

Migration – The movement of a person or a group of persons across within a state or an international border. Migration encompasses the movement of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes (IOM 2011).

Non-Refoulement – The principle of migration that forbids the forced return of refugees to their country of origin or any country in which they might be subject to persecution (IOM 2011).

Refugees – Persons or groups of persons who leave their country of origin due to fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion (IOM 2011).

Repatriation – The right of a refugee, prisoner of war, or civil detainee to return to his or her country of nationality. Also considered a durable solution, this right is generally specified with certain conditions in various international instruments (IOM 2011).

Resettlement – This durable solution calls for the relocation and integration of refugees, internally displaced persons, and other types of migrants into a third country. Refugee resettlement usually involves the granting of asylum or other long-term residence rights and eventually the opportunity for naturalization in the third country (IOM 2011).

Returned IDPs – Returned IDPs refers to internally displaced persons who have returned to their place of origin or habitual residence (UNHCR 2013).

Stateless Person – A person who is not considered a national by any state. This status prevents stateless persons from accessing certain rights afforded to state nationals, including certain protections and right of return in case he or she travels (IOM 2011).
1. Introduction and Aims

This Delmi report focuses on responsibility-sharing for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. It offers a multi-level analysis of responsibility-sharing with attention to: the policy level, taking into account the perspectives of governments in the region; the operational level, taking into account the views of international organizations, nongovernmental organizations and civil society institutions that provide services to refugees and displaced persons; and the lived experience of refugees and displaced persons themselves. Responsibility-sharing is a core tenet of international responses to refugee crises. Although national authorities have the principal responsibility to provide asylum, from its beginnings, the UNHCR was to operate in cooperation with them in addressing the issue of refugees. In establishing the UNHCR, the General Assembly called “upon Governments to co-operate with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in the performance of his functions concerning refugees falling under the competence of his Office” (UN General Assembly 1950). The 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (UN Refugee Convention) reiterated in the preamble that international solidarity and national responsibility were mutually reinforcing concepts: “The High Contracting Parties ... considering that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United Nations has recognized the international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved without international co-operation” (UN General Assembly 1951, p. 13).

Responsibility-sharing is essential largely because the burdens associated with protecting and assisting refugees and displaced persons are unequally placed. Where refugees go is often an accident of geography. States that are in close proximity to countries in conflict are often called upon to host far larger numbers of refugees than those that are farther from the insecurity that generates large-scale displacement. There are times, of course, when refugees move directly or out of
proximate host countries into other regions. For example, especially large numbers of asylum seekers came to Europe from and through the Middle East and North Africa in 2014 and 2015. During the same period, significant movements of Central Americans through Mexico into the United States and people from Bangladesh and Myanmar into other Southeast Asian countries also raised the global visibility of such movements and the need for more effective responsibility-sharing.

The above described movements pushed for a special meeting at the UN-level. In 2016, governments reaffirmed their commitment to responsibility-sharing in the New York Declaration adopted at the High Level Meeting Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants:

> We underline the centrality of international cooperation to the refugee protection regime. We recognize the burdens that large movements of refugees place on national resources, especially in the case of developing countries. To address the needs of refugees and receiving States, we commit to a more equitable sharing of the burden and responsibility for hosting and supporting the world’s refugees, while taking account of existing contributions and the differing capacities and resources among States (UN 2016).

However, the NY Declaration did not include the Global Compact on Responsibility-Sharing for Refugees that had been proposed by the UN Secretary General. As articulated in his report to the High Level Meeting, the global compact would encompass “differentiated contributions by Member States and international and national partners on the basis of international law and proven good practices” (Secretary General 2016). Rather than adopt the global compact in 2016, the New York Declaration committed to negotiate such a document for adoption at a summit in 2018.

In anticipation of the 2018 summit, this report focuses on responsibility-sharing for refugees in a key region, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The history, politics and culture of the region have been defined by the presence of refugees and displaced persons for much of the past 70 years. Since the large-scale displacement of Palestinian refugees in 1948, millions of refugees and displaced persons
have fled from and been hosted by MENA countries. At present, more than 25 percent of the world’s refugees and displaced persons are within this region.

In this report, the population of concern in our analysis broadly encompasses the following groups: refugees; IDPs who have fled conflict and human rights violations; stateless persons; asylum seekers; and Palestinian refugees as defined by the UN Relief and Works Administration for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA). It is important to note the differences between these groups of displaced persons, particularly refugees and IDPs, as these two categories are quite different in terms of the legal protections afforded by international law.

Refugees are persons or groups of persons who leave their country of origin and are unwilling or unable to return due to fear of persecution based on five grounds: race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion (IOM 2011). This definition and many of the rights and privileges associated with this category of displaced persons derive from the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Significantly, most of the MENA countries hosting large numbers of refugees have not ratified the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Nevertheless, they have been very generous in opening their borders to those fleeing conflict and repression in their home countries.

IDPs, by contrast, are persons or groups of persons who have been forced to flee their homes or places of habitual residence, usually as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, generalized violence, human rights violations, or natural or human-made disasters; unlike refugees, IDPs have not crossed a state border and remain in their countries of origin, and thus still are considered to enjoy the protection of their home state. As a result, they are not entitled to the same legal protections afforded to refugees. The 2001 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, which are based on existing international human rights and humanitarian law, establish basic standards for the treatment of and protections for IDPs. Unlike the 1951 Convention, the Guiding Principles themselves are not binding on states even though the underlying legal frameworks are.
Despite the clear divergence in these two categories of displaced persons and the international legal entitlements they can access, there is a great deal of utility in examining them together as part of a broader issue: forced displacement in the MENA region. Many of the same phenomena—persecution, armed conflict and other sources of violence—drive forced displacement in the MENA region, regardless of whether the displaced cross an international border, becoming refugees, or remain within their countries of origin, and are thus classified as IDPs. Sometimes whether a person is an IDP or a refugee is largely a function of their material situation and if they have the means to flee the country or not, but the drivers of displacement remain largely the same. Moreover, today’s IDPs become tomorrow’s refugees and vice versa. As such, throughout this study, we consider the forcibly displaced of the MENA region—refugees and IDPs, along with asylum seekers and stateless persons—together.

According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as of the end of 2015, countries in the MENA region hosted more than 18 million refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs and returnees (UNHCR 2016m). The largest group were IDPs (14.2 million), followed by refugees (2.7 million), returned IDPs (1.3 million), stateless (373,700) and asylum seekers (203,800) (UNHCR 2016, p. 14). Refugees from the MENA region hosted outside of the region include: 2.7 million Syrian refugees in Turkey; an estimated one million Syrian, Iraqi and other MENA region asylum seekers in Europe, and almost 76,000 people who went from Yemen to Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan.² In addition, there are 5.1 million Palestinian refugees registered with the UN Relief and Works Administration (UNRWA) in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the West Bank and Gaza (UNRWA 2016) that are not included in the UNHCR total. Under Article 1D of the 1951 Refugee Convention, Palestinians who are assisted by the UNRWA are excluded from UNHCR’s mandate (see Appendix B and Goddard (2009).

The report looks at responsibility-sharing in the MENA region from a number of different perspectives, examining perceptions at several levels (policy, operational and lived experience) about efforts to address the underlying causes of displacement within and across borders; efforts to find solutions, including resettlement of
refugees from host countries to third countries; initiatives to enhance protection; financial support for refugees, IDPs and the communities in which they reside; and technical assistance and training for host countries and local organizations. It examines these issues from the perspective of host country governments, other host country stakeholders, donor governments, service providers and, most importantly, the refugees and IDPs themselves.

This study is based on a rich set of empirical material. To produce this multilevel study, we analyzed relevant international agreements, meeting reports, and MENA government statements on responsibility-sharing. We also conducted interviews with MENA-based NGOs and aid organizations. We further analysed more than 500 qualitative interviews with refugees, IDPs, and host communities to shed light on the subject of responsibility-sharing from the perspectives of those who are most affected by successes and failures of responsibility-sharing. We use content-analysis of these sources to create data-driven, subject-based frameworks as the basis of the three main chapters (chapters 4, 5, and 6). These chapters, which are organized around the perspectives of our respondents, reflect their understanding of the issues, rather than the researchers’ a priori assumptions about responsibility-sharing. Based on this analysis, we present a set of recommendations that aim to enhance international cooperation in protecting, assisting and ultimately finding solutions for those forced to leave their homes because of conflict and repression. The hope is that these recommendations will contribute to the negotiation of the Global Compact on Refugees, as called for at the 2016 UN High Level Meeting Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants.

The report begins with a top-down approach, looking at official statements, particularly in the context of the 19 September 2016 UN High Level Meeting on Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants, the 20 September 2016 US Leaders’ Summit on Refugees, and other international gatherings of states. It then moves to a bottom-up approach based on fieldwork and interviews with stakeholders, community members and refugees. This research utilizes several hundred interviews that the Georgetown team conducted in Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt and Turkey over the past five years as well as additional interviews conducted by telephone/Skype with key
informants to update our information. These interviews are supplemented by preliminary findings from a 3,848 family study of Iraqi IDPs that we are undertaking with the International Organization for Migration.

The research confirms the importance of international cooperation, particularly in a region with a considerably large number of refugees and IDPs. Yet, it also establishes that moving from the rhetoric of ‘responsibility-sharing’ to address the reality on the ground will not come easily and will require that all actors work together to protect and assist the most vulnerable. Pieces of this course of action can be seen in MENA countries already, as agencies have been compelled to collaborate and innovate due to the scale of the refugee situation. At the same time, our interviews with stakeholders and refugees and IDPs reveal major gaps in the system. The international community appears cognizant of these challenges, as witnessed by the commitments made in the New York Declaration. Still, filling the gaps will take more than a declaration, or even a compact on responsibility-sharing, much as those are welcomed. In order to make responsibility-sharing real, it is necessary to achieve true collaboration, changes in policies and practice from the donors to the implementers, and approaches that will empower refugees and IDPs to become part of the solution by fostering their capacities and giving them opportunities they need and deserve.

More specifically, this report elucidates seven areas requiring greater international responsibility-sharing. First, all actors emphasize that the best response to refugee and IDP crises is to resolve the main causes of displacement and urged the international community to take greater responsibility in addressing such causes and barriers to solutions. Second, while more long-lasting solutions are found, there are calls for the focus of international responsibility-sharing to shift from a mostly humanitarian approach to a more development-oriented programming that focused, for example, on livelihoods, education, and capacity-building. Third, many of our respondents, particularly those facing protracted displacement, saw moving to a third country as the key to the future for many refugees and called for an expansion in safe, orderly refugee resettlement programs. Fourth, respondents called for the international community to advocate more forcefully for greater safety and
security for refugees in host countries through the exercise of humanitarian diplomacy. Fifth, respondents called upon the international community to develop innovative approaches to finance programs for refugees, IDPs and, importantly, host communities. Six, there were numerous calls for operational improvements in humanitarian assistance programs. Finally, respondents emphasized the importance of international support for technical assistance and training for host countries, local organizations, and diaspora- and refugee-led organizations.

The remainder of this report is divided into six sections. The next section describes our methodology. The following one discusses notions of responsibility-sharing from the establishment of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in 1950 to the present. Later, the report presents three perspectives on responsibility-sharing, that of: policymakers in the MENA region, Turkey as the principal non-regional host country, and principal donor countries, primarily through their official statements; stakeholders in the major host countries, primarily through in person and teleconference interviews with representatives of operational agencies; and refugees and internally displaced persons, primarily through in person interviews. The final section presents conclusions and recommendations. Fuller profile of refugees and IDPs in the MENA region as well as the two principal UN agencies with responsibility for them—UNHCR and UNRWA—are included in appendices (see Appendix A and Appendix B).

Endnotes chapter 1

1. UNHCR’s MENA region includes Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, and for operational purposes Western Sahara.

2. These included Yemenis and other nationals (primarily Somali) who had been resident in Yemen.

2. Methodology

This report stems from certain premises about responsibility-sharing. The first is that the term is discussed among governmental bodies and international institutions. A second premise is that those discussions influence the various ways that humanitarian aid and political asylum processes are formed. Finally, we believe that those most affected by responsibility-sharing policies – refugees and IDPs – have experiences and opinions on these policies. In order to explicate these premises, we collected data in the following ways: 1) review of the extant literature on responsibility-sharing (see 2.1 below as well as chapter 3); 2) collection and analysis of official policy documents; 3) qualitative in-depth interviews with stakeholders (undertaken specifically for this project); and 4) content analysis of qualitative interviews with refugees, IDPs, and host communities (undertaken for previous projects).

We followed a constructivist research methodology that builds on standard ethnographic techniques. In-depth interviews with refugees, displaced persons, service providers and other key informants provided empirically-informed aspects that were added to the analysis project. The respondents narrated their own experiences in their own words, highlighting issues that the research team may not have conceived of for inclusion in a standardized questionnaire. Such insights into what is important to refugees and stakeholders enabled the research team to formulate better policy and programmatic recommendations. It also led the research team towards different modes of reporting on the findings in chapters 4-6. As the views of policymakers were gained through official documents, chapter 4 is organized around commonly understood policy and programmatic issues. Chapter 5, is based on stakeholder interviews and it follows a similar pattern than in the previous chapter because the respondents generally commented on those same issues. Chapter 6, however, is organized around the perspectives of refugees and displaced persons, who generally framed their concerns in their own terms, not necessarily in obviously policy-relevant ones. Finally, in the concluding chapter the research team bring these perspectives together and highlights the results relevant for policy making.
2.1 Literature and Policy Document Review

The research team began the project in spring 2016 with an extensive desk-based review of the extant literature on international responsibility-sharing, the UN's strategic plans, Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) for the upcoming year, and reports from the UN, international NGOs, local NGOs, and other actors pertaining to the situation of refugees and other displaced populations in the five countries of study. This review played an instrumental role in the project overall, as the review's final product was a detailed annotated bibliography that guided the next phase of the research—developing a set of questions for stakeholders in the five countries of study.

2.2 Policy Maker Perspectives

As primary sources for discerning the issues related to policy sharing on the minds of key policymakers, the research team used statements issued at the 19 September 2016 UN High Level Meeting Addressing Large Scale Movements of Refugees and Migrants and 20 September 2016 U.S.-led Leaders’ Summit, as well as other international conferences in 2015 and 2016 that focused on refugees in the region. Statements from representatives of all MENA countries and countries hosting MENA refugees made in plenary sessions and roundtables were used. Statements of all major donor country representatives in the MENA region were also reviewed. Some of the statements were published whereas others were reviewed through webcasts provided by the UN. These were supplemented by press releases and news articles in which representatives of the MENA countries were quoted. Statements made in Arabic were translated into English when necessary. These statements were analyzed for two major purposes: 1) to gauge attitudes and perceptions about responsibility-sharing, with full knowledge that what governments say publically is not necessarily a reflection of their actual policies; and 2) to obtain factual information that could be verified through other sources.

2.3 Stakeholder Interviews

From March to October 2016, the research team conducted in-depth, semi-structured qualitative interviews with 34 different stakeholders in Jordan, Lebanon,
Egypt, Iraq, and Turkey. Stakeholders were identified as actors providing mostly
direct services to refugees in countries of asylum. Actors providing direct services
offer a unique, on-the-ground perspective that is rarely considered systematical-
ly in academic studies. Service providers are also well-positioned to comment on
the divergence between policy and practice on the ground, an area this report
attempts to address. We compiled a list of organizations fitting the above defini-
tions of stakeholders. We contacted a targeted sample from those lists, based on
our research experience over the last seven years in these countries, a review of
websites and written reports, and the recommendations of trusted colleagues. We
contacted approximately 50 organizations in order to complete the 34 interviews.
The main challenge was in getting them to respond to our request for an interview,
given their busy schedules with service provision. We made special efforts to reach
representatives of local and refugee-led organizations, which have fewer staff than
the larger international organizations.

The research team paid special attention to a second set of stakeholders: Syrian-led
organizations, defined for the purposes of this paper as any refugee service provider
organization that self-identifies as Syrian. Several of the organizations were run by
the Syrian diaspora, with headquarters in the United States or Europe that support
field offices in the MENA region. Other organizations were run by Syrians who were
almost always themselves refugees; most were registered with the UNHCR and re-
ceived aid for their families. The heavy involvement of Syrian-led organizations in
service provision in countries of asylum and cross-border assistance in Syria marks
an introduction of a new kind of actor that transcends the traditional humanitarian
and development division of aid-givers and aid-receivers. Many Syrians are at once
agents of aid as well as its recipients. As others have previously noted, this is a
change that merits further in-depth exploration (Malkin 2015).

Our study attends to the variant operating contexts represented by each of the five
countries of study. In order to better catch the contextual factors, separate sets of
questions were developed for each country, although certain core questions were
asked of all respondents (See Appendix C for the questionnaire). Interviews were
conducted in Arabic and English by a bilingual researcher. These interviews were
undertaken over Skype, the phone, and in person. The face-to-face interviews took place in the United States and during research trips to Beirut, Lebanon (April 2016), Cairo, Egypt (September 2016) and Erbil, Iraq (October 2016). Interview transcripts were recorded in English.

The stakeholders approached by this study included UN employees, government representatives, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), humanitarian aid workers, and host community organizations. Almost all of the stakeholders interviewed were engaged in direct service provision to refugees and other displaced people, and their work spanned the education, health, psycho-social, and legal sectors.

Analysis of these interviews was conducted on the translated transcriptions using content analysis. Themes that had been pre-determined through the review of the literature as well as the policy documents' review formed the structure for the content analysis. In addition, themes raised by the stakeholders not reflected in the reviews were also selected and made part of the analysis.

Finally, due to the sensitivity of providing assistance to displaced persons in all of these countries and a desire to elicit stakeholders’ frank opinions on the topics at hand, stakeholders were informed that no identifying information about them as individuals or their organizations would be attached to their responses. The transcript of interviews included only the type of organization the respondents represented.

### 2.4 Refugee and IDP Perspectives

Since 2010, researchers at the Institute for the Study of International Migration (ISIM) and the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS) at Georgetown University have been building a rich repository of qualitative interviews with refugees in Jordan and Lebanon. Using participatory research methods designed by the team, Georgetown researchers identified researchers from local and refugee populations with the help of local refugee assistance organizations. The researchers were then trained on human subjects protection, qualitative interviewing techniques, and mock interviews accompanied by critique from peers and the instructor.
The researchers were then asked to identify interviewees from their communities, aiming for a diversity of ages, genders, places of origin, and financial situations. Each researcher conducted qualitative interviews with potential respondents (between 4 and 6 in total), and then transcribed these interviews. Translation of the interviews from Arabic to English was done in the United States by graduate student research assistants and researchers and later checked by a supervisor. For this study on international responsibility sharing, the Georgetown study team drew upon approximately 300 interviews of Syrian, Iraqi, Palestinian, Sudanese, and Somali refugees collected in 2010, 2011, 2013, and 2014. The qualitative interviews provided valuable information about the shifting context for refugees in the Middle East over the last six years (See casebook in Appendix D for additional information).

Additionally, the study team sought to capture issues related to internal displacement by creating a case study within this section on the topic of social cohesion, drawing upon 80 qualitative interviews with Iraqi internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 80 host community members in four governorates of Iraq (Baghdad, Basrah, Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniyah). These interviews were conducted by Iraqi enumerators in Arabic and Kurdish in May and June 2016 as part of a joint Georgetown-IOM project surveying 3,848 families on access to durable solutions for IDPs in Iraq. The qualitative interviews provided more detailed information relevant to responsibility-sharing than the more structured surveys.
3. Survey of the field: Notions of Responsibility-Sharing

3.1 Introduction
Responsibility-sharing for refugees and IDPs is anchored in international law. It is necessary because, as our recent history tells us, geography and borders restrict where refugees go, and thus the burdens associated with protecting and assisting refugees and displaced persons are unequal. Responsibility-sharing centres on three main goals. First, most importantly, to prevent the situations that cause people to be displaced; second, to maintain adequate protection for refugees and displaced persons while addressing undue burdens on host countries and communities; and third, to promote solutions for the displaced, including local integration, return and resettlement. While acknowledging that the nation-state system puts the sovereignty of national authorities above all else, international responsibility sharing is needed at all stages of displacement, from prevention of the causes through durable solutions. The challenge of international responsibility-sharing is then to ensure that arrangements for international cooperation expand and improve the protection space for refugees and displaced persons.

3.2 Why Refugee Responsibility-Sharing?
Responsibility-sharing is essential because the burdens associated with protecting and assisting refugees and displaced persons are shared unequally among states. As such, the notion of responsibility sharing underpins the international refugee regime, and this concept can be seen throughout the various documents and legal instruments that have come to determine the ways international and national
bodies address the displaced (Schuck 1997; Suhrke 1998; Betts 2005). The United Nations established the UNHCR in 1950 to operate in cooperation with national governments in addressing the issue of refugees. The General Assembly listed eight ways governments could support the work of UNHCR:

(1) Becoming parties to international conventions providing for the protection of refugees, and taking the necessary steps of implementation under such conventions;

(2) Entering into special agreements with the High Commissioner for the execution of measures calculated to improve the situation of refugees and to reduce the number requiring protection;

(3) Admitting refugees to their territories, not excluding those in the most destitute categories;¹

(4) Assisting the High Commissioner in his efforts to promote the voluntary repatriation of refugees;

(5) Promoting the assimilation of refugees, especially by facilitating their naturalization;

(6) Providing refugees with travel and other identification documents would normally be provided to other aliens by their national authorities, especially documents which would facilitate their resettlement²;

(7) Permitting refugees to transfer their assets and especially those necessary for their resettlement; and

(8) Providing the High Commissioner with information concerning the number and condition of refugees, and laws and regulations concerning them (UN General Assembly 1950).

These principles were reiterated and further developed in the UN and other international bodies. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees asserted that international solidarity and national responsibility were mutually reinforcing concepts where national authorities had the principal responsibility to provide asy-
lum, but the international community would cooperate with governments that faced an unduly heavy burden in carrying out its responsibilities.Outside of the UN, the concept of international solidarity received further articulation in Article 11 (4) of the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugees Problems in Africa: “Where a Member State finds difficulty in continuing to grant asylum to refugees, such Member State may appeal directly to other Member States and through the OAU, and such other Member States shall in the spirit of African solidarity and international cooperation take appropriate measures to lighten the burden of the member state granting asylum” (OAU 1969, p. 5).

The UN further developed protections for those displaced with the publication in 2001 of the *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*. This document establishes the framework for international cooperation, in support of national responsibility, to be applied to persons who are internally displaced. As the internally displaced people continue to reside in their own country, their rights, as those of all citizens, derive from international human rights conventions and, to the extent displacement is caused or affected by war, as established by the Geneva Convention. While Principle 25 states clearly, “The primary duty and responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons lies with national authorities” (OCHA 2001, p. 15), it goes on to say that “international humanitarian organizations and other appropriate actors have the right to offer their services in support of the internally displaced.” (Ibid.)

The Organization of African Unity (OAU, now known as the African Union-AU) subsequently adopted a regional convention on internal displacement that codified the responsibilities of national authorities and the norms of regional cooperation. Article 8 of this Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugees Problems in Africa sets out obligations regarding the African Union. It specifies that the “African Union shall support the efforts of the States Parties to protect and assist internally displaced persons under this Convention (OAU 1969).”

Revived again in the 21st century, burden- and responsibility-sharing has become a discussion point, but agreement on how states can best share responsibility has been a point of contention. At the UN High Level Meeting on Large Movements of
Refugees and Migrants, the Secretary General called “for a more predictable and equitable way of responding to large movements of refugees through adoption of a Global Compact on responsibility-sharing for refugees” (UN Secretary General 2016, p. 116). Governments were unable to come to consensus, however, regarding the content of the Global Compact or the scope of responsibility sharing to be incorporated; the New York Declaration stemming from the meeting put off adoption of a Global Compact on refugees until 2018 when it would also consider a Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. Elizabeth Ferris, former co-director of the Brookings –LSE Project on Internal Displacement and current Research Professor at Georgetown University, who played a central role in drafting the Secretary General’s report, observed that the negotiations in 2016 raised a number of still to be answered questions about the nature of responsibility-sharing:

It might also be helpful to explore the meaning of the term ‘responsibility’ in this context; in particular, does it refer to a ‘moral obligation’ or is the term intended only to be a substitute for the word ‘burden’? Does it refer to the individual responsibility of each state or to a more generalised sense of responsibility on the part of the ‘international community’ – a term often used but which remains fairly general, and one which seems to let individual states off the hook relatively easily (Ferris 2016, p.17).

As will be described in later chapters, our respondents tended to use the term in both ways, at times speaking of the responsibilities of specific states and at others of the amorphous international community.

The needs of host countries, particularly those close to origin countries of refugees, have been a particular focus of responsibility-sharing concerns (see Figure 3.1). As one study of burden-sharing notes, “refugees’ movements are uneven throughout the world for morally arbitrary reasons. Refugees tend to flee to states that are located close to their countries of origin; they often manage to get to places where there is an existing community of refugees with their same nationality in order to make assimilation easier; they prefer to go to places where their national language is spoken; and so on” (Kritzman-Amir and Berman 2009, p.624).
Oftentimes, the neighboring states are affected by the same political instability as the countries of origin, and they are likely to be in regions with few economic resources. In fact, the same states may be countries of origin of refugees and internally displaced people and, at the same time, countries of asylum. Iraq is an example: in 2015, Iraq hosted 225,000 Syrian refugees while also dealing with 4.4 million IDPs (UNHCR 2016f). At the same time, more than 260,000 Iraqis have become refugees, mostly in neighboring countries including Syria (Ibid.). As of this writing, UNHCR has announced contingency plans to receive still more Iraqi refugees in Syria and as many as one million IDPs as fighting in Mosul accelerates (Robinson 2016).

Figure 3.1 Number of Refugees in Host Countries, end of 2015

(Source: UNHCR Global Trends 2015)

Complicating the situation is the disproportionate impact of displacement on poor countries. Figure 3.2 shows the countries that are hosting the largest number of refugees as a percentage of their Gross Domestic Product. With the exception of Turkey, these countries are in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.
The strain on states is especially pronounced in *protracted* situations involving large numbers of refugees and displaced persons who have been living in situations of displacement for five years or more. The duration of stay for refugees and displaced persons can vary from days to years to generations. During this time, refugees and displaced persons could be in camps, although more and more are finding refuge in both urban and rural areas. Even with considerable international financial support, these protracted situations can pose significant long-term burdens on local health, education and social services for locals, and adversely impact labor markets and housing options for some in the host community.

Security has become a central focus of the need for responsibility-sharing. In hosting the September 2016 Leaders’ Summit on Refugees, U.S. President Obama captured the connection between international cooperation on refugees and security:

> It is a crisis of our shared security. Not because refugees are a threat. Refugees, most of whom are women and children, are often fleeing war and terrorism. They are victims. They’re families who want to be safe and to work, be good citizens and contribute to their country.... [The]
challenge to our security is because when desperate refugees pay cold-hearted traffickers for passage, it funds the same criminals who are smuggling arms and drugs and children. When nations with their own internal difficulties find themselves hosting massive refugee populations for years on end, it can risk more instability. It oftentimes surfaces tensions in our society when we have disorderly and disproportionate migration into some countries that skews our politics and is subject to demagoguery (The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 2016).

These complex impacts, especially on poor and often unstable countries with a disproportionately large number of refugees and displaced persons, highlight the importance of international cooperation in addressing them. Astri Suhrke, an academic expert in the area, noted the benefits of organizing and institutionalizing responsibility-sharing in her seminal work on the topic:

In refugee matters, the logic of burden-sharing starts from the premise that helping refugees is a jointly held moral duty and obligation under international law. By institutionalizing the sharing in accordance with agreed principles of equity, states can discharge these obligations in a manner that simultaneously promotes national interests. Organized sharing means more predictable responses, greater international order, and lower transaction costs during a refugee/migration emergency—all of which are goods that states value, and which they seek to obtain through organized international cooperation (Suhrke 1998, p. 398).

In effect, Suhrke argues, international solidarity is both the right thing and the smart thing to do. With the Holocaust in mind, the founders of the post-World War II refugee regime clearly saw themselves to have a moral responsibility to ensure that refugees would not be forcibly returned to persecution and they enshrined the principle in international law. They also gave states the principal responsibility to enforce this norm. But, recognizing that adhering to the principle would place greater burdens on some countries than others, they also exhorted the states to cooperate with each other and the UNHCR to carry out what they conceived as a shared responsibility towards refugees.
The ethical dimensions of responsibility-sharing for refugees Suhrke alludes to have also been dealt with by scholars. Matthew Gibney (2004), in his review of asylum, and Joseph Carens (2013), in his work on immigration more generally, apply liberal democratic principles to understand states' treatments of foreign nationals living within their borders. Gibney suggests that there is a “schizophrenia” that pervades Western thinking about asylum-seekers and refugees; great importance is attached to the principle of asylum but enormous efforts are made to ensure that refugees never reach the territory of a state where they could receive its protection (Gibney 2004, p. 2). In seeking to bring together “ethical force” and “practical relevance,” Gibney argues that “states have an obligation to assist refugees” but qualifies that humanitarian obligation in adding “when the costs of aiding are relatively minor and the negative consequences of withholding aid to individuals are both dire and imminent (Gibney 2004, p. 55). Carens also recognizes the practical barriers to admission of refugees. Referring to resettlement, he argues that “democratic states have a moral duty to provide [refugees] with a new home if they are unable to return safely to their state of origin within a reasonable time (Carens 2013, p. 224).” Yet, he also concludes “we cannot be too optimistic that democratic states will be willing to do what they ought to do in admitting refugees” (ibid). Implicit in both authors’ perspectives, however, is that democratic states, particularly wealthy ones, have an ethical obligation to do more to protect and assist refugees elsewhere.

3.3 Why is Responsibility-Sharing So Difficult?

The implementation of responsibility-sharing and making it operational in different contexts has many challenges.

The first challenge is state sovereignty, which is the basis of the nation-state concept at the heart of the United Nations and other international bodies. While some states feel obligated to their own citizens, others are unable or unwilling to fulfil those obligations to their own citizens. In both these cases, the state has the ability to decide who comes in and out of its borders. Thus, refugees who cross borders without personal documentation or who cannot return to their home countries undermine that idea of state control and state responsibility, thus living as a
population in limbo within a state that is not their own. Responsibility-sharing offers solutions for such issues, but it also takes some of the sovereignty out of the hands of the state.

IDPs complicate even further this notion of state sovereignty because they are citizens of the state in which they are displaced. State sovereignty, in the words of Francis Deng, the first Representative of the Secretary General on Internally Displaced Persons, is responsibility:

> The sovereign state’s responsibility and accountability to both domestic and external constituencies must be affirmed as interconnected principles of the national and international order. Such a normative code is anchored in the assumption that in order to be legitimate, sovereignty must demonstrate responsibility. At the very least that means providing for the basic needs of its people. (Deng et al 1996, p. xvii).

International responsibility-sharing can promote protection for persons whose rights have been violated by states that are unwilling or unable to ensure their safety. However, these are exactly the situations in which international cooperation may be stymied by governments using sovereignty as an excuse to bar international aid for those most needing protection. Or, as in the case of failed states, international action becomes a substitute, rather than a support to national responsibility.

A second challenge lies in the temptation of states to move from burden-sharing to burden-shifting. In some cases, the burden has shifted from national authorities to UNHCR. As Slaughter and Crisp describe:

> “UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations have assumed a primary role in the delivery and coordination of support to refugees, initially by means of emergency relief operations and subsequently through long-term ‘care and maintenance’ programmes. Host country involvement has generally been quite limited, focused primarily on the admission and recognition of refugees on their territory; respect for the principle of non-refoulement ...; and the provision of security to refugees and humanitarian personnel” (Slaughter and Crisp 2009, p. 1).
In other cases, the shift is from state to state. For example, states with greater financial and political power may shift physical responsibilities for refugees unto poorer and weaker states.

A third challenge is the voluntary nature of responsibility-sharing. It can be the lowest common denominator of action rather than the optimal path to ensuring protection for the displaced. As Suhrke notes: “The critical weakness of sharing schemes is precisely that they may encourage collective action along restrictive lines, similar to the process of asylum harmonization in Europe, or permit involuntary relocation of refugees among states” (Suhrke 1998, p. 398). As the principle of solidarity is voluntary, rather than binding upon states, it can be a moving target: generous when powerful states see a national interest in ensuring protection but restrictive when national interests of such states are challenged or unclear. Historical examples abound of differential standards of international cooperation depending on political interests, foreign policy concerns, public opinion, economic conditions and a host of other factors that had little to do with the protection needs of refugees. During the Cold War, for example, many Western governments saw a foreign policy interest in ensuring the protection of refugees who fled Communist countries but were less concerned about flight from authoritarian governments that may have been allied with the West in the fight against Communism. Domestic constituencies often supported generous policies towards refugees whom they saw as targeted for shared beliefs but were indifferent or even hostile towards those who had different beliefs.

A fourth challenge is the dynamic of refugee policy that changed in the 1990s. Exit controls from many previously Communist countries were lifted just as nationalist conflicts in such places as the former Yugoslavia created conditions that caused massive displacement. Civil conflicts that had been linked to the Cold War, such as those in Afghanistan, appeared to be settled, only to re-erupt into unresolved domestic battles. Many neighboring countries grew weary of hosting refugees, and donors were weary of providing financial support, leading to a further erosion of solidarity. Developed countries also took steps to restrict access of asylum seekers to their territories, establishing policies that permitted asylum seekers to be returned to what were called ‘safe third countries’ or even to supposedly safe zones within countries of origin. These policies became negative role models for
many host countries in developing regions that were also looking for ways to reduce what they considered to be an excessive burden.

The fifth complication is that setting criteria for burden-sharing is complex and unique to many situations. Disagreements arise about what are the principal ‘burdens’ and ‘benefits’ that are to be shared. Boswell has argued that in burden-sharing schemes that are predicated on physical relocation of refugees:

> “[o]ne central question is that of the criteria for distribution. Distribution may be based on two different types of consideration: justice-based or outcome-based. Justice-based systems will typically base distribution on static indicators such as receiving-country GDP, population, or size of territory. By contrast, outcome-based indicators are more concerned with the consequences of hosting refugees or asylum seekers: for example, the repercussions of reception and assistance on inter-ethnic relations or security, or on the standard of protection and assistance received by refugees or asylum seekers themselves” (Boswell 2003).

Host countries and communities often emphasize the problems associated with refugee and displaced populations and ignore the benefits that may arise. In part, this may be a function of time—at the start of an emergency, refugees and displaced persons may be in need of substantial levels of assistance, particularly if they endured lengthy periods of deprivation prior to arrival and came with few material resources. Over time, however, they may have skills that could be put to good use in the host economy. A similar situation arises in the context of the return of refugees and internally displaced persons. Yet, governments may be concerned about competition between refugees and internally displaced persons, on the one hand, and local populations, on the other. They may then bar the refugees and displaced persons from earning their own livelihoods, creating what might be a long-term fiscal burden. From the perspective of host governments, these policies may help to reduce tensions between refugee and hosts that could lead to political upheaval and communal violence. A principal aim of the UN High Level Meeting on Large Scale Movements of Refugees and Migrants was to identify ways to offset these concerns by linking development and humanitarian aid to help ensure that neither group falls behind when poor communities host refugees.
Burdens may also be differently perceived depending on specific circumstances and in relative terms. The so-called CNN Effect, in which media coverage shapes the way in which the public perceives human suffering, may lead to greater willingness to share burdens among some and a determination to reject asylum seekers in others. By contrast, many crises occur outside of the media limelight or persist well after the television lights dim. This leaves little understanding among publics or politicians, for that matter, about the need for international cooperation in responding to such crises and can lead to neglect.

In conclusion, building international responsibility-sharing to address underlying causes of refugee crises is even more difficult than it is to respond to crises that are underway. Especially difficult is engaging countries of origin when they may be a large part of the problem. Early warning systems may alert the international community to the potential for mass displacement, but effective action requires political will, not just information. Prolonged displacement may, in fact, result from actions or non-actions taken by the Security Council or regional organizations in ending conflicts or sanctioning repressive governments. Peace agreements, such as the Dayton Peace Accord that ended fighting in Bosnia, may include provisions encouraging refugees and displaced persons to return home, but they may also recognize political outcomes that make it extremely difficult for people to go back to areas in which they would now be a minority. In the absence of peacekeeping missions with a strong mandate to protect civilians, and initiatives to resolve community tensions, the safety of returnees may be at significant risk.

Finding effective policies to address the causes and solutions to displacement require action on a number of fronts, requiring the involvement of international organizations and national ministries responsible for foreign policy, development, trade, economic reform, governance, defence, environment, etc. Addressing these situations also means the involvement of non-state actors (insurgencies, NGOs, civil society, private sector). Since many of these organizations operate in silos, with relatively little coordination with other actors, achieving solidarity of action becomes all the more difficult.
3.4 Principal forms of solidarity/responsibility sharing for refugees and displaced persons

Many reports, papers, and academic articles discuss solidarity and responsibility-sharing. Scholars have tended to focus on responsibility in the form of granting asylum (Whitaker 2008) and the provision of funding for responses to displacement crises. Given the risks and difficulties of instituting effective burden shifting, the mechanisms to be used must be well conceived and continually monitored.

In essence, the tools of international responsibility-sharing need to support three main goals: to prevent the situations that cause people to be displaced; to maintain adequate protection for refugees and displaced persons while addressing undue burdens on host countries and communities; and to promote solutions, including local integration, return and resettlement.

The tools are many and varied to support these ends but they can be divided into five principal areas. Perhaps most obvious are the financial tools that assist countries address the costs of hosting refugees and displaced persons (Whitaker 2008, Roper and Barria 2010). These include humanitarian assistance, development assistance, costs of peacebuilding and peacekeeping, and others. As one scholar noted, “Fiscal burden-sharing applies equally to situations of mass influx and to individual arrivals. It is now widely accepted as an essential component of international cooperation in the refugee field. In the context of North-South cooperation, it may be regarded as a specific facet of development aid” (Hurwitz 2009).

The second set of burden-sharing tools pertains to the underlying causes of displacement. Refugees and internally displaced persons are largely the product of persecution, massive human rights violations and conflict. Tools to address these causes include preventative diplomacy, early warning systems, peacebuilding and peacekeeping, and, in rare cases, Security Council actions to sanction one or more parties to the conflict.

A third set of tools promotes effective protection for refugees and displaced persons, often seen as the granting of asylum (Thielemann 2003; Noll 2005; Czaika 2005; Kritzman-Amir and Berman 2009). Protection of these populations is at the
core of both national responsibility and international solidarity. As UNHCR observes, “[Refugees] have no protection from their own state—indeed it is often their own government that is threatening to persecute them. If other countries do not let them in, and do not protect and help them once they are in, then they may be condemning them to an intolerable situation where their basic rights, security and, in some cases their lives, are in danger” (UNHCR 2016). Internally displaced persons are often in even more dire situations, without the protection of their own state but still living within its borders. At times, resettlement of refugees and IDPs may be necessary to maintain protection.

A fourth set of tools promote durable solutions. The three traditional durable solutions to displacement are repatriation, local integration and resettlement. For refugees, it means return to one’s home country, integration into the country of asylum, or resettlement in a third country. For internally displaced, it means return to one’s home community, integration in the area of current refuge, or resettlement in another part of the country or movement to a different country. All of these solutions are difficult and at times impossible to achieve, leaving many refugees and internally displaced persons in protracted situations with little opportunity to find new homes or livelihoods and too often living in insecure environments. Ensuring durable solutions for refugees and IDPs, or even more secure status and livelihoods in protracted situations, requires both the exercise of national responsibility and the support provided through international cooperation.

The fifth set includes capacity building and sharing of data and good practices to increase the capabilities and thereby reduce burdens on receiving communities. Many of the countries with the largest number of refugees and internally displaced persons are among the least developed countries and/or lack governance structures to undertake protection and assistance activities. These problems exist at both the national and the local community levels. Building capacity is a long-term process that involves numerous local, national, regional and international actors.

As this list indicates, international responsibility sharing is needed at all stages of displacement, from prevention of the causes through durable solutions. The principal focus throughout these processes is protection and the principal responsibility
continues to rest with national authorities. The challenge of international responsibility-sharing then is to ensure that arrangements for international cooperation expand and improve the protection space for refugees and displaced persons, and do not constrain it.

In only a few instances have truly comprehensive responsibility-sharing responses to refugee crises been achieved. The Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees (CPA) and International Conference on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA) are two such success stories. The CPA was adopted at an international conference in 1989 to address the continuing outflow of refugees from Vietnam and Laos. UNHCR (1996) summarized its achievements at its conclusion in 1996:

During its seven-year life span, the CPA provided temporary refuge for some 112,000 asylum-seekers from Viet Nam and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, reduced clandestine departures, expanded legal departure possibilities and introduced region-wide refugee status determination procedures which helped stem the flow of asylum-seekers. The CPA facilitated the recognition and subsequent resettlement of over 74,000 Vietnamese refugees, and supported the repatriation to their country of origin and subsequent reintegration of over 88,000 Vietnamese who did not fulfil internationally recognized refugee criteria. The CPA also facilitated the resettlement of some 51,000 Lao and supported the voluntary repatriation and reintegration in their country of origin of some 22,400 Lao, most of whom were recognized as prima facie refugees (paragraph 5).

The CPA succeeded because it had the support of all countries in the region—both source and destination—as well as the principal extra-regional donors and resettlement countries. Moreover, it simultaneously addressed multiple aspects of the problem. As Betts (2009) observed, states supported the CPA because its provisions corresponded to their own security, immigration and trade interests. While criticizing implementing of parts of the agreement, Robinson (2004, p. 319) nevertheless concluded that the CPA was a “model of how interlocking commitments—to asylum, resettlement and repatriation — can promote regional cooperation in response to protracted refugee crises.”
CIREFCA took place in May 1989 as part of efforts to reinforce the recently adopted regional peace plan: “CIREFCA’s purpose was to seek a durable solution for the problems of refugees, returnees and displaced persons within the framework of social and economic development in the region (Crisp 1994, para 6).” Despite some shortcomings, the overall process was shown by evaluators to be successful in reinforcing the regional peace process; achieving the commitment of governments to respect human rights and to attend to the needs of the uprooted; increasing consciousness about the responsibilities of states toward uprooted populations and reinforcing their legal protection; and attracting additional resources and directing them towards refugees, returnees and displaced persons (Crisp 1994). The evaluation offered lessons for future attempts at global responsibility-sharing that are highly pertinent to this report: “secure political commitment of the parties involved; establish follow-up mechanisms to encourage compliance, including flexible systems for tracking and evaluating projects to ensure needs are covered and resources are used effectively and efficiently; establish a neutral coordinating mechanism such as a UN joint support unit; and ensure access to adequate international funding (Crisp 1994, paragraph 21).

**Endnotes chapter 3**

1. This provision is relevant to this report in that responsibility-sharing is especially important in encouraging poor host countries to allow entry to all refugees, not just those who are able to work and support themselves.
2. For example, passports.
3. “The High Contracting Parties ... considering that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United Nations has recognized the international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved without international cooperation” (UN General Assembly 1951, p. 13).
4. Policy Perspectives on Responsibility-Sharing in the MENA Region

4.1 Introduction

Gatherings by world leaders to discuss refugees and displaced persons sheds light on the priorities and perspectives on responsibility sharing of governments within the MENA region as well as important neighbors such as Turkey. Several such conferences took place in 2016, including the Supporting Syria Conference on 4 February, the UN High Level Meeting Addressing Large Scale Movements of Refugees and Migrants on 19 September, and the Leaders’ Summit on 20 September. As this report assesses similarities and differences in perceptions of, as well as facts about actual responsibility-sharing, the statements are valuable in understanding how the countries in MENA project their needs, justify their positions, and explain their expectations of the international community.

The High Level Meeting was particularly relevant to our analysis. It was motivated by concerns about mass displacement. In opening the summit, Peter Thomson,¹ President of the 71st Session of the General Assembly, summarized the situation as follows:

We are witnessing the worst humanitarian and refugee crisis since the Second World War. Millions are fleeing armed conflict and the brutal effects of war. Others are escaping violence, persecution; and systematic violations of their human rights. Some are uprooting their lives in response to the adverse effects of climate change and natural disasters. And others still are in search of opportunity and a better life for their children (Thomson 2016, p. 1).
Attended by Presidents, Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers, the summit adopted the New York Declaration which set out principles and common understandings about large scale movements and committed to develop global compacts on refugees and on safe, regular and orderly migration by 2018.

Not surprisingly, given the large number of refugees in the region, governments of MENA countries played an important role in the summit preparations and negotiations. Ambassador Dina Kawar, Jordan’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, co-facilitated the preparations with Ambassador David Donoghue, Ireland’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations. She is credited, along with her colleague, with successfully shepherding the New York Declaration through multiple rounds of negotiations. At the summit itself, the region’s principal host (Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Egypt), origin (Syria, Iraq and Palestine), transit (Libya and Tunisia), and donor countries (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and United Arab Emirates) spoke. In some cases, countries play multiple roles (e.g., Iraq is a source and host of refugees). In addition, Turkey, as the host of the largest number of Syrian refugees, also participated in the dialogue.

Many of the responsibility-sharing issues that MENA countries raised were common to those discussed by countries in other regions. The focus, not surprisingly, was primarily on efforts needed to address the principal refugee and IDP situations within the MENA region. Clearly, the Syria and, to a somewhat lesser degree, Iraq crises were front and center in the minds of MENA governments, but equally strong calls were made to find solutions for Palestinian refugees. Few of the government statements referenced other MENA crises, though, such as Yemen, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Western Somalia and Libya.

The need for greater international cooperation was expressed by all of the countries, regardless of the role they played with regard to refugees. Source countries were most adamant about this need. The President of the Council of Ministers of Lebanon summarized the risks for his country: “barring a massive effort of the international community, Lebanon runs the risk of a serious collapse” (Salam 2016, p. 2). He continued in outlining the scale of Lebanon’s challenge: “What the Lebanese have done by harboring one million and a half Syrians for a population of four mil-
lion is unprecedented. What the Lebanese have done by spending close to US$15 billion—they do not have—in three years, to service the displaced Syrian population, is unprecedented. What the Lebanese have done by maintaining stability and order and safeguarding security with means they do not have, is unprecedented…” (Ibíd.).

Queen Rania of Jordan also raised the extreme impact on her country, noting: “In a country of 6.6 million Jordanians, we have opened our doors to 1.3 million Syrians fleeing violence in their homeland, just as we have opened our doors in the past to Palestinians, Iraqis, and others seeking a safe haven.” Foreign assistance to Jordan, she continued, is “barely covering one-third of the cost of hosting refugees” (Office of Her Majesty 2016). The general call for international cooperation was echoed by Iraq, which is both source and host country. The Director of the International Organization Department called on the international community to “stand with Iraq in the face of these dangerous global phenomena [terrorism and displacement]” (Barwary 2016, p. 2 [translated from the Arabic]).

Turkey, remarking that it hosts an estimated three million refugees, referenced that it has spent more than US$12 billion dollars for the Syrians alone, with contributions of only US$512 million from the international community (Cavusoglu 2016). In what was clearly an understatement, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs said, “We will continue to do what we can. But, we have to admit that this is not fair (sic)” (Ibid.). Turkey struck a pessimistic tone in talking about the future, lamenting that “our own experience shows that it is almost impossible to talk about burden sharing” (Ibid.). Interestingly, in earlier years, Turkey asked for and received little international assistance for refugees within its borders, leaving it with a significant financial burden. According to Icduygu (2015), by early 2015, the cost of assistance for Syrians was more than US$ 5 billion. The international community covered only about three percent. Icduygu (2015, p. 1) goes on to explain: “Turkish reception policies were at the outset predicated on the assumption that the conflict would come to a swift conclusion” and the Syrians would repatriate. Moreover, as a mid-income country,
Turkey was not eligible for many of the forms of assistance available to low-income refugee hosts, a situation facing Jordan as well, as discussed below. It was only in the context of the European Union-Turkey agreement on curtailing movements across the Aegean Sea that substantial levels of aid were pledged. In November 2015, the €3 billion Facility for Refugees in Turkey was established “to deliver efficient and complementary support to Syrian and other refugees and host communities in close cooperation with Turkish authorities in 2016-2017” (ECHO 2017).

Donor governments in MENA also raised the importance of international efforts, particularly within the context of the United Nations. Kuwait, for example, “believes in the importance of joint international efforts to address the excruciating challenges that face the world today.” (Al Sabah 2016, p. 2 [translated from the Arabic]). Kuwait emphasized that “the United Nations continues to be the right place to conduct international and multilateral work that meets our expectations and demands, to monitor and evaluate what has so far been achieved of the steps to deal with humanitarian crises around the world that challenge our global peace and security” (Al-Sabah 2016, p. 3 [translated from the Arabic]). Similarly, the UAE called on the international community to shoulder the joint responsibility of protecting refugees and supporting host countries.

While the High Level Meeting was policy-oriented, the February donors’ conference and the Leaders’ Summit aimed at concrete commitments from states. The donors’ conference was hosted by UK, Germany, Kuwait, Norway, and the United Nations with the aim of raising “significant new funding to meet the immediate and longer-term needs of those affected.” It led to more than US$ 12 billion in pledges with half for 2016 and the other half for 2017-20. The focus went beyond the needs of refugees and displaced persons to encompass a broader range of humanitarian concerns inside Syria and the surrounding region. Important focuses of attention were education and jobs for those affected by the Syrian crisis. Similarly, the Leaders’ Summit aimed at pledges although these were focused more specifically at refugees and required states to commit to new or additional efforts in three areas: resettlement of refugees, financial contributions to refugee assistance, and provisions for education and employment for refugees.
More specifically, throughout the three gatherings, governments called for responsibility-sharing through 1) higher levels and more effective types of financial aid, 2) more aggressive steps to address causes of displacement; 3) renewed efforts to find solutions for refugees and displaced persons, and 4) new initiatives to increase the technical expertise and capacities of host countries.

The next sections aim to describe these four mechanisms highlighted by governments in the region to ensure responsibility-sharing.

### 4.2 Financial Aid

The host countries in the region were the most specific in their calls for the financial assistance that they need to serve both refugees and local host populations. The need for donors to move from a sole focus on humanitarian aid towards development assistance was a consistent theme. Lebanon asked for intensification of funding for development projects at local and regional levels as well as a fundraising effort for the UNRWA “to address vital humanitarian needs, ensure a sustainable pursuit of its educational programs and complete the reconstruction of the Nahr el Bared Palestinian camp” (Salam 2016). The Permanent Observer Mission of the State of Palestine also called for increased support for UNRWA, saying the agency “has helped to alleviate the plight of our refugees” (Al-Hamdallah 2016, p. 2 [translated from the Arabic]). Referencing critical funding gaps for UNRWA, he asked for sustained and predictable support commensurate with growing needs.

The need for new approaches to aid was echoed in a number of statements. Jordan in its plenary and roundtable statements referenced Jordan’s plan to establish 18 special economic zones to create jobs for both Syrians and Jordanians. At the February donors’ conference, Jordan asked for help to support “Jordan’s growth agenda whilst maintaining its resilience and economic stability (Jordan Compact 2016, p.1),” noting three aims:

1. Turning the Syrian refugee crisis into a development opportunity that attracts new investments and opens up the EU market with simplified rules of origin, creating jobs for Jordanians and Syrian refugees whilst supporting the post-conflict Syrian economy;
2. Rebuilding Jordanian host communities by adequately financing through grants the Jordan Response Plan 2016-2018, in particular the resilience of host communities; and

3. Mobilizing sufficient grants and concessionary financing to support the macroeconomic framework and address Jordan’s financing needs over the next three years, as part of Jordan entering into a new Extended Fund Facility program with the IMF (Ibid.).

At the High Level Meeting Queen Rania of Jordan emphasized that financing for the zones requires multiple parties working together: “public and private, humanitarian and development, donor and host” (Office of Her Majesty 2016). Egypt referenced the burden of providing health and education services to refugees and asked for “enhanced cooperation in supporting economic development” (Al-Sisi 2016, p. 4). Iraq asked for support for medical, social assistance, and “psychological rehabilitation for [those] who have experienced rape and other forms of cruel, degrading and inhumane treatment,” quicker delivery of international aid for IDPs and refugees, and help from the international community in providing ways for refugees to integrate into society and live in a way that preserves their dignity (Barwary 2016, p. 2). Turkey did not request specific forms of aid but did reference the World Humanitarian Summit, which took place in Istanbul in May 2016 and emphasized the need for greater collaboration between humanitarian and development partners. At the February donors conference, Lebanon emphasized the importance of international funding, stating: “The Government of Lebanon affirms that the success of the Conference in London will depend on how international partners respond to this vision and support Lebanon to uphold the central pillars of providing humanitarian assistance, education for all, and the expansion of economic opportunities and jobs (Lebanon 2016, p. 5).”

The donor governments in the region recognized the disproportionate impact on the primary origin countries and reported on their financial contributions to help offset their burden. In doing so, members of the Gulf Cooperation Council emphasized that they too host large numbers of Syrians and others fleeing conflict. The Saudi crown prince said that his country welcomed more than 2.5 million Syrians but did
not consider them to be refugees. Nor, he said, did Saudi Arabia establish refugee camps, “so to preserve their dignity and integrity” (Al Arbiya 2016). Instead, he noted, the Syrians have freedom of movement, work permits and access to free healthcare. Kuwait, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar made similar statements with regard to the smaller numbers they host. Presumably, many of the Syrians are in the GCC countries as migrant workers. They are not counted as refugees by UNHCR, which has liaison offices in some of the GCC countries but does not register refugees. None of the countries indicated if they follow the non-refoulement policy that prevents states from forcibly returning refugees to their countries of origin. Non-refoulement is a norm applying to all countries under customary international law (UNHCR 1994).

The donors cited their contributions to the international refugee system from government and private sources as an important form of responsibility sharing. Using different metrics, it is difficult to compare the levels of assistance but it is clear that the countries themselves see them as significant. Kuwait said it ranked first in providing humanitarian aid in comparison to gross national income in 2015 and had provided US$2 billion over the past five years (Al-Sabah 2016). Saudi Arabia announced it ranked third in the world in providing humanitarian relief and development assistance, US$139 billion over the past four decades (Tarak 2016). Qatar noted its aid of US$1.7 billion to Syrian relief since 2011, while the UAE announced it had contributed more than US$600 million in humanitarian and development aid to Syrians in refugee camps and additional support to the Mrajeeb Al Fhood camp for Syrian refugees in Jordan (Al-Muraikhi 2016; Emirates News Agency 2015).

4.3 Causes of Refugee Movements

Many of the statements at the high level meeting focused on the need to address the causes of refugee movements in the MENA region. As the UAE summarized, the causes include poverty, conflicts, and extremist violence (Emirates News Agency 2015). The Prime Minister of the State of Palestine elaborated, stating that the root causes of displacement included “wars and armed conflicts, including foreign oc-
occupation; oppression and persecution; discrimination and human rights violations” as well as terrorism, natural disasters and climate change, and poverty, unemployment and food insecurity (Al-Hamdallah 2016, p. 2).

Collective action, including through the United Nations, was seen as necessary to address these problems. Egypt stated “we strongly believe in the importance of collective work in addressing the root causes of this crisis” (Al-Sisi 2016, p. 2). Yet, Lebanon asked pointedly, “when is the UN going to stand up to the task and significantly rally efforts to help refugees and migrants in observance of its number one responsibility: safeguarding peace and security?” (Salam 2016, p.2). Speakers generally supported swift political solutions to the conflicts that produce massive displacement. Since a number of the MENA countries and their neighbors are themselves involved in the conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, the challenges of this approach are obvious. Qatar emphasized, however, that failing to end these conflicts are serious threats to national and regional peace and security. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, referring to the terms of reference in the UN Charter, urged the use of mediation as a way to peaceably settle conflicts (Al-Muraikhi 2016). UAE broadened the approach, urging states to commit “to enhancing international cooperation for development, resolving conflicts through peaceful means and promoting values of tolerance, moderation and respect for sovereignty” (Emirates News Agency 2015). The statement from Kuwait added the necessity of working “through the respect and application of laws and international resolutions to arrive at a political solution to stop the bloodshed of innocent lives” (Al-Sabah 2016, p. 1). Tunisia emphasized the important role of the Sustainable Development Goals in addressing the underlying causes of migration, including in conflict settings (Al-Ghinawa 2016).

Not surprisingly, source countries experiencing conflict and extremist violence also commented on the root causes. Iraq referenced armed conflict along with terrorism as major factors. The statement asked for support from the international community in the “prosecution of criminals from Daesh and the sending of a message to all perpetrators of these crimes that there will be no impunity” (Barwary 2016, p. 2 [translated from the Arabic]). In contrast to Ambassador Barwary’s statement, which referred to Iraqi refugees, Minister Counsellor Munther of Syria used the term
'migrant,' not 'refugee,' in describing the Syrians who have left the country. His statement did not cite conflict as a cause of movement, instead listing terrorism, Israel's occupation of Arab Territories, external interference in internal affairs, enforced economic policies, brain drain, and the looting of people’s resources as the major factors. The difference in perspectives about the causes of displacement, as well as the terminology used in describing the victims, is significant in framing the nature of the international cooperation sought. Syria recommended that the U.N. 1) stop terrorism and “assume its responsibilities in addressing the migration of tens of thousands of terrorists and foreign mercenaries from over 100 of the Member States to join terrorist organizations;” 2) “end the unilateral coercive measures imposed on the Syrian people by some states;” and 3) “support the efforts to find a peaceful political solution to the Syrian crisis on the basis of an inclusive national dialogue between Syrians themselves, separate from external pressures and agendas” (Munzer 2016, p. 2 [translated from the Arabic]).

Some of the transit states in the region brought up facilitating factors in large movements of refugees and migrants in addition to root causes. Libya, Tunisia and Turkey—all countries through which asylum-seekers have transited to Europe—focused on irregular migration, human smuggling and trafficking as important facets and drivers of these movements. Libya acknowledged that the “organized crime networks involved in smuggling and human trafficking are exploiting the security situation in Libya, leading to further instability” (Siala 2016, p. 2 [translated from the Arabic]). Effective responses, he said, require concerted regional and international efforts. Turkey noted that “through the tireless efforts of our relevant authorities, we were able to decrease irregular migration in the Aegean Sea by 95 percent in the last six months,” but also said that unilateral efforts cannot be sufficient to cope with this global problem” (Cavusoglu 2016, p. 1). Rather, the “world needs a better strategy to deal with irregular migration. And, we need it urgently” (Cavusoglu 2016). Tunisia addressed not only the transit of irregular migrants from other countries but also the loss of hundreds of Tunisians who died in the Mediterranean following the revolution in Tunisia. The statement cited the relief and shelter provided to those who come by boat to Tunisia but highlights that assistance is limited in the absence of genuine international solidarity (Al-Ghinawa 2016).
4.4 Solutions

The discussion of solutions at the High Level Meeting was often presented as the flip side of causes—if the international community did a better job at addressing the precipitating factors in flight, more refugees and IDPs would have solutions. Hence, conflict resolution is the best solution for refugees and IDPs. Recognizing, however, that conflicts would persist, the MENA countries also proposed other solutions to be achieved through responsibility-sharing. These focused on the three traditional durable solutions: repatriation, local integration and resettlement.

Lebanon was most specific with regard to the first solution—return of Syrians when conditions in that country permit. This is perhaps not surprising, given the absolute numbers, proportional impact of refugees, and internal ethnic and sectarian politics of Lebanon. The recommendation put forth was specific. The government asked the UN to “draft, within 3 months, a detailed logistical mapping of the return in safety and dignity of the Syrians now in Lebanon to Syria, specifying transportation needs, departure locations and all associated costs. Raising the financing for this plan should be started immediately. This will allow, when circumstances permit, a swift implementation” (Salam 2016, p. 1).

Several countries in the region highlighted the need, as stated by the Prime Minister of the State of Palestine, for a “just solution to the plight of Palestinian refugees, including respect for their right of return, in accordance with resolution 194 (III)” passed by the General Assembly in 1948 (Al-Hamdallah 2016, p. 4). A number of countries also called for enhanced resettlement of refugees. Lebanon recommended “burden-sharing quotas for countries in the region and elsewhere” and urged the UN to “negotiate the enactment of resettlement efforts before year-end” (Salam 2016). Turkey referred to resettlement as a key instrument (Cavusoglu 2016). While Egypt did not specifically mention resettlement, the government did call for “opening more channels for legal migration” as a solution to the growth in irregular migration (Al-Sisi 2016, p. 3). The Leaders’ Summit led to concrete pledges to resettle additional refugees. The United Arab Emirates committed to resettle 15,000 Syrian refugees over a five-year period (Gulf News 2016).
None of the host country statements at the High Level Meeting called for full integration of refugees into their communities as it is often conceived—that is, as a route to naturalization. They perceive the refugees as temporary visitors even if (or because of) past experience in the region that displacement often becomes long-term. However, they did emphasize the importance of integrating refugees into the health services, education, and even labor markets of their countries. Such integration would broaden the social rights of refugees even if they did not offer political rights. Jordan, as discussed above, discussed the income-generating opportunities that its special economic zones would offer to refugees and citizens alike (Office of Her Majesty 2016). Egypt and Lebanon referred to efforts to help refugees gain more secure access to education, health, housing and food security. All of these initiatives, they argued, required the support of the international community; otherwise the full burdens would fall only on the host countries.

Finally, in support of more effective solutions for refugees and in keeping with the UN Secretary General’s new initiative to combat xenophobia, a number of countries called for stronger efforts to combat xenophobia and racism. Egypt referred to the alarming manifestations of xenophobia and racial discrimination as sources of societal rejection for receiving refugees in host countries (Al-Sisi 2016). Qatar also raised concerns for the “growing hatred of foreigners and the use of hate speech and racism,” which contributes to the spread of extremism and “has devastating consequences on societies hosting refugees and migrants” (Al-Muraikhi 2016, p. 2). Kuwait stated “we must move forward in the fight against hate, contempt for foreigners known as ‘xenophobia,’ intolerance, and violence against refugees and migrants, especially on the basis of religion or race. We must help them realize their desires to live a free and dignified life in peace and security” (Al-Sabah 2016, p. 2).

4.5 Education, Technical Assistance and Training

There was less discussion of technical assistance and training than there was for other aspects of responsibility-sharing. Iraq asked for the international community’s support in training “government employees in the ministries and organizations that have a relationship to migration and displacement on the provision of first aid
for the displaced and contributions to solving the problems of refugees and asylum seekers” (Barwary 2016, p. 2). Iraq also requested greater presence of the international community in the country, “especially in light of the economic fallout in Iraq in the last year that affected the capacity of the state to respond to the large wave of displacement and hosting non-Iraqi refugees in Iraq” (Barwary 2016, p. 2).

What was prevalent in the statements was strong endorsement of education for refugees as a priority in humanitarian relief. All of the host countries detailed their efforts, despite severe financial constraints, to provide education to refugees within their countries. Queen Rania of Jordan urged participants at the high level meeting to “think of these children—the past they escaped, and the potential they hold” (Office of Her Majesty 2016, para 17). Qatar echoed these sentiments, stating “we cannot disregard the right of education, which should be mandatory and available to all refugee children. Education contributes to empowering children and protects them from exploitation and extremism” (Al-Muraikhi 2016, p. 2). Then, Qatar, as a donor, remarked of the international system that “surprisingly the budgeted allocation for education in emergency situations is only two percent of total humanitarian aid” (Al-Muraikhi 2016, p. 2).

4.6 Conclusion

These official public statements are significant in so far as they capture how countries in the MENA region communicate responsibility-sharing within the region and with the broader international community. Regardless of their own domestic, economic, or foreign policy reasons, host, source, donor and transit countries alike emphasize the severe and often disproportionate impact of refugees and IDPs on the region. States closely involved as combatants or funders in the conflicts leading to displacement raise these impacts without reference to their own roles. Instead, they urge enhanced regional and international cooperation to address the causes and find solutions to displacement. They also highlight the need for greater social and economic rights for refugees, with special attention to education of children and youth, while seeking support from the international community in carrying out new programs to achieve these results. The statements demonstrated two models
within the MENA region with regard to the legal status of Syrians as well as their access to employment. One set of host countries—Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt and Iraq—have allowed UNHCR to register Syrians as refugees but have limited the refugees’ access to employment. A second set of countries, mostly in the Gulf Cooperation Council, have allowed Syrians to come as labor migrants, with full access to employment but not necessarily to legal protections, such as non-refoulement (non-forcible return). Finding a hybrid model that would offer both types of protection—legal and economic—is a challenge for all countries, regardless of whether they have ratified the UN Refugee Convention or not.

Most countries see the United Nations as a venue for fostering international cooperation, but interestingly, with the exception of frequent calls for more support for UNRWA, there were few references to the other international organizations that are most engaged with these issues—the UNHCR and International Organization for Migration (Qatar mentions donations to UNHCR and Egypt mentions working with both organizations). In the case of UNHCR, this may be because most of the countries are not Parties to the UN Refugee Convention and have not had the exposure to UNHCR that is seen in other regions. In the case of IOM, it may be because the organization is associated with labor migration in the region, not large scale displacement.

Endnotes chapter 4

1. Thomson is Fiji’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations.
2. https://www.supportingsyria2016.com/about/
3. As of 2013 (two years into the Syrian crisis), there were one million Syrians reported to be in Saudi Arabia, up significantly from 112,000 in 2010 before the demonstrations in Syria began. These numbers are reported in the World Bank’s bilateral migration data (http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaiissues/brief/migrationremittances-data).
4. Independent sources confirm the growing role of the Gulf states as humanitarian donors. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ financial tracking system, for example, shows Saudi Arabia’s contributions of US$796.8 million in 2014 and $570.3 million in 2015. This is roughly comparable to Sweden’s contributions of $958.2m and US$628.4m in 2014 and 2015, respectively.
5. Operational Perspectives on Responsibility-Sharing in the MENA Region

5.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on responsibility-sharing from the perspective of key stakeholders in the MENA region who work with or on behalf of refugees, other displaced persons, and in some cases, the local host population. They represent actors assuming ‘de facto’ responsibility for ensuring that the refugee system functions properly. Therefore, understanding their perceptions is essential to the purposes of this study. This delves into questions of ‘who contributes what’ and how these contributions can be enhanced and built upon through more effective responsibility-sharing. A prerequisite to analysing which actors are assuming ‘de facto’ responsibility for refugees is a thorough grounding in the major challenges for refugees, or clarity on the responsibilities these actors are fulfilling. All of the 34 stakeholders interviewed were asked about the most pressing problems for refugees that their agency, organization, or research endeavours to address (see Appendix C, Interview Guide for Stakeholder Interviews.) The answers to these questions resulted in a rich and detailed picture of the challenges refugees face in each country of study. This chapter offers a map of the major challenges for refugees and the organizations that serve them in the five countries of study, broken down by sector.

This chapter begins with the major challenges as identified by these stakeholders. It opens with thematic challenges and then discusses institutional constraints. Finally, it focuses on actions recommended by stakeholders to improve responsibility-sharing on the ground. These recommendations are addressed to donors, international organizations and host governments.
5.2 Major Thematic Challenges

The major challenges identified by stakeholders fall into six categories: protection and legal problems faced by refugees; livelihoods; education; health services; problems faced by non-Syrian refugees; and lack of durable solutions.

5.2.1. Protection and Legal Problems

Early in the course of our research it was clear that legal protection is one of the most pressing challenges for refugees in countries of first asylum. Protection—including valid legal status and basic safety and security in the country of asylum—was frequently identified as a prerequisite for livelihoods, education, access to medical care, and other basic services for refugees.

At the broadest level, stakeholders pointed to violations of international refugee and human rights law by major refugee-hosting states that had little to no ramifications for those host states. For several of the organizations with whom we spoke, this reflects the geopolitical reality whereby the international community is so dependent on major refugee-hosting countries that there is a reluctance to criticize them for such actions. A prime example of this phenomenon is the December 2015 deportation of approximately 800 Sudanese asylum-seekers and refugees from Jordan, over 100 of whom were interrogated upon their arrival in Khartoum (Davis et al. 2016). According to a legal services provider in Jordan, the deportation of individuals seeking asylum back to the country where they are fleeing persecution is a violation of the Refugee Convention and, potentially, the Convention against Torture, among other international human rights norms.

A number of stakeholders working in Turkey mentioned the EU-Turkey Agreement (2016), which has taken effect and manifested in the return of 578 migrants from Europe to Turkey under the one-to-one provision of the deal (IOM 2016c, p.1). Stakeholder sentiments towards the agreement were fairly unanimous: a US based humanitarian organization with operations in Turkey said that it represented the “gradual chipping away of the international protection regime” for refugees, and a
Turkish lawyer working with refugees in Turkey called the readmission agreement “ridiculous.”

Protection issues also arise in other arenas. First, the lack of personal status documentation becomes a major problem. Many refugees arrive in countries without proper documentation—often destroyed, lost, or left behind in their countries of origin. This has particular implications for Syrians coming to Turkey without personal IDs or other forms of documentation; this can lead to long delays in their registration with the appropriate authorities and thus access to services for refugees. Personal status issues also extend to other dimensions of refugee life. Some Syrian marriages, for example, are not recognized under Jordanian law. In Syria, particularly in the rural areas, marriages are not officially registered, and the union is blessed by a local religious leader. If a Syrian couple has a new baby in Jordan and their marriage is not recognized under Jordanian law, the Jordanian authorities will not issue a birth certificate for the child, which in turn precludes the family from registering the baby with the UNHCR. Similar problems of refugees accessing documentation were observed in Egypt and Lebanon particularly and, to a lesser extent, in Turkey and Iraq.

Second, many refugees, Syrian and non-Syrian alike, face legal problems surrounding the issue of work (see Section 5.2.2 below for more information on livelihoods). Because most refugees cannot work legally, employers often exploit their refugee workers. In many cases, they refuse to pay wages, as refugees have virtually no legal recourse under the legal codes in any of the five countries of asylum studied.

Third, because the vast majority of refugees in all five countries of study live in urban areas outside of camps, they must secure rented accommodations. One of the legal service providers we interviewed in Jordan indicated that many refugees, particularly Syrians, cannot fulfil the financial obligations of rental contracts that they sign. Problems between landlords and refugees often occur as a result. The service provider explained that this problem mostly affects Syrian refugees; Iraqis, for example, have been in Jordan for longer than the Syrians and are thus more accustomed to navigating Jordanian law. Similar problems with difficulties in paying
rent were also explicitly mentioned by stakeholders in Lebanon and Egypt.

Fourth, the physical safety of refugees in countries of asylum also represents an important issue. While threats to refugees’ safety in countries of asylum certainly affect Syrians, stakeholders mostly referred to the experiences of non-Syrian refugees. A legal services NGO employee in Egypt underscored this issue: “Sudanese, Ethiopians, Somalis, Eritreans, and others... experience daily violence and extreme levels of harassment and discrimination”. This is due in large part to their visibility. The color of African refugees’ skin is relatively darker than most of the largely Arab host community, and thus they stand out as outsiders.

Fifth, refugees experience challenges in obtaining and maintaining a legal residency permit in countries of first asylum. An employee of a large INGO covering the MENA region reported that the problem is widespread in Lebanon, with approximately 70 percent of all Syrian refugees there living without a residency permit, as the government asked UNHCR to stop registering Syrians as refugees in March 2015, which has precluded them from obtaining legal status in the country. The government’s stance on Syrian refugees can be explained by Lebanon’s previous experience with the Palestinians and the conflicting attitudes of Lebanon’s political parties towards the Syria conflict (Janmeyr 2016, p. 7). Similarly, in Egypt, an Egyptian lawyer working with Syrian refugees indicated that obtaining a residency visa in Egypt was next to impossible for many Syrian refugees there because of lengthy waiting times, bureaucratic red tape, and difficulty and expense in renewing identification documents through the Syrian embassy. The punishment for not maintaining a residency visa can be imprisonment. A Syrian lawyer in Egypt indicated that Egyptian police conduct regular sweeps of predominantly Syrian neighborhoods and arrest everyone who does not have a valid residency. This translates into a major concern among refugees; the Syrian director of a community-based education organization in Egypt said that he endangers himself daily by meeting and teaching groups of Syrian refugees because he himself does not have a residency permit and is thus vulnerable to arrest at any time.
5.2.2 Livelihoods

Refugees’ ability to work is key to their ability to sustain themselves and their families in countries of asylum. The ability to work legally also marks a degree of integration into the host economy (that some refugee-hosting countries have resisted) as well as a clear move from humanitarian response to more sustainable, development-oriented approach, one of the main commitments of actors at the World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016 (World Humanitarian Summit 2016, p. 11) and the High Level Meeting in September 2016. While some countries of asylum, namely Jordan and Turkey, have committed to provide work permits for Syrian refugees, stakeholders reported that accessing such permits was almost impossible in reality. An employee from an international NGO operating throughout the region indicated that there were a number of problems, including restrictions on where refugees can work and complicated application processes. Lebanon stands in contrast to these countries in its staunch refusal to consider offering work permits to refugees. In fact, one stakeholder reported that in 2015, the Lebanese authorities began asking refugees to sign pledges not to work in order to curb the widespread employment of refugees on the black market.

The livelihoods situation for refugees in Iraqi Kurdistan, where 98 percent of Syrian refugees in Iraq have sought refuge, illustrates how livelihoods prospects for refugee, IDP, and host communities throughout the MENA region are intertwined (UNHCR 2016m, p. 6). “Because of the economic crisis in Kurdistan, IDPs, locals, and Syrians are all suffering when it comes to job opportunities,” noted a Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) official. While she reported that Syrians in the KRG had jobs and in some cases were more likely to be employed than the host community, they were still struggling. This reflects the reality that making ends meet is difficult for refugees, other displaced populations, and host communities alike across the MENA region. Other stakeholders emphasized the importance of keeping in mind refugees’ relative vulnerability compared to the host community. “There are opportunity costs in everything a refugee does. Anything you accomplish can be gone in a second,” said a legal aid service provider in Egypt, referring to the exploitation of refugees by employers and the lack of legal recourse in Egyptian courts for refugees.
During the discussions about livelihoods with stakeholders, the waste of human resources was a prominent theme. “You really kill the spirit of people if you do not let them work,” said a representative of a Syrian-led organization based in the United States. In Egypt, refugees are rarely allowed to work legally, as the government made no commitment to expand work permits for refugees. The director of an education program for Syrian refugees in Egypt, explained the consequences of the situation: “There are over 3,000 Syrian teachers here in Cairo, and they do not have jobs because they are not allowed to work. It would be great if we could employ those teachers to run our own schools, and that would lessen pressure on Egyptian schools.”

Stakeholders also noted that refugees were concerned about losing their benefits, such as financial aid or food aid, if they are legally able to work; refugees with jobs are considered generally to be less vulnerable than jobless refugees, and as such they are less likely to receive assistance from the UN or other aid-giving agencies. In the case of Syrians in Turkey, an employee of an INGO explained, this issue is compounded by the fact that what a refugee could make working for minimum wage in Turkey is generally less than what vulnerable refugees would receive in the form of shelter support, food aid, etc. In Grabska’s study of Sudanese refugees in Egypt, a similar situation can be seen. Grabska explains that refugees often perceive the policies of aid-giving organizations as not rewarding those refugees who show resourcefulness in solving their own problems. It was seen that those who are self-sufficient are cut off from assistance, and refugees were concerned that if they were seen to be doing “too well,” they would not be considered for resettlement to a third country (Grabska 2006, p. 301). In short, refugees felt that those who are managing to support their families via formal or informal employment will be denied access to material aid or resettlement opportunities, and this tension—between wanting to support their families but also to be able to access assistance available to them—must be recognized and addressed.
5.2.3 Education

The lack of access to education for school-age refugees is a problem across all countries of study. In Egypt, most refugees may attend public schools. Due to a range of problems, including security concerns on the commute to school, discrimination in the classroom and the overall quality of education, many refugees attend community schools rather than public schools. In particular, Syrians attend community schools set up by Syrian community-based organizations. However, these schools are not accredited or authorized to operate by the Egyptian government. Because of the lack of accreditation of many community schools, one Syrian community leader said that an area where the international community could be especially helpful would be in expanding educational opportunities for refugees. The respondent suggested that refugee schools should be provided with materials relevant to the American or Swedish curriculum and receive the corresponding accreditation. The perception among refugees and refugee-led organizations is that Syrian students would have more higher education opportunities abroad if they graduated high school with an American or Swedish high school certificate rather than, for example, an Egyptian or Jordanian high school degree. Refugees largely perceive their situations in countries of asylum like Egypt and Jordan to be temporary and hope to secure better futures for their children. The community leader suggested that such a measure would also better prepare those few families selected for refugee resettlement for life in resettlement countries.

This extends to other countries as well. In Turkey, the issue surrounds language. One service provider reported that Syrian school-aged children cannot attend Turkish schools until they speak Turkish well enough, resulting in delays in schooling and often leaving them to rely on a network of community schools as well. The scale of refugee children out of school is quite concerning. An education service provider indicated that of the approximately 450,000 school-aged refugees in Lebanon, 155,000 refugees accessed schooling in 2015, but the number dropped to 97,000 children in 2016. Another organization providing education services to Syrian refugees in Lebanon indicated that around 70 percent of education for Syrian refugee children is informal; public schools are overcrowded and most are divided into
morning and afternoon shifts. Because many informal schools are not accredited and thus cannot issue formal graduation certificates, according to the organization providing education to Syrians in Lebanon, parents do not see the value in sending their children to school and often pull them out. The stakeholder indicated that without a graduation certificate, refugees cannot continue their studies, even in non-academic pursuits like vocational training.

5.2.4 Health and Mental Health Services

In all countries of study, stakeholders reported that the health systems, where they are open to refugees, were overburdened and did not have the capacity for refugees to access basic medical care. Lebanon serves as an example. Legal status is required for refugees to access public and some private healthcare facilities. Not all Syrians are registered with UNHCR, however (see Appendix A for additional information about registration). As a result, large numbers of Syrian refugees in Lebanon receive little to no health assistance. Even those who are eligible find barriers to obtaining healthcare. A Lebanese stakeholder indicated that the existing medical system in Lebanon is quite weak, and that one must have money to access services of quality. Under the current arrangement with the Lebanese government, 75 percent of medical expenses are covered for Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR. In the case of Turkey, language appears once more as a problem for refugees. Accessing healthcare in Turkish hospitals is quite challenging because most refugees do not speak Turkish, and doctors and other hospital staff do not speak Arabic.

Access to health services is complicated by the large number of refugees in urban areas in the MENA region as well as the presence of chronic health care needs among the refugees. A study that members of this research team undertook on health care mainstreaming in Jordan in 2012 was based on interviews with both stakeholders and refugees and showed a hybrid system of mainstreamed and refugee-specific services. According to stakeholders, the complexity of the Jordanian system made it difficult for refugees to navigate the mainstream services (Martin and Taylor 2012, p. 5). At the same time, the mainstream services did not necessarily have knowledge of refugee needs or services that were specific to those needs. In
particular, stakeholders cited the absence of mental health services for refugees who had experienced significant trauma. Donors and UNHCR were pressing for a shift from refugee specific to mainstream services, an approach which aligns with present-day stakeholder perspectives that there was little for refugees beyond basic primary care. Stakeholders recommended that donors channel more money to building the capacity of national health systems rather than funding small-scale clinics or health projects for refugees (Martin and Taylor 2012, p. 8).

The US State Department’s approach to this issue serves as an interesting study of how the international community can respond to such challenges. The United States funded two programs: the first focused on orienting refugees to the Jordanian community health system, while the second provided funds to the Jordanian health ministry to improve access for refugees, particularly to emergency room services (Martin and Taylor 2012). However, two issues remained problematic: First, access to health care services for older refugees with chronic or emergency needs. Such care is expensive and raises serious ethical and practical issues because a few cases could expend all available resources. As one report cited, “Operational ambiguities (e.g. not knowing what has already been expended for health care, what excess the budget might permit, what process to follow for higher level permission, will future funds be available for expensive chronic cases) make a difficult ethical decision even more difficult” (Leaning et al. 2011, p. 2). Second, obtaining mental health services through the public system still remained elusive for refugees and the principal provider of refugee specific mental health services reported that the need for services among [refugees] outweighed the available resources (Martin and Taylor 2011, p. 10).

5.2.5 Needs of Non-Syrian Refugees

Service providers working with non-Syrian populations in the MENA region all referred to the shift of international interest, and therefore funding, to Syrian refugees, over recent years. An organization working with Palestinian refugees said that it is an issue of numbers, as there are more Syrians than any other refugee population in region, and that there is simply not enough money available. This is taking
place at a global scale as well. An American organization working with refugees across the world added that it was much more difficult to find funds for programs for refugees elsewhere in the world. The interviewee observed “Try finding funding for a program in Burundi.... [It is] virtually impossible.”

Stakeholders in the region told us that “everything is geared towards Syrians now, which effectively locks out other refugees.” For example, the term “other affected populations” is often used in Jordan to refer to non-Syrian refugees, but they are often not identified by their legal status (i.e., as asylum-seekers) or their nationality (Iraqi, Somali, Sudanese, etc.). In Egypt, another stakeholder observed that because there was more programming and aid focused on the Syrian refugee population than on other refugee communities of other nationalities, “Syrians seem to be getting by better. [They] just don’t seem to have as severe problems as non-Syrians—evictions, exploitation, etc.”

“Just include everybody else, why not?” asked a stakeholder in Jordan. For many groups we interviewed the shift of focus on Syrians and away from other displaced groups also in need of assistance is a major consequence of the MENA countries’ response to refugees being ad hoc and not based in any clear or coherent policy. “There is nothing in Jordanian law about how refugees will be engaged, and the Memorandum of Understanding [between UNHCR and the Jordanian government] is reinterpreted to mean many different things,” explained a legal service provider in Jordan. The effect of this is that most programming for refugees is open to donor interests, and donors are largely uninterested in any refugee populations other than Syrians at the moment.

5.2.6 Lack of Solutions

Another theme that emerged from the stakeholder interviews was the inadequacy of the framework of the three durable solutions—return, integration, or resettlement—in capturing the options open to refugees and other displaced populations in the MENA region. As conflict and persecution continues unabated in Syria and major refugee-sending countries such as Iraq, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia,
and Afghanistan, it is difficult or impossible for refugees to safely return home. Integration in countries of asylum, the second durable solution, is also quite limited. As illustrated above, protection and legal problems and little access to education, health, and livelihoods renders integration prospects unlikely in the view of most stakeholders. A Syrian lawyer expressed his frustration at the barriers to refugee integration in Egypt and the international community’s response to these hindrances: “What does the UN and the international community expect?” he asked. “[Integration] is not a tenable option for people who cannot get a residency permit, but no one seems to want to do anything about it.” Finally, the third durable solution, resettlement, is also not a viable option for most refugees, as under the current international arrangement, with relatively low resettlement quotas in countries of resettlement, less than one percent of the 14.4 million persons of concern to UNHCR will be resettled. In the absence of the possibility to return home or to integrate, resettlement represents the only durable solution for many refugees. Resettlement represents an attractive prospect for many refugees who feel caught in such an impossible situation. Thus, stakeholders have called for a significant expansion of the international refugee resettlement program as a primary way that the international community can support refugees. This recommendation will be discussed in further detail at the end of this section.

5.3 Major Policy, Institutional and Funding Challenges

Addressing the sectoral challenges in a way that promotes international responsibility-sharing is difficult because of policy, institutional and funding challenges highlighted by the stakeholders.

5.3.1 Lack of Clear Policies

National policies and priorities drive priorities for responsibility-sharing but countries in the region do not always have the capacity or political will to fulfil their obligations. Many service providers stated that it is the domestic legal frameworks dealing with refugees in the MENA region in Turkey—or the lack thereof, in the cases
of the other countries of study—that result in many of the problems for refugees.

State policy towards refugees differs significantly by country. In Egypt, while the state is a signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and there exists a complex patchwork of domestic policies that evolved in reaction to large refugee influxes, state-guaranteed refugee protections are quite weak in practice, with the government assuming what Norman has called “strategic ambivalence”. Egyptian authorities are aware of the migrant and refugee populations living within its borders but choose to take a more “hands-off” approach (Norman 2016, p. 347). The director of a major refugee service provider in Cairo reiterated this view, stating that the government of Egypt does not engage actively with its refugee population or the service providers who support them. However, another service provider in Egypt noted that the Egyptian government did involve itself when it felt that an NGO had gone too far and was criticizing the government. A number of NGOs working with refugees were shut down in 2014, and the remaining organizations are too fearful of meeting the same fate to engage meaningfully with the Egyptian government on refugee issues. An Egyptian lawyer commented that for the Egyptian government to engage properly, a ministry dealing exclusively with foreigners in Egypt should be created, instead of spreading the responsibility among four different ministries.

In Lebanon, where the influx of Syrian refugees was significantly larger than the refugee influx in Egypt, the government response was more coordinated, despite the fact that the government had been without a president for two and a half years (Chehayeb 2016). The Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) led the Lebanese government response to the displacement crisis in the initial years. In 2014, a crisis cell comprised of eight different ministers was created. Additionally, according to an interview with a UN agency, there are high levels of coordination and cooperation between UNHCR and the Lebanese government, with UNHCR funding several positions within Lebanese ministries, which marks an innovation in increasing coordination.

Turkey, by contrast, has numerous state policies and laws that explicitly address refugees. According to an employee of an American organization providing humanitarian assistance to Syrian refugees in Turkey, there is an impression that
Turkey has taken control of the refugee situation and that the state takes steps to ensure that NGOs, INGOs, and the UN have a hands-off role in managing refugee populations. Non-Turkish NGOs must obtain permission to work within certain sectors or provide certain services to refugees. A Syrian doctor working with refugees in Turkey observed that international organizations and their staff are not particularly welcome, as the Turkish government prefers Turkish NGOs to work with refugees. In 2015, Turkey created the Directorate-General for Migration Management (DGMM) under the Ministry of the Interior in 2015, which is the principal focus of responsibility for managing migrants and refugees living in Turkey (for more information, see Appendix A: MENA Country Profiles). While this institutional development would not be, in itself, problematic it was accompanied by efforts to limit the ability of international organizations to operate in Turkey. International staff members report problems accessing work and residency permits. Tensions between the Turkish government and international humanitarian organizations culminated in the expulsion of several prominent international NGOs from the country.

### 5.3.2 Coordination

A major theme among stakeholder interviews was the need for improved coordination among actors providing services to refugees. The coordination mechanisms, generally led by UN bodies, varied by country, but stakeholders across the region tended to agree that while attempts had been made to improve coordination, there is a great deal of room for improvement in several different areas. The problem, as one stakeholder in Lebanon put it, was that the lack of coordination led to a situation in which “lots of organizations are constantly re-inventing the wheel” instead of building off each other’s work and capacity. An employee of a UN agency in Lebanon gave an example: “In the winter, local [Lebanese and Syrian-led] organizations will go to areas where refugees live and distribute blankets, but [the UN] will have already arranged a distribution there, so there is significant duplication of efforts.” If coordination were better, the quality and efficiency of services for refugees could be vastly improved. A coordinated effort could avoid the duplication of functions in areas or sectors already saturated by service providers and neglect of under-served.
There were a number of barriers to coordination identified. An employee of a large INGO in Jordan indicated that the root of the problem is that coordination structures are set up in the early phase of displacement crises and in a way that is not inclusive of local and refugee-led organizations. When international organizations first set up in a country experiencing a large influx of refugees, the employee explained, they create structures as if there were no local government bodies or organizations on the ground. This allows for large amounts of aid to be delivered to affected populations quickly in the initial phase of a humanitarian crisis, but engagement with local organizations, refugee-led organizations, and local government bodies needs to be scaled up, and the barriers to better coordination among these groups addressed.

Stakeholders also pointed to other issues with coordination. The director of a service provider organization in Egypt indicated that high staff turnover rates and a lack of training among staff at UNHCR, the agency typically responsible for managing coordination mechanisms like sector working groups, contributed to a lack of coordination. Additionally, language was identified as a primary hindrance to coordination between local organizations, refugee-led organizations, and international organizations, but the particulars of that issue varied according to the country of asylum, and stakeholder views were mixed. Generally, Syrian-led organizations operate in Arabic and do not have a great deal of English language capacity, and international organizations employ primarily “international staff,” for whom their working language is English, and the majority of whom do not speak Arabic or other refugee or local languages. For one Syrian-led medical services organization in Jordan, language marked a major barrier for communication: “Syrians do not have a common language with the INGOS, so you have to have some intermediaries; the result is that there is no direct dialogue between [international] organizations and Syrian organizations.” In accordance with that view, an employee of a large international NGO in Jordan indicated that while there were sophisticated coordination mechanisms and regular sector meetings, the meetings were all run in English, effectively excluded much of the local (Jordanian) organizations, government representatives, and refugee-led organizations who did not speak English fluently. The employee lamented the fact that he did not speak Arabic and wondered just how much his organization was missing as a result. Other stakeholders interviewed did not feel as strongly. The director of a Syrian-led organization in Jordan said
that language was not such a problem because Jordanian government officials bring translators to meetings, she said, and most educated Jordanians and Syrians working in local and Syrian-led organizations spoke enough English to participate in the meetings.

Interviews with stakeholders in Lebanon also highlighted important issues surrounding the management and sharing of data that apply to all countries of study. In both Lebanon-based organizations and organizations undertaking cross-border operations, getting the right numbers and general monitoring and evaluating procedures were cited as areas that need improvement. Organizations do a lot of monitoring, we learned, but they only use about 10 percent of the data gathered. Despite the existence of many different mechanisms for cooperation and coordination among organizations, there is still a great deal of primary data being generated which is not subsequently shared among different organizations. The result is what one monitoring and evaluation officer called “beyond survey fatigue” in certain areas. At the same time other areas, often geographically isolated from the metropolitan Beirut, where most organizations are based, remain underserved as their needs are not studied or reported.

5.3.3 Relationship between Humanitarian and Development Programming

Another common theme among stakeholder interviews was the need for a shift from humanitarian response to more development-oriented focus in responding to refugees’ needs in countries of asylum. The necessary degree of change, however, differed among the respondents. A Syrian-American organization working in Turkey captured the general sentiment of other stakeholders by emphasizing the need for focusing on deeper, lasting development-oriented solutions rather than surface-level “band-aid aid.” However, an employee of an international humanitarian organization noted that humanitarian needs must be balanced with a transition to more sustainable levels of development programming. “As long as there is a war on, there will always be humanitarian needs,” he pointed out. The general consensus
was that current levels of humanitarian assistance are not sustainable, and that a shift towards livelihoods-based programming would be needed, which is a recommendation echoed throughout NGO position papers, included those issued in the lead-up to the World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul, Turkey, in May 2016 and the UN High Level Meeting on Large Scale Movements of Refugees and Migrants in September 2016.

5.3.4 Support for Syrian-led Organizations

Of the 34 stakeholders we spoke with, eleven were Syrian-led organizations (see Chapter 2 Methodology for more information). Several were Syrian diaspora-led organizations, with headquarters in the United States or Europe that supported field offices in the MENA region. One such organization, headquartered in the United States with field offices in Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan, indicated that because it had the dual-positionality of being both an international and Syrian-led organization, it was able to transfer money, implement programs, and generally operate in countries of first asylum more easily than those organizations seen as “Syrian only.”

These “Syrian only” organizations were run by Syrians who were almost always themselves refugees. Most were registered with the UNHCR and received aid for their families. As Malkin has argued, the traditional distinction in the language of development and humanitarian interventions between “aid givers” and “aid receivers” is blurred in these cases (Malkin 2015, p. 47). This marks a significant shift in the way we conceive of the subjects and agents of intervention, and with the introduction of organizations in which the ‘beneficiaries’ in need of ‘saving’ also become its agents, traditional relationships and power structures are re-shaped. Meaningful refugee participation in the design and implementation of programs aids in building an understanding of refugee lives “as more than merely ones of ‘dis-’:dis-placement, dis-enfranchisement, dis-empowerment,” which in turn has the potential to “invert the power relations that are inherent to aid industries” (Malkin, 2015, p. 56).

Regardless of the positionality of the Syrian-led organizations—whether seen as “Syrian only” or as having a more complex identity, such as “Syrian-American” —
functioning in countries of first asylum proves difficult. A Syrian organization headquartered in the United States mentioned that they experienced delays on international money transfers—they could not open a PayPal account because they had the word “Syrian” in their name. There are concerns that PayPal will be used to transfer money to terrorist groups in Syria, where terrorism-designated groups are party to the active conflict. In the United States, as in other countries, there are strict laws against providing material support to terrorism-designated organizations. Similar issues were reported in countries of asylum as well. For example, in Jordan, some local banks refuse to open accounts for or work with Syrian-led organizations, or generally, organizations that provide assistance to refugees.

5.3.5 Engaging in Cross Border Operations

Almost all of the Syrian-led organizations (as well as one international organization) we spoke with conduct cross-border operations to deliver aid into Syria via neighbouring countries. The official crossings for cross-border aid provision are in Turkey and Jordan, and unofficial aid delivery is conducted from Lebanon. There are both informal and formal channels for cross-border delivery. One stakeholder felt that much cross-border aid was not reported. In Jordan, there is just one crossing, and it can be closed suddenly by the Jordanian authorities without any notice. Organizations must coordinate closely with the Jordanian authorities and obtain clearance for what can be moved through the border. In general, it is easier to obtain clearance from the authorities for medical items. Syrian-led service providers in Jordan told us that UN convoys are typically closed to any non-UN organizations doing cross-border assistance into Syria, except in times of emergency.

All organizations doing cross-border work suggested that transferring humanitarian aid into Syria would be significantly easier if they were consistently allowed to use the UN convoys.

Further, transferring cash into Syria represents a major challenge for organizations doing cross-border work. Organizations must transfer cash in order to do a number of important things, including paying their aid worker employees in Syria, etc. In the
absence of a functioning banking system in Syria and the virtual impossibility of wiring money via Western Union or another service, organizations must rely on their employees to carry cash into Syria. When we asked about how cash is delivered to its recipients in Syria, the head of one organization said, “Well, we authorize someone in Syria to receive the cash, and he transfers the cash ‘in his own ways’”. The lack of regular, safe channels to transfer money to organization employees represents a major problem for organizations doing cross-border work. Stakeholders interviewed suggested that the UN or another large organization should dedicate resources to transferring cash safely and securely into Syria.

The bottom line for organizations working on cross-border operations is to stop the fighting and achieve a basic level of security, an area where many of the stakeholders interviewed indicated that the international community had an important role to play in ensuring the violence stops.

5.3.6 Funding

The resounding message from all organizations with whom we spoke was that, “at the end of the day, funding is everything.” Stakeholders were clear, however, that it was not just the amount of funding that should be re-worked but also the way it is given and to whom it is distributed. First, it was stipulated time and again that the funds given to host governments must be tied to increased protection measures for refugees. As previously mentioned, protection was identified as one of the most pressing needs for refugees in countries of asylum. Increased protection measures for refugees should include guarantees of non-refoulement, facilitating the provision of legal residency for refugees, etc.

Second, smaller local and refugee-led organizations indicated that funding should be given directly to implementing organizations rather than in the form of sub-grants through the UN or larger INGOs, as overhead and administration costs in processing the funding account for a large amount of the funding. While this point has already received attention in the international limelight during the World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016, where donors resolved to earmark 25 percent of all funds
for local and national responders by 2020, stakeholders agreed that the problem persists (World Humanitarian Summit 2016, p. 5). A Syrian community leader living in Egypt broke down the process: “Donors deal with contractors and sub-grantees only and do not deal directly with refugees [when it comes to money]. For example, Kuwait donates money to UNHCR for refugee education. The money goes to UNHCR, which takes some money for administration costs. Then they give the money to CRS [Catholic Relief Services], which takes more money for administrative costs. Then the money finally makes it to Syrian refugees, the amount greatly reduced because of the contracting and sub-contracting involved.” Thus, the result, the community leader explained, is that even when significant amounts of money are pledged to support refugees, as what happened at the London conference earlier in 2016, the bulk of the money goes to host states and international organizations and does not make it to refugees.

Third, stakeholders indicated the need of funding for more substantial programs, rather than just small projects. “These [donor] governments love to fund little programs,” said the head of a psychosocial program for refugees in Egypt. “We don’t need funding for little programs. We need money for the most vulnerable people to eat or a place for them to live,” observed the director of an organization in Cairo. A Syrian-led medical services organization in Jordan echoed this sentiment, adding that instead of funding small projects, donors should focus on building the capacity of systems in countries of asylum so that they can support refugees and vulnerable host communities alike, as seen in ISIM’s 2012 study of funding for the Jordanian health system (Martin and Taylor 2012).

5.4 Enhancing Responsibility-Sharing

Almost all actors interviewed indicated that one of the most important ways the international community can support refugees and the organizations that provide them with services is to exert pressure on the source and host country governments in the region. One stakeholder in Lebanon offered a prescription that could be applied to the MENA region as a whole: “It is not just about sending experts and money; there needs to be real political pressure on the Lebanese government
for transparency, accountability, and adopting a longer-term approach. Don’t just throw money at the problem!” For those engaged in cross-border aid delivery, stakeholders expressed that the international community should put pressure on the Syrian government to ensure humanitarian access to underserved areas, particularly in rural Damascus.

In the view of stakeholders, it is important for donor countries to get a first-hand look at the needs on the ground. The director of a service provider organization in Egypt described a trip around refugee neighbourhoods that she led for a number of Western embassies in Cairo meant to mobilize the international community’s advocacy for refugees in Egypt. She recounted: “We went all around the poor refugee neighbourhoods and we made them walk up lots of stairs. Afterwards, there were many discussions, and we encouraged embassies to form a group to work with the Egyptian government in order to advocate on behalf of refugees.” The same service provider was sceptical, though, that such advocacy with host governments on behalf of refugees would be successful, recounting their own experience: “However, this didn’t really go anywhere, as the embassies feel that they don’t have any clout with the Egyptian government and that they couldn’t do anything.” The conclusion was that a broader, more concerted effort would be needed: “It would be great if the Italians, French, Germans, Japanese, etc., would get together to do something, but...everyone feels that approaching the Egyptian government would not serve any purpose.”

Donors could also play a major role in encouraging better coordination among their grantees. They can do this in numerous ways. For example, donors can promote better sharing of data, much of which is collected to fulfill reporting requirements. They can also provide for a smoother collaboration or transition between the humanitarian and development funding they provide in the same locations. As an example, the two projects referenced above to facilitate mainstreaming of refugees into health services were funded respectively by the Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration (for the refugee services) and US Agency for International Development (for the Jordanian Ministry of Health) but these two U.S. agencies and their grantees seldom met to coordinate their efforts (Martin and Taylor 2012). Donors could also earmark more funding towards local host and refugee organizations and provide greater capacity building to help them operate programs as effectively as possible.
At the same time, donors need to identify and ensure funding for refugee groups that are not now served adequately by either refugee or development programs.

Finally, a majority of the stakeholders interviewed called for expansion in refugee resettlement programs. For an employee of a Turkish organization working with refugees, this represented the most viable way that the international community could share responsibility for protection of refugees. This respondent cited Canada as a good model for refugee resettlement that other countries should follow.

However, stakeholders indicated that the refugee resettlement process is not without its problems. For example, there were concerns surrounding the vulnerability criteria used to evaluate refugees for resettlement. Several different respondents indicated that the people getting resettled are not the most vulnerable or most in need of resettlement; an employee of an American humanitarian organization said, “The people getting the worst of this are under siege in Syria or in horrible situations in countries of asylum.” Syrian lawyers in Jordan and Egypt indicated that it was widely known among the refugee community that refugees paid bribes to UN officials so that they could be resettled. This speaks to the importance of closely monitoring such resettlement programs, which would be a significant way that the international community could further improve the integrity of the resettlement process.

5.5 Conclusion

Interviews with stakeholders, particularly operational actors who are directly engaged in service provision and support to displaced persons, shed a great deal of light on where enhanced responsibility-sharing can significantly improve the prospects for solutions for displaced persons. For the interviewees, it was clear that the international community, as donors and policymakers, has an important role to play in many areas. Concrete actions that stakeholders suggested the international community should take include coordination of responses to displacement, bridging the divide between humanitarian and development initiatives, prioritizing assistance to refugee-led organizations and cross-border operations, and exercising diplomatic influence to pressure major host countries in the MENA region.
While calls for diplomatic pressure on host countries were common throughout many of the interviews we conducted, there was considerable scepticism that such diplomatic efforts would be successful, particularly in addressing protection problems. Stakeholders cited the *refoulement* of approximately 800 Sudanese refugees and asylum-seekers from Jordan back to Khartoum in December 2015 as a prime example. Jordan is widely praised as a refugee haven, but, in their view, it has not been called to account for this violation of refugee rights. At the same time, the MENA host countries plausibly argue that they have taken on the responsibility for far more refugees than is true of the countries in which many of the critics reside. The interviewees emphasized that only through greater and more effective shared responsibility for refugees can these protection problems be addressed.
6. Refugee and IDP Perspectives on Responsibility-Sharing in the MENA

6.1 Introduction

This chapter draws upon more than 300 formal interviews with refugees, IDPs and host communities in Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq, as well as fieldwork in Turkey and the Netherlands, to explore their perspectives on responsibility-sharing. As in the previous section, it focuses on the assessment by these populations of their own needs, institutional roles, and potential solutions that would benefit from greater international cooperation in responsibility-sharing. See Chapter 2: Methodology and Appendix C: Casebook for Refugee Interviews for more details.

6.2 Thematic Issues

Forced displacement presents many challenges to refugees and IDPs. Our respondents describe these challenges in financial, psychological, and social terms that reflect the hardships that they experience. It takes time for those who are displaced to adjust to a new living situation. They may no longer be subject to the everyday threats that accompany conflict and persecution but life in displacement is not easy. On occasion, displacement results in new opportunities, but these are rare because of financial and safety constraints. More typically, new and well-founded fears complicate their lives—fear of being forcibly returned, fear of being caught working illegally, fear for the well-being of loved ones left behind, and fear for the future. Moreover, the displaced must learn how to accept assistance because they are now at the mercy of individuals and institutions. In these situations, refugees find it difficult to exercise rights that exist in international law but not in practice: they
move from being contributing members of a state and recipients of its services, to being non-citizens with few rights in a foreign country.

Refugees and IDPs discuss many of the same challenges presented by policy makers and other stakeholders. For them, however, the challenges are more acute and of a personal character as failure to address them could be life-threatening. IDP and refugee experiences with aid providers vary, and they say it is often what helps them get by, even as they object to being objects of aid and charity. For most, thinking about the future, and whether it brings return, resettlement, or integration, reminds them of their lives prior to displacement and the contrast with the limited opportunities that are now before them and their children. As they look to solutions to their situations, they have many opinions about the roles of the international community. These views vary from hopes for foreign intervention to calls for support for political freedoms to warnings to leave solutions to the people most directly involved. And while they express these opinions, they also see themselves as in limbo, without political representation or advocates for their issues. How refugees and IDPs perceive burden-sharing are described here, in sections on hardship and change, learning how to be displaced, uneven aid distribution, education, livelihoods, the future, social cohesion, and institutional challenges.

### 6.2.1 Hardship and Change

Displaced persons feel most strongly the impact of the difference between their abilities to access an adequate standard of living before displacement compared to their current situation. “My life has changed 180 degrees,” said a government employee from Mosul, in northern Iraq, now living in the southern Iraqi city of Basrah. “I had a residence, employment, and a car, and I lived an organized and calm life... now I am unable to provide for my family’s needs.” Prior to displacement, the vast majority of IDPs and refugees had been employed and socially rooted in their communities. With displacement, their employment and social status changes for the worse. In the IOM-Georgetown 2016 survey of 3848 households in Iraq displaced after 1 January 2014 by ISIS, an overwhelming majority of respondents (92.6 per-
Refugee and IDP Perspectives on Responsibility-Sharing in the MENA

Refugee and IDP Perspectives on Responsibility-Sharing in the MENA

cent) report that their standard of living is worse now than their situation where they were living as of January 2014. In their pre-2014 estimation, more than 90 percent of them were able to provide an adequate standard of living before January 1, 2014 (Davis et al. 2017a).

The violence that many have experienced fundamentally changes their status, income, and physical capabilities. The Iraqi head of an institution in Baghdad for the disabled was targeted by a Shia militia in 2012. After executing his son and kidnapping and torturing his wife, the militia also injured him and took their home. The man, his wife, and 5-year old daughter took refuge in Jordan, but he later said that “The explosions and strikes affected my hearing, so I do not hear well. I am not able to work, so I just clean the bathrooms in the mosque, and I clean people’s houses occasionally. The Jordanian neighbours help us with food from time to time.” But it is not only the negative change in their ability to provide for themselves and their families, but also the negative sense of self and ability to participate in meaningful social values that goes with it. He continues, “My house is a single room made of metal with a nylon roof that does not stop the water getting in. The chairs in it are not good. I cannot invite anyone to visit me. It is not healthy. It is not even fit for animals. I fear for my daughter that I may die because I am old but she is still young. I do not have friends and we cannot visit people. I cannot believe what has happened to our lives.”

The shifts that refugees bear, and the burdens they carry, are not only ones of poverty and humiliation; they are also ones of fear. Their lives changed not only by losing what was taken from them or what they left behind. The fear of breaking laws in the host country because they are working without permission or because they fled the refugee camps defines many lives. A 28-year old Syrian housewife from the Golan Heights describes that fear: “[Life in Jordan] is not good because it is difficult and humiliating, and we are scared of being sent back to Zaatari camp or back to Syria because of my husband [who was detained by the regime for 6 months] works illegally. There is no work and the rent here is really expensive. We are barely managing to pay the rent. We feel like beggars.” For the most part, few MENA states have sent refugees back. But the uncertainty, the lack of stability, and the constant worry
about making ends meet feeds those fears. The actions by Turkey and Jordan in 2016 to allow for a limited number of work permits for Syrians (but not other refugees) are major steps toward addressing refugees' fears and needs by allowing refugees to provide for themselves and work legally.

For refugees and IDPs, leaving their former life behind and trying to recraft a new one and to provide for their families is a huge burden, both physical and psychological. For many, the process takes time—to learn how to live with less, to learn how to accept aid, and to learn how to think of oneself as “displaced.”

### 6.2.2 Learning How to be “Displaced”

The classification and labels that the international and host communities impose on the displaced by virtue of managing them, requiring information from them, and working with them takes adjustment. Becoming a displaced person, whether refugee or IDP, requires not only new strategies for finding shelter, income, food, and clothing, but also learning to navigate the host community, state laws, and the aid and asylum system. It becomes part of who they are and how they think of themselves. A 27-year old Syrian man living in Jordan said, “From my perspective, I wish to return to Syria and get rid of the word “refugee” which I feel is very humiliating.” Another young Syrian man exclaimed, “In Lebanon I became a man without any dignity.” Articulating the shift differently, a 24-year old Syrian woman, also in Jordan, explained “I hope that we are respected as Syrians, that we have our rights. I hope that if someone mistreats us and we complain about it, someone will listen to us. We don’t have the right to speak because we are Syrian refugees.” This sense of being somehow a lesser person or one without rights is common among the displaced.

A Syrian woman in her late twenties recalls refusing to accept the situation they were put in as refugees. They had fled to the Jordanian border where the border guards held them for days and then, she says, “they put us in Zaatari camp and gave us a tent, things, and blankets. The tent was unbearable. We stood in a row to fill the water bucket and the toilets were filthy and foul-smelling and the women did not have cleaning things. We almost died from the cold. The coupons were not
enough for food.” Faced with this situation, they sought another way. “We began searching for a Jordanian sponsor to get out of Za’atari. Jordanians want a lot of money, but we did not have any. We got a permit (to leave) and did not go back to the camp.” For her, “It would be better for us to return to Syria and die there than to stay in Za’atari.” It is impossible to say how many people feel this way and then actually act on it. But anecdotal evidence from our years of research suggests that people do end up returning, either when forcibly returned or because they feel extreme desperation about how they are living. This is perhaps more true of young men who cannot study or work and who feel an obligation to contribute to their families’ well-being (Davis 2016).

A researcher interviewing people on the Lebanese-Syrian border described a young man returning to Syria, which illustrates this issue of the desperation that some feel.

“A 24 year-old from a village near Hassakah in the north of Syria, he had fled the country several months ago when ISIS were approaching. However, most of his family remained there, and life had proved so hard in Lebanon that now he had decided to go back.

“There is no work, the Lebanese army beat me, insult me, and they arrested me because I don’t have residency here. Now I’ve realised that it’s much better for me to go back to live with the Islamic State, or what some call Da’esh.” When asked if he was afraid of them, he shook his head with a laugh and replied that before it may have been difficult for him to abide by their ban on smoking, but that he hadn’t smoked for months as he could no longer afford cigarettes, so now he was well-prepared.

When we asked if he planned to work there, again, he raised his eyebrows and tilted back his head in the negative. “No, there is nothing there. But at least I will be with my family. And the Islamic State aren’t anything like how the news portrays them. My family told me what it’s actually like. My female relatives can’t leave the house, but they don’t really mind that, and
for men things are completely fine. The worst thing is that I'll need to stop shaving, and I don't know how easy it will be for me to grow a beard!” he laughed. We then asked if he would consider fighting for them. “I'd prefer not to, but I think it would be OK, and if I did, they would provide for me, so perhaps it is the best choice. Anyway, I would prefer to die on my own soil that die of starvation here in Lebanon” (Todman 2015).

That people think it better to go back and fight, not for ideological reasons but out of desperation because of their life in exile, is something that is rarely addressed by the humanitarian aid community. Costly programs are set up to “counter violent extremism” or to retrain workers; but in many cases, simply pushing governments to allow for legal employment and to encourage investment and industry in countries that host large refugee populations, would go far to keeping many potential fighters from seeking dignity and a source of income through war.

The sense of exile and worries for those left behind is another psychological burden that can define people’s lives. A 32-year old man from a village in southern Syria now living in Jordan articulated it as such: “From a psychological perspective, things are not good. I mean anyone who is forced to leave his country, has not chosen to emigrate ... there is a big difference between emigrating and being forced to emigrate. One who emigrates from his country feels its suffering. There is something that always pushes him back towards his country. One is not comfortable in exile, it is called ghurbeh (alienation, homesickness, feeling estranged in a foreign country). In the end, when it comes to being in exile abroad, I expect things to compound. I mean as a migrant at any moment I miss my home and want to fly back. Even worse, since I am displaced and my parents are still there, I fear for them and the problem is that I expect bad news everyday to upset and upturn our lives.”

Another man from Sudan in his thirties, alone in Jordan, described the difficulties of not only living in exile but also of being without his family. Living in Darfur, Sudan, he said, “We used to live normally. ...I did not expect the problems to come like they are now. It used to be a life of nature, agriculture and animals, thank God.” After fleeing Darfur to Khartoum, and then to Jordan with the help of an uncle, he described his current state as follows: “I do not have anything except my family, and
I am far away from them. And we do not have money for them to come here. I pray that God will return life to how it was before. I think about my children; maybe I will see them once more? I always worry that my children are hungry and cold. Maybe I will die at any time. I sit in the centre of the city by myself. I do not know anyone. I try to forget the difficult situation. I am not able to talk to anyone about who I am and my story, because I am afraid that I will be threatened.” The psychological isolation and fears are a significant component of refugee lives.

For others, the situation they fled was worse than where they are now. A Syrian man, originally from a village near the city of Hama, and now living in southern Jordan, described the psychological transformation that takes place among the people who stay in conflict zones. “I have arrived recently from my country. I persevered there for almost four years. I left because I was exhausted and fed up, and there was no one left in the area I lived in except those who barely had any money and had given up. The bad thing was that I had grown indifferent. Fine, if I die, I die. I stopped wondering or fearing the shelling or being hit by something painful. The positive was that I was still in my house, and in my village. I woke up in the morning to the sound of birdsong on the veranda, and the smell of the jasmine that my mother grew before she left. The worst thing was that I was really lonely. I only left my country when things had got so bad that I was forced to leave and come to stay with my family, who I missed a lot, and with the girl I got engaged to at the start of the revolution, because she also left with her family, fleeing death and pain.” He describes what pushed him to leave, and the role of his family. He also explores the psychological state that he was in, both his acclimation to war and conflict, but also his deep loneliness living a life under bombardment without his family and friends around.

Once out of the conflict, this man was able to examine how he had gotten used to the war. Life in Jordan is easier to live in than the area he fled from: “The last few years of my life have been the worst period of my entire life. I left through smuggling routes. I can only say that it was the way the Syrian people’s blood is traded. I am trying to get used to life here. It is true that it is a country, but it is not our country and I am always thinking of going back to my country. Oh God, save it as soon as possible. There are no difficulties for me here because my family came to this coun-
try first, and they established relationships here. In short, Jordanians are good people. There is no problem finding work, especially because I am a farmer, just like I was in my country before I came here.” Despite his recognition that his host country has been good to him and his family, he expresses the challenges of living a life in another country. IDPs often describe the same ambivalence about their situation, thankful to be safe in another part of the country but missing a home that existed prior to the conflict that drove them out. As displacement becomes more protracted, however, the prospects for return begin to diminish and attention must turn to how they may best integrate into their new communities.

Some of those who are refugees and IDPs remembered their previous role as “the host community” and helping others, before they themselves were displaced. An Iraqi man in his thirties recalled that “in previous years, we ourselves gave aid to Syrian refugees. Unfortunately, our situation is now worse than theirs.” A Syrian woman in Lebanon remembered that in 2006, when the Israelis bombed Lebanon, tens of thousands of Lebanese fled temporarily to Syria, and her family offered help. It was not uncommon in Lebanon, at the start of the uprising in Syria in 2011, for Syrian families to seek out the Lebanese that they had sheltered during that time, or for the Lebanese families to offer them shelter. More than five years later, those relationships have changed, and Lebanon hosts such a large percentage of its population as Syrian refugees that many in the country now see all “Syrians” as a problem.

6.2.3 Uneven Aid Resources by Nationality, Legal Status and Gender

For both IDPs and refugees across the region, more general complaints of uneven access to aid stem in part from their contact with aid providers that may not result in aid, as well as lack of coordination across aid providers. As an Iraqi female head-of-household from Salaheddin living in Kirkuk said, “There are many organizations that visit us, register our names, take our signatures, and then disappear and never return.” A 40-year old Syrian woman registered her dissatisfaction with the type of aid they were getting: “We registered with [a prominent international charity] and we did not get anything from them. But every day they tell you to come and parti-
cipate in a lecture. These are just meetings. And they do not even pay the transport for you to get there. When I went the first time, they started talking about useless things. Like how I speak with my son and how my son speaks with me, and if I was harsh with my son and if I meet his needs. We cannot make ends meet, so how can I meet his needs?”

Others described why they had been excluded from receiving aid. “Currently, the aid provided by the local councils depends on personal relations and favouritism,” complained the son of an IDP family from Salah al-Din, Iraq living currently in Baghdad. While some IDPs had received multiple rounds/forms of aid, others had still not received anything. In other cases, a 20-year old Syrian man in Jordan complained that the aid organizations “only give to women. Once I went to [a prominent Islamic charity] and they threw me out and said to me that they give to families, meaning I’m not a human.” Therefore, it was suggested that information about aid distribution to the needy should be shared among all of the major aid providers to allow for more equal distribution of assistance; greater coordination among the aid providers and government actors would facilitate this process as well.

Other interviewees mentioned that they could not access the available services, either because they did not fit the criteria, or because they could not register with the body responsible for protection of displaced persons, such as UNHCR, AFAD (Disaster Management and Emergency Presidency of the Prime Ministry), or MoMD (Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration), or for a variety of other reasons. A 21-year old Somali woman in Jordan noted that “As Somalis, we don’t have any aid organizations to help us in any parts of our lives, including for food, clothes, or other things. All the attention is directed to Syrians and Iraqis. It’s like we are not humans or not even refugees.” In some of the MENA countries, access to aid for Syrians has also been difficult at times. For example, the Lebanese government requested that UNHCR stop registering Syrians as refugees in May 2015. Since that time, it has been much more difficult for Syrians to access aid. This case is illustrated by the account of a 22-year old Syrian man, who is a graphic designer from Damascus now living in Beirut and sharing a place with 5 friends. He said, “I thought about going to Lebanon because I thought that since they are Arabs, our culture would be
similar. I work all day. I want to study but I cannot. Luckily my health is good. I have become used to living this way. We are very tired by it, but have accepted it now. My father sent me money through a hawaleh [money transfer] for the first 7 months until I found a job. Now I have a job in a supermarket, ordering products from 8 am-11 or 12 pm every day. I often work 16 hours a day. I earn US$250 a month. Three Syrians work for the amount that one Lebanese gets. I don’t get any help from the UN because I am not registered as a refugee here.” The issues illustrated by these two accounts reveal how refugees can find themselves outside of the systems that are designed to assist them.

6.2.4 Education

While public education is free in all of the MENA countries, children must bring with them school uniforms and supplies, and in some cases, provide for transportation. This burden is difficult to bear for the poor in general. But when money is tight, especially for IDP and refugee parents, they often cannot afford to send children to school, nor are they required to by the laws that demand nationals to do so. IDPs and refugee families also report having to pull their children out of school due to lack of money; the father of a family from Anbar living in Basrah recounted: “I had throat surgery in Turkey on a medical trip sponsored by the Iraqi Ministry of Health, and [now] I don’t work because of my health situation. My children left school because there is not enough income to cover their educational needs.” Similarly, a female head of household from Salaheddin living in Kirkuk, who has to cover monthly medical expenses for a chronically ill daughter, said, “It has reached the point where I had to take my children out of school and make them work just to provide some money for us to live on.” There are increasing accounts of child labor to make ends meet, particularly in the rural and peri-urban areas of Turkey and Lebanon where many Syrian refugees are housed. In Iraq, less than 3 percent of our survey of IDP respondents reported employment for children under the age of 16 as a way of increasing income (Davis et al. 2017a).

Since the arrival of large numbers of Syrian refugees and Iraqi IDPs public schools in Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq hold classes in two or three shifts (morning and afternoon). Additionally, with the increased demand, schools have trouble with pro-
viding enough books and other necessities. As many from the host community relate, school overcrowding and shortened days due to fitting in two or three shifts affects all of the children’s education, not just the refugee and IDP children.

6.2.5 Livelihoods

For some, receiving aid is enough to ensure their access to an adequate standard of living, but for most others, it is not sufficient. The interviews reveal that in most families, at least one member of the family is able to find some kind of work. This work is most often illegal, because they do not have work permits, and this situation leads to exploitation in terms of hours and pay. Other issues also arise such as unfair termination, no recourse to legal authorities if employers are exploitative, and no recourse for workers injured on the job. In addition, such labor is often unpredictable and occasional, and thus cannot meet a family's financial needs. For these reasons, refugees and IDPs living outside camps describe paying their rent in full and on time as their biggest challenge. The initiatives by Turkey and Jordan to grant Syrian refugees work permits (as discussed in all previous chapters) would ease not only some of the livelihood challenges, but also the psychological strains on families if it reaches a broad spectrum of refugees.

Our research has shown that borrowing is an important strategy to maintain an adequate standard of living. This puts an undue burden on family and friends, and even the host community. In our study of Iraqi IDPs, 60 percent reported that they were able to borrow money following displacement, and 95.8 percent of IDPs who borrowed money preferred doing so informally and from relatives or extended family. Friends and acquaintances provided the second-most common source of borrowing, also informal. All other sources, including shopkeepers, financial institutions, and religious charities amounted to a tiny percentage. However, as IDPs’ time in displacement extends, borrowing from family and friends puts a strain on others who are not displaced. Thus, borrowing is not a sustainable solution. In the absence of secure livelihoods, many express concern that this is merely a short-term solution and that they will not be able to cover their debts later: “I had to borrow an amount
of money to meet some needs and I cannot currently pay back the money that I bor-
rowed,” said an Iraqi military officer from the town of Daquq, in Kirkuk governorate,
who was forced to flee to Kirkuk City in Iraq after ISIS took over his home.

Increased opportunities for borrowing money from institutions, particularly for IDPs
who could use that money to establish small businesses, buy tools, or assist with
their children’s education are an untapped potential source that would give the dis-
placed some of the sense of dignity that is lost, allowing them to become closer to
self-sustaining.

6.2.6 The Future: Return, Resettlement, and Integration

Refugees and IDPs have many different responses to the future. In response to ques-
tions about their hopes, fears, and their perceptions about their current situation, it
is obvious that displacement figures as a heavy psychological burden. When asked
about his hopes, a 54-year old Iraq man said, “That we migrate so that we can feel
safe, and that we have a future. I want to have a nation (homeland). I want to see
my daughter grow up and study, have health care and have someone who can pro-
tect us.” Likewise, when asked about what he fears most, a 52-year old Syrian man
responded: “I fear for the loss of my children’s future.” A younger Syrian man with
a newborn baby living in Jordan described his worries as follows: “I always wonder
why I am in this country, and why I am a refugee. I think about the life of subjugation
that we lived in Syria. Yes, we were subjugated, but it is still my country, and I think
about a type of social and mental stability that we had. What I mostly think about
is how my son will live, and how I will write about his date of birth and nationality,
and if he will get my country’s nationality, or if he will be homeless in the future, and
what punishment awaits him. I hope that he will not live the pain his parents have
lived through. I always worry about where we are going. I tire myself looking for an
alternative homeland for my son. But where?” As this father articulates, those who
are displaced certainly feel the weight of planning and thinking about the future of
their children and themselves, and where they can be safe, healthy and fulfilled.

Many expressed an awareness of the generosity of countries and organizations in
donating to helping them. Some countries were perceived as giving aid instead of opportunities: “The countries that give us aid, give it from afar so that we do not leave and go to them and get citizenship with them. They give aid to countries that host refugees so that they will stay there,” said a 21-year old Syrian man in Jordan. For many, particularly as their time in displacement has prolonged, the best solutions were resettlement to a third country so that they could support themselves. “The international organizations might have been giving us food and a place to live,” a 26-year old Syrian man in Jordan said, “but I hope that they give us open doors for immigration for people who do not know where to go, like those refugees living in Turkey, Jordan, or Egypt.” He warned that life in the current host countries is not tenable. “Syrians are surviving there, but it will be another crisis after a while. Other countries like America, Canada, France, Switzerland, and Sweden used to open their doors for immigration and of course Germany, but now they closed the doors for Syrian immigration.” Some, like this Syrian man, see third country resettlement as a viable solution to their current situation. They believe that countries in Europe and North America and the Arabian Gulf could offer them legal status, citizenship, and a chance to work and study. A 21-year old Syrian said, “We want them to open the immigration gates, to open up the gates to life. We do not know what the future holds and we do not know where we are going.” This young man continued, “It is unacceptable that young people take on responsibilities much greater than our ages, I feel like I am 40 years old.” Another 33-year old Syrian man asked: “Why don’t the Gulf countries open their doors for the Syrian refugees? Why did only Jordan and Turkey open their doors?”

A 22-year old Syrian man in Lebanon expressed the hopes and actions of many displaced in 2014 and 2015 who saw Europe as the key to their future. “I am dreaming of going to Europe. I have worked out a route. We will fly to Turkey and then go by boat from Istanbul to Greece. Once we are there we are going to walk to Germany or Sweden. I do not think it is too far, and it will be worth it because life is perfect there. There is no racism, there is support for Syrians. I might be able to study and get qualified to work and earn a living, but working far fewer hours each day. They have justice. A life in Germany is a dignified life.” While this is perhaps unrealistic about the difficulties of a life in exile, not knowing the language, and having to adjust to
new conditions, the search for a future with dignity and with justice is what drives many on this path.

Returning to their home countries was on the mind of many people. The large majority stated, however, that they would not return if the conflicts continue. A 35-year-old Syrian former policeman living in Jordan declared, “If I were to return to Syria, things would have to be calm and Syria would be liberated, ruled by a civilian, democratic government. If this were the case, I would be among the first to return to Syria and I would return to my job as a policeman to protect the rights of civilians and ensure security. If the situation remains as it is now, with killing, fear and destruction, I will not return. I wish to claim asylum elsewhere. At least I would like my daughters to return to school and I would like this desperate situation to end.” An Iraqi father, an IDP from Diyala now living in Sulaymaniyyah in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq stated that “Most of us want to go back to our places of origin but on the condition that we have good security...the most important is the availability of good security conditions, and then we need a house, services, hospitals, financial support, job opportunities, and...etc.” As these accounts illustrate, physical security remains a primary obstacle for return as long as conflict continues. Our interviewees were also concerned about economic and social security, which requires the infrastructure for people to maintain an adequate standard of living. Without greater stability in their home countries, few who are living in stable situations as refugees and IDPs will want to return.
6.3 Interactions between the Displaced and Host Communities – A Case Study of Social Cohesion among Iraqi IDPs

The IOM-Georgetown longitudinal study with 3,848 Iraqi IDP households and their access to durable solutions in Iraq, referenced in the methodology section, offers an interesting case study because it also has qualitative interviews with 80 members of the host community in the governorates of Baghdad, Basrah, Sulaymaniyah, and Kirkuk. The first round of the survey, conducted in 2016, asked IDPs to compare their current situation to their life before being displaced by ISIS on or before January 2014. The qualitative interviews asked host community members about the impact of the IDPs on their community. We draw on the qualitative interviews from both IDPs and the host community to present a short description of “social cohesion” among the displaced and their community of current residence.

We use a definition of what is termed “social cohesion” to illustrate the complexity of IDPs’ and host communities’ experiences. The United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Humanitarian Needs Overview defines social cohesion as “A general condition of stable co-existence within communities, when IDPs, refugees, and host community members accept socio-ethnic differences, have equitable access to livelihoods and other community resources, and feel safe and secure in their homes” (UNDP, n.d.).

While insecurity was the main driver behind their flight, few IDPs reported feeling physically unsafe in their current locations. In fact, 95.1 percent of all IDPs report feeling “completely safe” or “moderately safe” in their current locations, a statistic with very little variance between the governorates where IDPs were displaced. Where IDPs experience insecurity, the main sources are theft and petty crime. Incidents of insecurity in their current place of residence were reported by a small minority of the population (1 percent overall). Overall, only 39 families said they faced security incidents, of those, nine dealt with those issues by themselves, and nine went to the government forces, the army, or the asayish [Kurdish security forces] to resolve them. Basrah, at 2 percent, is also the governorate with the highest
overall incidence of reporting security incidents.

Another theme that ran throughout both the IDP and host community interviews was that the lack of trust in IDPs was framed in overall security terms. The IDPs were perceived to be associated with ISIS because they were fleeing from areas taken over by ISIS. A family from Diyala living in Sulaymaniyah detailed such an experience: “At the beginning, when we first arrived here, children in the area told us ‘you are Arab, you are ISIS.” A host community member with IDP neighbors in Basrah explained how this hindered IDPs’ ability to integrate: “There are some situations where IDPs do not integrate into the society because they are coming from places which some people consider to be sources of terrorism, and the result is that they withdraw from society, staying in their shells. The [host community] fears them because they came from areas where terrorism took place.” Another host community member living in close proximity to IDPs observed that IDPs are subjected to more scrutiny by the security forces than the host population, saying, “IDPs are treated as if they all were part of a [terrorist] sleeper cell...if a Basrah resident is arrested, he might be released after a day or two for a simple crime. But an IDP! He would be exposed to lots of questioning and interrogations.”

For some host community members, this meant that IDPs constituted a real threat to the security of the community. For others, IDPs were not threatening, and it was a matter of building understanding between IDPs and host communities. “[The host community needs to] better understand the IDPs situation, because they came here by force. There was no other choice, and they took refuge amongst us,” said a host community member in Basrah. When asked how they would take action to help IDPs, another host community member in Basrah said, “I would work on raising awareness among people that not all IDPs are terrorists in order to change the way the community perceives them.”

Displacement represents a rupture in social relationships, as displaced people are removed from their support networks in their places of origin, and forced to cultivate new relationships with groups with whom they may not have had previous experience. It thus follows that IDPs experience a major shift in the ways that they interact with the community, which in this case plays the role of a host. Thus, an
important indicator of social cohesion among IDPs is the feeling of acceptance by the host community. IDPs living in rural communities feel more accepted than those in urban ones (81 percent versus 72 percent) and this holds true in all governorates except Sulaymaniyah. Overall, the majority of IDPs reported that they felt accepted by the host communities.

Another way of examining IDPs’ shifting social landscape is by comparing people’s social support networks between pre-displacement time and their current situation. We framed social support in terms of the number of close friends IDPs reported. To this end, one of the survey questions asked IDPs to give the number of close friends they had: 0, 1-5, 6-10, and greater than 10. When IDPs identified the number of close friends they had prior to displacement (as of January 1, 2014), 81.8 percent reported having either 6-10 or greater than 10 friends. When asked about their current situation, IDPs were asked to identify the number of close friends “within the IDP community”, which showed 60.5 percent responded with 1-5 friends and 33.5 percent with 6-10 friends. A related question with the same response choices also asked IDPs to identify friends “in the host community”, and the data shows that 81.2 percent of IDPs had either 1-5 or 6-10 friends in the host community. Overall, it is not surprising that IDPs prior to displacement had many more friends than they do at present. It is revealing that they presently cite having similar numbers of friends from among IDPs and the host community, indicating that IDP communities are not isolated from the host community.

Some divisive elements cause problems for IDPs in the host communities. These include ethnic and linguistic differences, but there is not a significant difference between the magnitude of these problems pre-displacement (before January 1, 2014), and their magnitude in mid-2016 where the IDPs are now living. Even the “hot” categories, like ethnicity and religion, show remarkably little movement from before displacement to after it.

The qualitative interviews show instead the attitudes toward which IDPs and the host community approached each other. There were extensive accounts of the welcome that the host community offered IDPs. “The host community received us and visited us in order to make us feel welcome and to lessen the family’s suffering
at having lost our home, our family, and more,” recalls the father of a family displace
d within the governorate of Baghdad. “Our neighbors treat us with respect,” said a family from Anbar living in Sulaymaniyah. Another family from Diyala living in Sulaymaniyah added, “No one has told us we do not belong here.” The father from another family in Diyala living in Sulaymaniyah said, “There is no racism here, and I feel like I am in my hometown.”

Host community members felt that their welcome of the IDPs was instrumental in facilitating the latter’s integration. “IDPs are my neighbors in the area of my residence, and I also always meet and mingle with them. We share their joys and sorrows. The IDPs were able to integrate with the host community and coexist with them as a result of the host community’s welcome and acceptance of them,” said a member of the host community in Baghdad. “The neighborhood also adapted to the crisis and provided the assistance that it could,” the neighbor added, summing up a key component of social cohesion, the ability of communities to withstand shocks.

The results of our study suggest that IDPs’ sense of security and feelings of being accepted in the host community are linked. Surprisingly, we found that ethnicity, religion, and linguistic group do not seem to be a major factor in social cohesion. This could be linked to the fact that the refugees interviewed found themselves in places where they share those identifications with the host community (but this was clearly not the case in at least one governorate where there were major linguistic and ethnic differences between the host and IDP communities). Based on host community interviews, we found that rather than sectarian or ethnic differences, it is the very cause of displacement—the takeover of lands by ISIS—that frames how IDPs are seen by the host community. Finally, that displacement shifts the locus of social cohesion to smaller units so that displaced people have fewer numbers of friends, although those friends are made up equally of other IDPs and members of the host community. Among Iraqi IDPs, then, because they are still in their own country, their sense of belonging is strong and their abilities to access government services and employment key to their ability to survive displacement.
6.4 Institutional Challenges

A 35-year old Syrian woman in Jordan wondered if “It is possible that...people might have grown tired of giving aid since this crisis has been going on for four years.” Looking at the ongoing and increasing donations for Syrians, one would conclude that aid has not diminished at present. But what that conclusion masks are the hierarchies of aid that have developed in a number of countries (Davis et al. 2017). The pattern of dedicating funding to certain refugee crises reveals a hierarchy of policies and agreements based on the national origin or citizenship of the persons, rather than their status as refugees or asylum seekers (Su 2013). A Jordanian NGO, ARDD-Legal Aid, describes this hierarchy and what should be considered instead in a report titled “Putting Needs over Nationality” (ARDD-Legal Aid 2015). For example, in November 2015, UNHCR reported that it received US$197.2 million in donor contributions to its operations in Jordan for 2015, of which US$195.4 million went toward its Syria response and US$1.8 million toward its response to the Iraq crisis. It had requested US$329 million from donors to fund its Jordan operations in 2015, meaning that it had received only 60 percent funding as of November, all of which was contributed under the Syria and Iraq responses, leaving 40 percent of the needs unmet (UNHCR Jordan 2015).

Echoing views expressed by stakeholders in a previous chapter, refugees from Africa expressed concern about discrimination in aid operations. For them, however, the impact is personal: “I do not know of any place or international institution that cares about us, they do not even look at us. They just care about Syrians and Iraqis,” a 23-year old Sudanese woman responded. “There is a lot of discrimination even though all of us are refugees, humans and equal. There is no difference between us based on color, be it white, black or red. They do not meet anybody from African countries; they only care about Syrian and Iraqis who get everything for free. They get heaters, blankets, covers, and jackets for winter.”

For refugees and IDPs who can access aid and various charitable organizations, their experiences vary considerably, but it cannot be denied that despite the many complaints, aid organizations make it possible for people to survive their displacement. Iraqi IDPs who register with the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration
(MoMD) are eligible to receive a one-time payment of 1 million Iraq Dinars (US$ 840). Many said that this aid they received from the government or aid from organizations or charities immediately after they were displaced allowed them to purchase some basic necessities, pay (at least part of) their rent, and begin to get settled within the host community. The assistance of others offering cash, shelter, food, and non-food items plays a significant role for many in covering their basic needs. The host community and relatives and friends were cited as the major source of aid. “For almost an entire month, families brought many aid items and some families even invited us to eat food in their homes or brought food to us,” recounted an Iraqi IDP family from Salah al-Din living in Basrah. People described going without food and basic furnishings for their homes and depending on the host community in order to make ends meet. “We have gone without a lot of things...to the point that we have reached the stage of waiting for scraps of animal bones. My son works in a meat shop, and the owner of the shop helps him by giving him the remains from the bones in a bag. This makes me very happy because I cook it for my children, and this helps a lot,” said the mother of a family from Anbar now living in Baghdad. Local charities also play a big role in providing for food, clothing and shelter.

The formal and informal mechanisms in place that bring the displaced and host communities together, while a burden on the poor in the host community, can be a place for support. In addition, Jordan requires that 30 percent of programs for refugees be for local communities as well, in an attempt to treat those bearing the burden of hosting refugees. In northern Lebanon research “suggests that the role played by the host community demonstrates good local capacity which should be built on to encourage further civic engagement and empowerment” (Mackreath 2014). Some refugees and others see this as small steps towards building new societies and engagements through loan schemes and projects that are centred on the individual and not on big business or aid (Malek 2014).

The formal coordinated assistance is also essential for the displaced, and often comes from local NGOs who have contracts with INGOs. “They have been very good,” responded a 23-year old Syrian man. “UNHCR and charities helped us and offered us financial assistance and food aid.” A 22-year old Syrian woman said, “We
are only receiving coupons [WFP/UNHCR food coupons to get goods at designated stores] and God, I hope they do not cut them because they are what we are living on, they are keeping us going, although we are barely able to eat and take care of our basic expenses.” But for many, the small amount of aid is not enough. A 30-year old Syrian woman in Jordan replied that because of the need for assistance, “I registered with UNHCR, and I started getting the coupons. I also get a monthly allowance (via the ATM where I put in my card and also the retinal scanner that reads my eye to prove it is me). But despite everything, the life expenses here in this country are incredible, not normal. I look at the other Arab countries and Arab rulers who are watching us and I say to myself, they are just like me: helpless.” A 45-year old Syrian woman in Jordan wanted to take on additional work, but work that allowed her to prioritize her family first: “I hope they [aid organizations] will insure job opportunities for the housewives that will fit with their schedules and the schedules of their kids. I also hope they stop caring about having work permits.”

6.5 Enhancing Responsibility-Sharing

Refugees and IDPs offered ideas about what the international community should do to make their lives better. Most prominent was the sense that they want the international community to solve the crisis that makes them refugees, rather than give them handouts. But this varies with time and origin of the refugees. Certainly as time has passed, and people have been displaced for 3 or 4 years with no obvious solutions, the desire for resettlement to a third country has increased. And many were critical of the inaction of the UN and others toward the conflicts in their countries. This 59-year old Syrian man depicted the situation as such: “The silence of the world has put the revolution between the gavel of the regime and the anvil of the extremist groups, which are two faces of the same coin.”

When refugees in Jordan and Lebanon were asked about what they thought the role of the international community could be, they focused on the need to stop the fighting. “The first thing that I think is to end the fighting and the murdering and the attacking,” said a 30-year old Syrian man living in Jordan. A Palestinian living in Lebanon opined, “All the countries should get involved to stop the conflict; and
we should have organizations to ask for peace in Syria.” More pointedly, a 43-year old Syrian mother asked, “Those mothers who lost their children: to whom are they going to tell their pain? In every house in Syria, there is an arrested person, a martyr, or both. Why should we be the victims of the Russian veto and Chinese resentment? This is unreasonable. The least that could happen is to stop supplying the regime with weapons, which the regime is buying with our money and using to kill our children.” These refugees understand the complex nature of the ‘international community,’ which includes not only the humanitarian organizations that sustain them but also the states they see as a large part of the reason they are refugees.

The suggested means for a potential intervention were both nuanced and contradictory. People called for the right kind of foreign intervention as well as the end to foreign intervention. A 32-year old Syrian suggested that “the international community can convince the external opposition to sit with the current government on a negotiation table to discuss all of the different things that they can do.” Another Syrian in Jordan said, “My hope is that all countries strive to solve the crisis in Syria, stop the killing and destruction, and help our people to put an end to this war that has wreaked such devastation and death on our people, and on our nation.” A 33-year old Syrian was more direct in his solution: “In my opinion, countries have to take in refugees, and if they do not want to, they have to take out Bashar [al-Assad]. We don’t want any talk. We need actions and aid to help the refugees. Why are all these countries silent? Are all the countries really siding with the regime? What is the role of the rest of the countries in the world?”

The 22-year old man wanted international assistance for his vision of freedom and tolerance: “Everyone has to help us improve our political system so that it satisfies everyone and does not marginalize anyone, and so the country will have what it takes to succeed and overcome the drowning and chaos.” Similarly, a 23-year old Sudanese in Jordan spoke about the fears that drove them to flee their country and the burden of being where they are today: “My fear is that Sudan collapses and the conditions will become harder, materially and morally. We hope that the international community will solve all of the problems and I think that they have the solutions.”
In part, these comments about the need for the right kind of foreign intervention were critical of what had been done already. “In my opinion the international community is not doing anything serious to get the crisis solved and all the conferences and meetings they are doing, are useless,” proclaimed a 46-year old Syrian woman. Others called for assisting those calling for revolution for a better future: A 45-year old Syrian woman said “I hope that the Western countries help the revolutionaries in Syria to put down the regime and I hope that they help us to build a country and an army to protect the people and do not kill them.” Others thought that the problem lays with what the international community has been doing: “I don’t believe that [the international community] should do anything more,” said a 64-year old Palestinian from Syria living in Lebanon. Instead, “The two sides should engage in a dialogue, and the foreigners should leave. The [international] community has to help us to return because, shame on everyone, look what is happening to the Syrian people!”

But the actions to end the fighting and to create new governments, others argued, should be from the people themselves. A 21-year old Syrian man living in Jordan argued for more power to the people: “A transitional government that is chosen by the people should be formed, and every group should agree, including supporters of the regime. The most important thing is that those great powers of the world should stay away from us and leave their interests outside of Syria, and the need to conspire against our people because these countries are the main reason for what is happening in Syria.” Likewise, a Sudanese woman in Jordan expressed hope in her countrymen and women: “I hope I can return to my home country as soon as possible and that my country will get security and peace back. The tribes should have taken a lesson from what happened because war does not solve any conflict. They can solve conflicts by negotiating.”

6.6 Conclusion

The vast majority of refugees and IDPs in the Middle East fled their homes as a result of conflict and violence. Whether this was state-sponsored, insurgent-led or communal struggles for political power, violence and fears of violence have left deep marks in contemporary Middle Eastern society, politics, and economic well-being.
Ultimately, people fled to seek safety and security for their families. Displaced persons clearly articulate the difference between their abilities to live meaningful and successful lives before displacement compared to their current situation where they have to borrow money, rely on charity and aid, and live in substandard housing. Those who are displaced articulate responsibility-sharing, in these situations, not just as others looking out for them and helping them. They also argue that those responsible for their situation are those who supported and funded the governments and the wars that resulted in the violence. For the displaced, they most fervently want the wars and violence to end so that they can go home. Or they want to be resettled somewhere where they are valued as human beings, with dignity, and the ability to work and contribute to society. For them, ultimately, responsibility-sharing means allowing them to be responsible as well, for themselves and for their families by providing them with the abilities and resources they once had to be contributing members of society.
7. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

As negotiations continue on a Global Compact on Refugees, states will be grappling with the concept of international responsibility-sharing. In no region in the world is this issue more important than in the Middle East and North Africa, where millions are uprooted and the geo-politics of displacement so keenly evident. Such displacement presupposes significant challenges, foremost to the refugees and internally displaced persons but also to host countries, humanitarian response and development organizations, and the broader international community. The number of refugees and IDPs in the area is extremely large. These challenges are overly great to be met effectively by any one country, group or organization. Rather, the concerted efforts of all actors—including the refugees and displaced themselves—is required to find solutions.

This multilevel study has reviewed perspectives on such responsibility-sharing as presented by the literature on the subject, statements by policymakers, interviews with stakeholders—mostly practitioners—working at the field level, and interviews with refugees and IDPs themselves. There are great similarities in their views as to the areas that require more effective collaboration and that would benefit from more engagement by the international community. At the same time, the emphases differ based on the impacts and experiences of the actors assessing the needs and opportunities for responsibility-sharing. Further, the reasons that different policymakers, practitioners and refugees note support for similar outcomes may differ in significant ways. Some actors clearly see broader international engagement as a mechanism for obtaining greater financial support; others appear motivated by foreign policy interests and some by humanitarian concerns. For many, all of these factors are at play when they refer to responsibility-sharing.
The consistency between the perspectives of actors in the MENA region and the pledges made in the New York Declaration is apparent, making this study of significant policy relevance. The Declaration already includes commitments that governments made to improve responses to refugee crises. However, the High Level Meeting was unable to arrive at a Global Compact on Responsibility-Sharing for Refugees, leaving its negotiation for a second summit to take place in 2018. Better understanding similarities, differences and, most importantly, nuances in the perspectives of governments, stakeholders and refugees in the MENA region may help ensure greater success in crafting a meaningful and implementable document.

Our research points to concrete recommendations for enhancing international responsibility-sharing in a manner that builds local capacities, including those of refugees and displaced persons. The following recommendations are aimed at national authorities in donor, host and transit countries, international organizations and international, national and local (including refugee) nongovernmental organizations in the humanitarian and development fields. Some of the recommended actions can be taken unilaterally but many require international cooperation to be successfully implemented. Some are readily actionable and achievable whereas others (particularly those related to prevention and solutions) will require sustained attention. They call for the type of paradigm shift towards a more development centred approach to responsibility sharing that has already been endorsed in the World Humanitarian Summit and the High Level Meeting. Together, these recommendations should result in a more holistic approach to responsibility-sharing that improves the lives of refugees and displaced persons while also addressing legitimate security, economic and other concerns of host communities.

7.1 Address the underlying causes of displacement

All actors emphasize that the best response to refugee and IDP crises is to resolve the principal causes of displacement. This is consistent with the New York Declaration's recognition that “armed conflict, persecution and violence, including terrorism, are among the factors which give rise to large refugee movements,” and the commitment of governments to “work to address the root causes of such crisis
situations and to prevent or resolve conflict by peaceful means.” (2016, p.13)

The refugees and IDPs were most vociferous in expressing these sentiments. For most of those we interviewed, returning home is the best perceived solution but it can only occur if there is greater safety and security in their countries of origin. In their view, the most important action that the international community can take is to help bring an end to the conflicts that plague their countries. They by no means agree, as discussed above, as to the best way forward in doing so, with some arguing for a more robust intervention by the international community and others wanting external forces to pull back and allow the people themselves to end the fighting. This appears to reflect both their frustration with the failures of peace-making to date in Syria, in particular, and differences in their own understanding of the dynamics of the conflicts in their countries. Policymakers and stakeholders agree with the general sentiment, and most make the point that conflicts must end, but the remarks often appear to be rhetorical—a point to be checked off in formal statements. Nevertheless, they appear to agree that the core responsibility for refugees, and probably the most difficult one to achieve, is a political one—resolving conflict.

Accomplishing this goal will be exceedingly difficult without sustained political will, not only from the parties to the conflicts but also the states that directly or indirectly support them. Countries within the MENA region have a particularly important role to play, one that may be at odds with their current positions supporting one or another party to the conflicts. Moreover, cessation of immediate hostilities will not necessarily allow for safe return of refugees and IDPs if the underlying reasons for the conflict are not addressed. Otherwise, as seen in many cases, conflict is likely to resume and cause re-displacement.

Recent reports of almost 500,000 Syrians returning to their homes in 2017 suggest that the end to fighting in some areas allow people to check on property and family and potentially restart lives there. The vast majority of those returns were of IDPs moving within Syria, with some 31,000 returning from other countries. A less beneficial return is of those who are returning to fight. Setting up programs in host countries and communities that target young men for employment and socialization, in
particular, would be a significant way that the humanitarian aid community could keep young men from the battlefield and assist in de-escalating conflict. Such programs would provide alternatives to men who return home and become paid soldiers out of desperation and despair (BBC 2017).

7.2 Promote resettlement of refugees

Resettlement of refugees must be part of any responsibility sharing schema. Given the protracted nature of most of the conflicts producing refugees and IDPs in the region, consideration of solutions should go beyond establishing conditions conducive to repatriation to include third country resettlement. The need for higher levels of resettlement was echoed by refugees, stakeholders and policymakers alike. This is also reflected in the New York Declaration: “We intend to expand the number and range of legal pathways available for refugees to be admitted to or resettled in third countries. In addition to easing the plight of refugees, this has benefits for countries that host large refugee populations and for third countries that receive refugees” (2016, p. 15). Much of the focus was on increasing the number of resettlement slots and improving the processes for admission of Syrian refugees. As in a number of the areas we investigated, the need for solutions, including resettlement, for the smaller but often more vulnerable refugees from Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and elsewhere tended to be ignored by the policymakers and stakeholders in the region.

7.3 Promote greater self-sufficiency for refugees through development initiatives

Although the prospect for full local integration into host country communities appears elusive, and in some cases undesirable to our respondents, they urged the international community to take steps to enable greater independence for those who would otherwise be dependent on long-term humanitarian assistance. In the short to medium term, there was strong support, either explicitly or implicitly, for shifting the current aid paradigm from mostly humanitarian to a more balanced humanitarian-development approach as a way of more equitably sharing respon-
sibility for refugees and IDPs. The support appears to come from two different but interconnected perspectives. The first is a concern for the impact of displacement on host communities. The second is a concern about the impact on the refugees and IDPs of persistent reliance on humanitarian aid. Increasing self-sufficiency through new livelihoods and improving access to and quality of education were the key means towards addressing both concerns.

7.3.1 Foster new livelihood initiatives

Stakeholders, refugees and IDPs, and some governments articulated a need to increase the access of refugees and IDPs to jobs and other sources of income support. At the same time, they recognized that unemployment is a problem for many, especially young people in the host populations. The Gulf Cooperation Council members, while not recognizing Syrians as refugees, all emphasized that the Syrians in their countries were employed. By contrast, the host countries that allowed UNHCR to register refugees as such (though, in some cases, not being parties to the UN Convention or using the term refugees themselves) generally were more restrictive in allowing them to have access to employment. On the other hand, the countries treating Syrians as migrant workers do not necessarily see themselves as bound by the Refugee Convention’s non-refoulement provisions while those that allow UNHCR to register refugees at least implicitly recognize they have that obligation. Finding a better balance between the two models would help ensure both refugee protection and economic security.

Some limited progress is being made in this regard. Jordan and Turkey have made commitments to open up their labor markets to refugees but stakeholders and refugees alike noted the practical barriers to legal employment even when legal restrictions on work were lifted. These include complicated application processes and restrictions related to the type of work permitted. Host countries in general are worried about competition between refugees and local host populations for what are often scarce jobs and may restrict the access of refugees to higher-wage employment. Some employers hire refugees because they are willing to work for lower
wages and are more exploitable; a legal work permit would not necessarily be a benefit in those cases. The situation for IDPs can also be difficult because employment options for locals are also restricted by poor economic conditions. Further, low wages in many jobs are an impediment for refugees, particularly those with large households. They may be reluctant to accept legal employment if it makes them ineligible for other forms of assistance but does not give them a higher level of income.

A development approach to the problem of livelihoods is seen as one potential vehicle for overcoming some of these barriers. Governments in particular are explicit in seeing the value of programs that target both refugees and IDPs as well as local hosts for additional employment. The Jordanian plan to establish 18 special economic zones to create jobs for both Syrians and Jordanians is a case in point. The New York Declaration (2016, p. 25-26) indicates an intention to do more: “we encourage host Governments to consider opening their labor markets to refugees. We will work to strengthen host countries’ and communities’ resilience, assisting them, for example, with employment creation and income generation schemes.” Stakeholders and refugees emphasized the loss of human resources when refugees are unable to work legally as a human development problem that needs to be addressed through smarter policies. In effect, if the estimated 3,000 Syrian teachers in Egypt were able to work, as referenced by one respondent, the benefits would accrue to both refugees and local hosts as the pressures on local schools would be reduced.

7.3.2 Augment international financial and technical support for education for all refugee children and youth

Access to education is seen as an immediate need that would support longer-term solutions for refugees. Stakeholders, and refugees and IDPs place education high on the agenda for international assistance and cooperation. In the New York Declaration, governments pledged “We are determined to provide quality primary and secondary education in safe learning environments for all refugee children, and to do so within a few months of the initial displacement. We commit to providing
host countries with support in this regard. Access to quality education, including for host communities, gives fundamental protection to children and youth in displacement contexts, particularly in situations of conflict and crisis.” (2016, p. 15). Yet, as reported by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Qatar, “the budgeted allocation for education in emergency situations is only two percent of total humanitarian aid (Saad Al-Muraikh 2016).” Moreover, there are many barriers to education reported by both stakeholders and the refugees and IDPs, including security concerns, non-accreditation of community schools and language (Turkey, in particular). As a result, the rates of refugee children in school are decreasing in some countries which already presented low levels. Local children suffer as well because schools are over-crowded and operating on multiple shifts with reduction in hours of instruction. Access to secondary and tertiary education is particularly problematic for refugee adolescents and youth, many of whom lost years of education in the conflict-affected countries that they fled.

Constraints on education, in combination with barriers to livelihoods, are seen as a security issue in the region that should be of concern to all actors and, therefore, an important area for responsibility-sharing. The refugee interviews, in particular, identified the conundrum in which many young people find themselves. With no access to education and no likelihood of working legally in their home countries, many feel they have no alternatives to return home, and perhaps recruitment into insurgencies, or moving illegally onward towards Europe.

7.4 Address ongoing protection problems facing refugees and IDPs, using a combination of resources

Challenges in protection emerged clearly in stakeholder interviews and the experiences recounted by refugees and IDPs. They involved both legal and physical barriers to protection. *Refoulement* (forcible return) is not an issue for most Syrians and Iraqis in host countries but is a concern for others. All refugees experience problems in gaining legal residency permits, work permits and personal status documentation. The New York Declaration (2016, p. 14) recognized the problems and pledged: “We encourage the adoption of measures to facilitate access to civil
registration and documentation for refugees. We recognize in this regard the importance of early and effective registration and documentation, as a protection tool and to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance."

Respondents also referenced the physical protection problems experienced by refugees and asylum seekers. Of highest concern in government statements are the risks that asylum seekers face in transit, particularly for those who have tried to reach Europe. Smugglers and traffickers are seen as primary culprits, as seen as well in the New York Declaration’s (2016, p. 8) pledge to “vigorously combat human trafficking and migrant smuggling with a view to their elimination.”

Stakeholders tended to discuss the physical safety of refugees, particularly non-Syrian, within the region. They cited daily violence, harassment, and discrimination on the basis of nationality, race and sexual orientation. Refugees do not seem to see as fine a line between legal and physical protection. As recounted above, fear is commonplace among refugees who worry that they may be deported to unsafe countries or sent to inhospitable refugee camps. In the view of stakeholders and refugees, the international community could play an important role in advocating for greater safety and security for refugees in host countries through the exercise of humanitarian diplomacy.

Perhaps the most vulnerable within the region from a protection perspective are the IDPs and trapped populations inside countries in conflict. They were not the focus of the High Level Meeting or New York Declaration but were of immediate concern to stakeholders, refugees and, especially, IDPs. A number of our respondents have cross-border humanitarian programs and identified barriers to delivery of aid. This is another area in which humanitarian diplomacy is urgently needed. Respondents asked the international community to apply pressure on the Syrian government to ensure access and to keep the borders open in neighboring countries.
7.5 Provide timely, appropriate and adequate financing

Financing as a form of responsibility sharing is an issue raised by all actors. Governments and stakeholders in the principal host countries made a strong case for additional support for both the displaced populations and affected host communities. Refugees and IDPs made an equally strong case that they need more resources to survive. Financing humanitarian assistance remains the principal way in which the international community can share the responsibility for the displaced populations as well as the host population. Because the host countries are poor and the refugees and IDPs could bring little with them, international financing is imperative. Most refugees live in host communities in the MENA region, and not in camps. They are often among the poorest and most vulnerable within the host countries, sharing the same services that were usually inadequate even when used by a smaller population. Although the costs have increased significantly, the resources to support the services have not risen to meet the new challenges.

The New York Declaration recognizes the problem and offers solutions that were discussed at the World Humanitarian Summit as well. In New York, governments committed to:

> providing humanitarian assistance to refugees so as to ensure essential support in key life-saving sectors, such as health care, shelter, food, water and sanitation. We commit to supporting host countries and communities in this regard, including by using locally available knowledge and capacities. We will support community-based development programmes that benefit both refugees and host communities (New York Declaration 2016, p. 15).

Governments also recognized the gap in resources: “We note with concern a significant gap between the needs of refugees and the available resources. We encourage support from a broader range of donors and will take measures to make humanitarian financing more flexible and predictable, with diminished earmarking and increased multi-year funding, in order to close this gap (New York Declaration 2016, p. 16).”
Stakeholders and refugees raised practical issues that need to be addressed if these commitments are to be fulfilled. Refugees and IDPs alike talked of the dehumanizing aspects of the assistance system which seemed to take away their rights and respect. A turn towards greater emphasis on livelihoods and education, with the concomitant funding needed to support such initiatives, could help dispel both the perception and reality of hopelessness for many who are unable to return home or be resettled elsewhere. In addition, aid agencies need to listen to refugees and IDPs and take concrete actions to address their concerns. Too often we heard scepticism from our respondents that their interests ranked first or even high amongst those of the aid organizations. Moving beyond consultation and surveys to refugee-centric and refugee-driven prioritization and implementation will help address these problems. Donors need to support such efforts and provide the funds to carry them out.

Greater support for refugee and diaspora-led organizations as well as local host organizations is also needed to accomplish these goals. A perennial challenge in aid operations is identifying community-based organizations that represent a broad constituency and have the skills to carry out programs. When operating in unstable environments, as often happens with IDPs, the challenges are even greater in ensuring that local organizations can and want to comply with the humanitarian principles that undergird the refugee assistance system: humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. Yet, working through community based organizations is often the only way to reach beneficiaries. Moreover, as some of the refugee-led organizations we interviewed stated, providing direct funding to them, rather than international organizations, can be cost-effective.

Addressing discrimination in aid operations should also be a high priority. Our interviews confirmed that some refugees receive higher levels of support and access to more services than others. In some cases, refugees and IDPs receive different levels of support even in the same location. Refugees from Africa, in particular, believed (often correctly) that Syrian and Iraqi refugees receive greater attention from the international community as well as national authorities. The way in which donors provide funding contributes to these discrepancies. Donations to refugees
in highly visible crises usually are higher, not only from governments but also from the public. Crises that are seen as having greater national security implications can also be better funded than others. Besides, acute emergencies generally receive greater attention than protracted situations. The resulting situation is that some of the most vulnerable refugees receive the least assistance. The World Humanitarian Summit and New York Declaration commitments to provide fewer earmarked contributions may help address this problem but it is essential to keep in mind the unintended consequences of even well intentioned efforts to respond to emergencies.

7.6 Make operational improvements in aid programs

Our respondents made clear that responsibility-sharing must go beyond policy and financing to include concrete improvements in the ways in which aid programs operate. Recommendations on ways that the international community could join together to improve the implementation of humanitarian assistance operations include:

- Enhance the use of micro-credit and other opportunities for refugees and IDPs to take out loans to start small businesses;
- Facilitate the delivery and reduce the cost of remittances, which are a lifeline for many refugees and IDPs;
- Encourage investment in host countries so as to increase income generation for both local hosts and refugees/IDPs.
- Provide financial and material support to private households, often composed of family members of newly arriving refugees, as they are often the major sources of aid for newcomers.
- Encourage development agencies, such as the World Bank and multilateral regional development banks, to increase efforts to support host communities in both poor and mid-income countries with large refugee and IDP populations, including through concessional development financing for affected communities (as recommended in the New York Declaration). Priority should go to fi-
nancing health, psycho-social, education, livelihood and community relations programs that enhance opportunities for both hosts and refugees and IDPs.

- Support initiatives to improve coordination of assistance among international organizations and nongovernmental organizations and between these entities and national and local organizations.

- Make changes in paperwork requirements to reduce unnecessary and duplicative activities. At the same time, promote sharing and analysis of data to improve service delivery. Also require that grantees report back to the beneficiaries of their services on the findings of monitoring and evaluation projects.

7.7 Provide technical assistance and training to build the capacity of local actors

Capacity building is required at every stage and among all actors involved in assistance and protection of refugees and IDPs. Priority should go to technical assistance and training of local organizations, with special initiatives for refugee and IDP-led organizations. Stakeholders pointed to high staff turnover at organizations that serve refugees and IDPs, including UNHCR. Such turnover is not surprising given the tense conditions under which humanitarian aid workers operate, especially those who are working inside countries in conflict. Often, families are unable to join workers at hardship posts. Even senior staffs are younger and more inexperienced than their level of responsibilities would warrant. Although there has been growth in professional education for humanitarian aid workers, many of those who join agencies have never had formal training. Responsibility sharing means providing those who are working with refugees and IDPs the sectoral, management, policy, evaluation and other skills they need to succeed.

7.8 Conclusion

In conclusion, international responsibility-sharing is crucial to ensuring equitable treatment of refugees and IDPs, as well as their countries and communities of asy-
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

Responsibility for these individuals should not be assigned based on proximity to countries engaged in conflict and serious human rights abuses. Destination countries in the MENA region, as well as other poor, conflict prone regions, bear most of the responsibility today for protecting and assisting refugees and IDPs. This report has outlined a number of steps that the international community can take to help these countries assist and protect refugees and IDPs on their territories while also addressing the needs of their own affected populations. At the same time, greater international cooperation is desperately needed to address the causes of displacement, improve the living standard, and find solutions for the millions of refugees and IDPs in protracted situations in the MENA region and beyond. Foremost, political will at the highest levels of governments must be exerted if the initiatives recommended herein are to be accomplished. The Global Compact on refugees provides an important opportunity to advance international responsibility-sharing. It is our hope that this report assists in that endeavour.
8. References


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Interview with researcher, Washington DC, 14 October 2016.
Appendix A: MENA Country Profiles

The five countries of study in this paper—Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq—were chosen because they are all located in the MENA region and have been recently and significantly impacted by flows of forcibly displaced people. These host countries represent a range of divergent policies, operating situations for service providers, and living conditions for refugees. As such, each country of study poses a unique context from which to conduct a three-pronged analysis of policy perspectives, operational actors and service providers on the ground; the following is a series of profiles that seek to capture these three dimensions of each host country.

**Egypt** has long-been a major destination country for voluntary and involuntary migrants alike, but the flow of refugees into Egypt is markedly larger than the flow of economic migrants. Migrant workers in Egypt come from some Arab countries, including Palestine, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, and other countries, including Russia, the United Kingdom, and Indonesia. Those from Arab and Western European countries usually have high or medium-high occupation levels, while those from Eastern European countries tend to work low-skilled white collar jobs. (Migration Policy Centre 2013a).

Palestinians constitute the largest population of non-Syrian refugees in Egypt, at approximately 50,000 to 70,000 in 2013 (Omar 2013). From the arrival of the first Palestinian refugees, Egypt resisted the creation of refugee camps, and, with the exception of several temporary camps that have now all been dismantled, this policy continues until today (Al-Abed 2010, p. 536). There are also more than 7,000 Iraqis seeking refuge in Egypt. Iraqis began entering Egypt in the mid-2000s, and another wave fleeing the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) arrived beginning in summer 2014 (UNHCR 2016n). Since 2011, Syrians have been entering Egypt as well.
The numbers of Syrian refugees in Egypt have fluctuated somewhat: a decrease in newly registered Syrians started in 2014 as a result of stricter visa requirements implemented by the Egyptian government in July 2013 (UNHCR 2016). Another reason why UNHCR has been registering fewer Syrians is that many use Egypt as a transit point to try to reach Europe (Shahine 2016). Most recently, at the start of 2015, UNHCR recorded more than 138,000 Syrian refugees registered in Egypt, but this number dropped to 117,000 by the end of 2015, and reached 119,000 by mid-2016 (Shahine 2016). Due to civil wars and political instability in the Horn of Africa starting in the 1990’s, there are also approximately 28,000 Sudanese, 7,000 Somalis, 6,9,000 Ethiopians, and 4,000 South Sudanese registered with UNHCR (UNHCR 2016n). In 2015, more than 1,000 Yemenis escaping civil war registered in Egypt, in addition to approximately 1,000 Nigerians (UNHCR 2016n).

Figure A.1 UNHCR Registered Refugees in Egypt, August 2016

(Source: UNHCR 2016)

Egypt has a variety of domestic legislative initiatives that regulate the legal status of refugees and asylum-seekers (Sadek 2013). In 1996, the Ministry of Interior decreed that refugees could receive a three-year temporary residency permit. Palestinian refugees who arrived in 1948 receive residency permits that are renewa-
ble every five years, but Palestinians who arrived in 1956 receive residency permits that are renewable every three years (Library of Congress 2016). Egypt has complex categories of residency permits that convey different rights based on whether the refugee arrived before 1948, after 1948, after 1956, or after 1967, and the result is a bureaucratic labyrinth so difficult to navigate that many Palestinians, even those born in Egypt, are effectively without legal status (Al-Abed, p. 79-80). Egypt is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, which it signed in 1951 and ratified in 1981, and subsequently signed its 1967 Protocol with reservations to five provisions (personal status, rationing, access to primary education, public relief and assistance, and labor legislation and social security) (Sadek 2013).

While Egypt is unique in that it is one of the few refugee-hosting countries in the Arab world that is a signatory to the 1951 Convention, the lack of implementing legislation and the state’s number of reservations to the 1951 Convention significantly constrain the rights of refugees (Grabska 2006, p. 287). Egypt signed a MOU with UNHCR in 1954 that gives refugees the right to receive refugee status and the delivery of residency permits from UNHCR, which must be checked every six months (Migration Policy Centre 2013a). It has been argued that the MOU was signed in a very different political, economic, and migration context in 1954, and as such many of its provisions are not relevant to or even constrain UNHCR’s ability to assist asylum-seekers and refugees today (Badawy 2010, p. 8). Egypt became a party to the 1969 OAU Convention governing specific aspects of refugees in Africa in 1980, and is a party to the Protocol for the Treatment of Palestinians in Arab States (Migration Policy Centre 2013a). Finally, Egypt has signed agreements with the EU and Greece regarding irregular migration (Migration Policy Centre 2013a). In response to increasing irregular migration of migrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees as well as Egyptians from Egypt’s northern coast into southern Europe from 2014 to 2016, there were indications in fall 2016 that the EU was considering signing a deal with Egypt much like the agreement it already has with Turkey, whereby, among a number of provisions, irregular migrants who travelled from Egypt to Europe would be returned to Egypt (Vystika 2016).
Jordan for decades had an “open door” policy toward migration and was considered to be a “refugee haven” (Chatelard 2010). This openness has been viewed as a method of replacement migration for the Jordanian citizens emigrating for work (Fargues 2009, p. 551). Because of the high demand for foreign labor, migrants were entering Jordan both regularly and irregularly. In order to reduce the estimated 300,000 undocumented laborer population, Jordan developed new requirements for residence permits and took steps to protect certain jobs for Jordanian nationals in 2007 (Chatelard 2010). In 2005-2007, the years before this normative change, more than 34,000 migrants were expelled from Jordan (Migration Policy Centre 2013b). Despite these policy changes, Jordan remains a top destination for migrant labor and works to regularize this population and secure their rights, including the right to join trade unions and the criminalization of forced labor (SDC 2014). The current estimated 1.5 million migrant workers in Jordan originate from countries including Egypt, Syria, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Indonesia (SDC 2014).

In terms of refugees, Jordan has often housed forced migrants from fellow Arab countries, including Lebanese escaping the civil war from 1975-91 and Iraqis since the 1991 Gulf War (Chatelard 2010). Palestinians who came to Jordan in 1948 were granted Jordanian citizenship and refugee status by UNRWA. Jordan, like Egypt, has varying policies on granting citizenship to those Palestinians who came in subsequent waves of displacement, depending on when they fled Palestine (Migration Policy Centre 2013). In 1988, Jordan severed administrative and legal ties with the West Bank, resulting in the loss of nationality for many Jordanians of Palestinian origins, one million of whom became stateless as a result (McDowall 1989). Today, more than two million Palestinians live in Jordan and have Jordanian citizenship, but they face challenges such as arbitrary withdrawal of citizenship (Human Rights Watch 2010, p. 26). For example, from 2004-08, Jordanian authorities revoked Jordanian nationality from more than 2,700 citizens of Palestinian origin (Human Rights Watch 2010, p. 1). Jordan also hosts 3,200 Yemeni refugees (UNHCR 2016).

Large numbers of Syrians began entering Jordan starting in 2011 due to the Syrian uprisings. According to UNHCR, Jordan has registered 630,000 Syrians, 500,000 of whom live in urban areas (UNHCR 2016). Additionally, many Iraqi refugees who fled to Jordan in the wake of the 2003 American coalition-led invasion in Iraq, although
the size of the Iraqi refugee population in Jordan has been contested among the Jordanian government and other actors; estimates in 2007 suggested there were anywhere between 100,000 and 700,000 Iraqis (Migration Policy Centre 2013b). It has been suggested that discrepancies in the number of Iraqis reported was due to inconsistencies in surveying and the fact that many Iraqis at this time were reluctant to share their true nationality for fear of deportation (Fargues 2009, p. 562). Currently, approximately 53,000 Iraqis registered as refugees (UNHCR 2016g). The Jordanian government refers to both Syrian and Iraqis seeking asylum in its territory not as “refugees” but as “guests,” which effectively prohibits them “from gainful employment, pushing them into the exploitative informal sector or in some cases, ‘partnerships’ with locals” (Chatty and Mansour 2011, p. 64). Unlike Egypt, Jordan, since its inception as a major refugee-hosting state after 1948, has promoted the creation of refugee camps for Palestinian and Syrian refugees. Representing separate humanitarian spaces, camps made aid delivery more efficient, but Jordan also aimed for the camps to provide for large numbers of refugees, often from lower socio-economic backgrounds, and keep them out of the Jordanian labor and housing market, reducing competition with low-skilled Jordanian workers and for low-cost housing (Turner 2015, p. 388).

Table A.1 People of Concern Registered with UNHCR, Jordan Sept 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Origin</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>655,831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>58,455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>4,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>3,104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>724,256</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: UNHCR 2016g)
There were also 3500 Sudanese registered in Jordan as of December 2015 (UNHCR 2016g). The majority of Sudanese in Jordan are from Darfur and report that their flight to Jordan was a direct result of the conflict that began in Darfur in the late 1990s and continues until today. (International Crisis Group 2015, p. 1). Similarly, there is also a small population of Somali refugees and asylum-seekers in Jordan who began coming since the advent of the ongoing civil war in Somalia in 1991. While legally protected from deportation while their asylum-cases are being reviewed, as per Jordan’s agreement with UNHCR (see below), both Sudanese and Somalis cannot access assistance from UNHCR or the Jordanian government (ARDD-Legal Aid 2015, p. 4).

Jordan is not a signatory to the UN 1951 Refugee Convention or to its 1967 Protocol. Jordan signed a MOU with UNHCR in 1998, which allows for asylum-seekers to remain in Jordan for six months after recognition as refugees, at which time UNHCR must find a resettlement country for them (UNHCR 2012). Additionally, Article 21 of the Jordanian constitution prohibits the extradition of political refugees (Sadek 2013). Further, Jordan has other laws that address the issue of protection for political asylees (Sadek 2013). However, the government does not have set conditions for who is eligible for asylum. Through Jordan’s piecemeal policy of refugee management, which was deeply informed by its experience with the Palestinians in the 20th century, the Jordanian government clearly encourages temporary protection over long-term settlement in the country (Migration Policy Centre 2013b). Additionally, Jordan is a party of the Protocol for the Treatment of Palestinians in Arab States 1965 (Migration Policy Centre 2013b). Jordan is a member of several international organizations that deal with issues of migration, including: IOM, ILO, UNHCR, and Arab League, among others. Jordan is also a participant in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and a member of the Union for the Mediterranean, a multilateral partnership within the ENP (Migration Policy Centre 2013b).

Lebanon’s migration flows are comprised of migrant workers, refugees, and asylum-seekers. Most tend to be female low-skilled migrant workers from Asian and African countries. The ILO estimates that there are more than 250,000 women migrant workers mostly from Ethiopia, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka working as
domestic workers (ILO 2016). Though the Lebanon began partnering with the ILO in 2005 to improve the protection of these workers, they still face significant human rights abuses (ILO 2016).

Palestinians have sought refuge in Lebanon since 1948, and according to UNHCR, at least another 32,000 Palestinians from Syria have arrived in Lebanon since 2011 (Migration Policy Centre 2013c). Currently, there are more than 320 thousand Palestinians in Syria (UNHCR 2015). There was a steady flow of Iraqis fleeing persecution at the hands of Saddam Hussein’s regime in the 1990’s, and in the mid-2000’s, Lebanon experienced an upsurge in Iraqis seeking asylum in the mid-2000 due to the U.S.-led invasion (Mokbel 2007, p. 1; Migration Policy Centre 2013c). Iraqi refugees began entering Lebanon in greater numbers in 2003, and UNHCR currently counts 17 thousand registered Iraqi refugees in the country (Library of Congress 2016). There are also 16 thousand refugees and asylum-seekers from Ethiopia, Sudan, and other countries (UNHCR 2016h). In 2011, Syrians began entering Lebanon, and this population reached 1.5 million by the end of 2015 (UNHCR 2014b). Given Lebanon’s population of 5.9 million people, one in three people living in Lebanon is not a Lebanese citizen. (UNHCR 2014b).

Table A.2 Refugees in Lebanon, 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Origin</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>320,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Ethiopia, Sudan)</td>
<td>3,104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,843,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: UNHCR 2016)

Lebanon does not have any domestic legislation that specifically addresses the status of refugees, and Lebanon is neither a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees nor to its 1967 Protocol. The UNHCR has said that refugees retain few, if any, legal rights (UNHCR 2010). The Lebanese government created the Central Committee for Refugee Affairs in 1950 to administer the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, and in 1959, the Department of Palestinian Refugee Affairs was created, which was then re-named the Department of Political Affairs and Refugee in 2000 (Suleiman 2006, p. 11-13). Lebanon signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with UNHCR in 2003 that provides a mechanism for issuing temporary residence permits to asylum seekers (UNHCR 2004). Under the terms of the MOU, the UNHCR adjudicates claims for asylum and the government issues a temporary residence permit, normally for three months but possibly extended to six to nine months, allowing UNHCR to find a durable solution for the refugee in question (UNHCR 2004).

Lebanon also has agreements with the EU, Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Switzerland regarding irregular migration. Lebanon further cooperates with the IOM, UNHCR, and UNRWA to deal with internal migration affecting the country since the 1975 civil war, the Palestinian crisis, and other non-Palestinian refugees. Lebanon is a party to the Protocol for the Treatment of Palestinians in Arab States, ratified with reservation. (Migration Policy Centre 2013c).

In recent years, Lebanon has significantly constrained the ability of refugees, particularly Syrians and Palestinians from Syria, to enter the country and maintain legal residency in the country. In the early stages of the Syrian displacement crisis, Lebanon was praised for maintaining open borders and allowing the entry of over one million Syrians into its borders, but significant policy changes, beginning in 2013, restrict the entry of Syrians and their ability to maintain legal status in the country (Janmyr 2016, p. 13). The government’s stance on Syrian refugees can be explained by Lebanon’s previous experience with the Palestinians and the conflicting attitudes of Lebanon’s political parties towards the Syria conflict (Janmyr 2016, p. 7).

Turkey hosts more than 2.5 million refugees, the largest number of refugees in the world (UNHCR 2016). In the past, due to the desire for a unified ethnic identity of the founders of the modern Turkish state, exclusive immigration priority was given to Muslim Turkish speakers or those from similar ethnic groups, such as Bosnians,
Albanians, Pomaks, Circassians, and Tartars from the Balkans (Kirisci 2003). Between 1923-99 more than 1.6 million people from mostly Balkan countries immigrated to Turkey (Kirisci 2003). By the 1970’s, however, the government turned away from its goal of population growth, and eventually began having to deal with larger irregular flows of migration. Thousands fled to Turkey from Communist states in Eastern Europe during the Cold War (Kirisci 2003). In the 1980’s, Turkey received Iraqi and Irani asylum seekers, including almost half a million Kurdish refugees from 1988-91 (Kirisci 2003). Presently, clandestine workers, transit migrants, and rejected asylum-seekers who make up the irregular flow of migration come from the Middle East, Asia, and Africa.

By 2011, UNHCR announced Turkey as one of the top five asylum-receiving countries in the world (Migration Policy Centre 2013d). In 2011, Turkey began hosting Syrian refugees (Migration Policy Centre 2013). Since 31 December 2015, Turkey has registered more than 2.5 million Syrians (UNHCR 2016i). The country began amending the “open door” policy it previously held toward Syrians fleeing their country’s civil war in 2015 (Haid 2016). Though Turkey started to implement strict enforcement measures at border crossings, the UNHCR website states that “...in 2016...Turkey has assured that it will maintain an open border policy, although tightly managed for security reasons...” (UNHCR 2016i). However, authorities closed the last two border crossings in March 2015, citing security concerns (Haid 2016). Though cited as a temporary measure, these and other crossings have not reopened. Further, in January 2016, Turkey began implementing visa restrictions for Syrians entering the country by sea or land (Haid 2016). In 2014, Turkey began receiving large numbers of Afghani, Iraqi, and Iranian refugees escaping renewed and increased political instability in their countries (UNHCR 2014a). Iraqi refugee numbers reached more than 100 thousand by the end of 2014 (UNHCR 2014a). The number of Afghani refugees quadrupled in 2014, with UNHCR registering more than than 29 thousand by the end of the year (UNHCR 2014a). The number of Iranian refugees doubled that year, reaching more than 11 thousand (UNHCR 2014a).

The Turkish migration law is governed by a series of codes that are often considered incoherent and lacking human rights safeguards. The EU and the Council of
Europe have put pressure on Turkey to reform its migration and asylum laws. Turkey ratified the Refugee Convention in 1962 and acceded its protocol in 1968 with a geographic limitation that events affecting refugees must take place in European countries. Refugees who arrive in Turkey outside of these parameters from non-European countries receive “conditional refugee” status until they are resettled to a third country. On June 20, 2016, the Union of Turkish Bar Associations signed a MOU with UNHCR to formalize a long-standing understanding between the two regarding the provision of legal assistance to refugees and asylum seekers in Turkey. Turkey is a party to the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and its additional Protocol on Trafficking in Human Beings. Turkey has several other agreements with countries including Ukraine, Greece, Syria, Kyrgyzstan, and Romania regarding irregular migration. (Migration Policy Centre 2013d). Notably, beginning in 2014, Turkey undertook a dramatic overhaul of its existing migration management system; it introduced the Law on Foreigners and International Protection and in 2015 created the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) under the Interior Ministry. Critics have observed that while the new system does provide increased protections and improves immediate material conditions for refugees and asylum-seekers, it does not provide a long-term solution for situations of protracted displacement (Corabatir 2016, p. 7).

### Table A.3 Non-Syrian Refugees in Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Origin</th>
<th>Applicants in 2015</th>
<th>Pending Applications in 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>52,167</td>
<td>79,438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>50,236</td>
<td>93,705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>9,108</td>
<td>17,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>1,692</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Asylum Information Database 2015)

In another high-profile move in March 2016, Turkey signed an agreement with the EU to ensure that migrants arriving in Europe from Turkey who have not applied for asylum or whose asylum claim has been rejected will be sent back (BBC 2016). One
provision of the deal provides one Syrian already in Turkey will be resettled to the EU for every Syrian migrant sent back to Turkey (EU-Turkey 2016). In exchange for this deal, Turkey would receive aid from the EU as well as political concessions like free visa-travel in the EU for Turkish citizens (EU-Turkey 2016). The deal's stated goal was to discourage people from irregularly migrating from Turkey to Greece. Human Rights Watch and other critics of the deal have highlighted the grave human rights concerns associated with the deal, calling it a “dangerous precedent” because it puts “at risk the very principle of the right to seek asylum” (Human Rights Watch 2016). According to the IOM, since January 2015, more than one million migrants and refugees, primarily from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, have entered the EU by boat from Turkey to Greece, and hundreds have died attempting to reach Greece (BBC 2016). Though this deal has reduced the number of migrants entering Greece, deportations have been slowed due to an increased number of applications for asylum in Greece from migrants who previously tried to enter northern European states (Winter 2016a). Further, the EU has been slow to produce a refugee distribution plan as many countries, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, refuse to accept asylum-seekers (Winter 2016b). Moreover, the EU has yet to grant free visa-travel to Turkish citizens, citing concern over Turkey's severe anti-terror laws and wide-reaching crackdowns enforced following coup attempts in July 2016 (BBC 2016). Turkey has threatened to cancel the entire agreement if this provision is not implemented by the end of 2016 (BBC 2016). The possible collapse of the deal could lead to another influx of migrants into the EU (BBC 2016).

In Iraq, flows of migration come from outside the state, as well as internal flows caused by conflict that result in high populations of IDPs. With more than 3.3 million internally displaced persons, Iraq has the third largest population of IDPs in the world (IOM 2016b, UNHCR 2016f). Many Iraqis fled their homes following the 2003 US-led invasion, and between 2006 and 2008, 1 million people were internally displaced (UNHCR 2016f). More recently, since 2014, 3.2 million people have been internally displaced due to ISIS and renewed fighting in parts of the country (UNHCR 2016f).

Iraq also houses Syrian refugees and Iraqi refugee returnees, all escaping the ongoing war in Syria. UNHCR estimates that there are 245 thousand Syrian refugees in
Iraq, and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), a semi-autonomous region located in the north of the country, hosts around 96 percent of the total Syrian refugee population. There are roughly 50 thousand non-Syrian refugees in the country, including Palestinians, Sudanese, and Iranians in the central and southern parts of the country, and Iranians and Turks in the KRI. There are also an estimated 40 thousand Iraqi refugee returnees and 50 thousand stateless people, a population that includes Syrian, Palestinian, and other refugees who cannot prove their nationality because they lack documentation (UNHCR 2016f).

Iraq is not party to the UN Refugee Convention, and the majority of its mechanisms to govern refugees’ status are domestic instruments, such as the Law 21-2010 that establishes the Ministry of Migration and Displacement, which provides assistance and services to both internally displaced persons and foreign refugees inside Iraq. The Political Refugee Law of 1971 addresses political refugees only, and establishes benefits such as the right to work and the same health and education services as Iraqis (Sadek 2013).

The KRI in particular has provided a safe-haven for Syrians, at least in part because it sees itself as a nascent independent Kurdish state and therefore takes in the Syrian Kurds fleeing Syria. That it hosts 96 percent of the Syrian refugees currently in Iraq (216,980 of 225,455), means that the Iraqi Central government does not contribute much to the Syrian refugee needs or make larger budgetary decisions for them, which is a significant financial burden on the KRI, as well as the host community. In the Kurdistan Region, Syrians are allowed to work, which means they can be more self-reliant and feel less the sting of being a burden or objects for aid delivery. Interestingly, it also may explain why there are significantly more adult Syrian men than women living in Iraq (as well as the large number of individuals present without their families). Particularly in Erbil, where the non-camp population is almost 77,000, Syrians are able to find jobs in hotels, restaurants, and within international organizations.

The migration landscape of Iraq has been particularly affected by high rates of internal displacement. Iraqi IDPs now constitute one-third of the Kurdistan Region’s residents, and alongside the 225,000 Syrians, these numbers of displaced makes
for challenging conditions for the host communities as well. A survey found that among Iraqis who cited securing a livelihood as their greatest challenge, 44 percent were residents of the Kurdistan Region (Chatham House 2016, 6). But this is also due to the fact that the KRI is the most stable area of Iraq, people feel secure there, and that, the KRI “employs approximately 70 percent of the [region’s] workforce” (DeWeaver 2016, p. 7). In addition, the expanding population has caused fierce competition for the limited available jobs, a decrease in wages, and a shortage of available housing. The father of a family from Diyala, Iraq, now living in Sulaymaniyah, in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, recalls their situation before displacement and laments their current conditions: “We were not from a family with a good financial status. We were a very simple family with a very simple and ordinary life, but at least I could provide for most of my family’s needs there. But here, it’s difficult. My family wanted me to buy them some new clothes, but I knew that if I did, we wouldn’t be able to pay the next month’s rent.” In the face of these major challenges, the regional government has struggled to meet the demand for public services. These circumstances prompted preparation of a large protest calling for IDPs to return home, which the government prevented by threat of arrest (Chatham House 2016, p. 7).
Appendix B: UNHCR and UNRWA

Any thorough discussion of responsibility sharing in the region should consider the two principal international organizations with responsibilities for refugees: the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN Relief and Works Administration for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). They work collaboratively with a range of different actors, including governments, international, national and local non-governmental organizations and refugee and diaspora groups.

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is arguably one of the most important bodies providing protection for and services to refugees in the world; further, much of the international funding for refugee crises is channelled through UNHCR and thus reflects a major instrument for the sharing of the responsibility for refugees. UNHCR was established in 1950 to “assume the function of providing international protection, under the auspices of the United Nations, to refugees who fall within the scope of the present Statute and of seeking permanent solutions for the problem of refugees by assisting governments and, subject to the approval of the governments concerned, private organizations to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of such refugees, or their assimilation within new national communities” (UN General Assembly 1950). Within ten years, the organization had expanded to become an operational agency organizing relief efforts; this change came about because of growing international recognition of the need for an effective body to provide relief and assistance to refugees on a global scale (Loescher 2001; Orchard 2014). This arrangement has gradually expanded throughout the decades, with UNHCR continuing to play a central role in administering protection for providing basic services to refugees, as well as identifying and screening refugees for resettlement, across the world today.
UNHCR operates in all five of the countries under study in this project, and its work in each country is governed by a series of Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) signed between each government and UNHCR. It has been argued that these MOUs were signed in very different contexts that do not reflect the current reality or scale of displacement today, and that many of its provisions are not relevant or are even constraining UNHCR’s ability to assist asylum-seekers and refugees today. As such, it has been suggested that the MOUs, such as the agreement signed by UNHCR and the Government of Egypt, should be re-drafted and signed to reflect the changes in states’ legal obligations (Badawy 2010, p. 4).

Table B.1 UNHCR Staff Details by Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International Staff</th>
<th>47</th>
<th>100</th>
<th>83</th>
<th>121</th>
<th>64</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Staff</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior Professional Officers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Volunteers</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Center for Immigration Studies 2016)

Operationally, the degree of UNHCR’s involvement varies by country in MENA. A number of scholars have written about UNHCR’s work in the MENA region, and more broadly, the developing world, and asserted that UNHCR has in some countries assumed the role of a “surrogate” state, a phenomenon that refers to the de-facto transfer of responsibility for managing refugee policy from sovereign states to UNHCR (Slaughter and Crisp 2009; Kagan 2011a; Kagan 2011b; Stevens 2016). Facing an inability to provide the basics for refugee populations, states confine themselves to the obligations to provide basic security and respect the principle of non-refoulement, and UNHCR and partner agencies assume effective responsibility for delivering direct assistance to refugees (Slaughter and Crisp 2009, p. 124). Within the five countries of study, all but one of the countries follow this “surrogate state” model, with UNHCR assuming the primary role in refugee protection, service
Appendix B: UNHCR and UNRWA

provision, coordination among actors, and refugee resettlement. Turkey, by con-
trast, has taken a different approach with regard to its engagement with UNHCR,
relegating the agency to a very minimal role in refugee resettlement and protec-
tion and supplanting its previously expansive role with the recently established
Directorate General of Migration Management in the Turkish Ministry of the Interior
(see Turkey Country Profile above for more information). In Iraq, UNHCR administers
refugee camps and fulfils the provisions of its Statute by providing protection and
service provision for refugees, including coordinating service provision, partnering
with implementing partners to ensure delivery of basic services. UNHCR has as-
sumed a similar role in Egypt, with a major difference being that it does not admin-
ister camps, because Egypt practices a strict no-camp policy and thus all refugees
live in urban or peri-urban settings. In Lebanon and Jordan, UNHCR administers
camps and leads protection, service provision, coordination, and refugee resettle-
ment, but does so in closer coordination with the governments of these two host
countries. For example, UNHCR also funds high level positions in the Lebanese min-
istries in order to facilitate coordination with the Lebanese government. A monitor-
ing and evaluation employee in an international NGO in Beirut remarked that such
an arrangement creates a conflict of interest, as UNHCR is supposed to function as
a “watchdog” to ensure refugees are receiving adequate protections in the host
country, a difficult task when the agency is so embedded in the government to the
extent that is funding government positions (In-person interview with INGO, Beirut,
Lebanon, 26 April 2016).

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near
East (UNRWA) plays a central role in advocating for and providing relief and services
to Palestinian refugees in the Middle East (UNRWA 2016). Established in 1949 as a
means to assist refugees and people displaced by the Arab-Israeli conflict, the agen-
cy was originally intended to be a temporary solution (Hanafi et al. 2014, p. 124).
Without the realization of a “just resolution of the question of the Palestine refu-
dees,” however, the UN has repeatedly renewed UNRWA’s mandate (UNRWA 2016).
With over 1.5 million Palestinian refugees registered, UNRWA operates in Jordan,
Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip and provides service to 58 rec-
ognized Palestinian camps as well as the areas outside some of the larger camps (UNRWA 2016). Where Palestinians do receive aid and protection from UNRWA, the 1951 Refugee Convention does not apply to them in accordance with Article 1D of the Convention. The provision states that the Convention “shall not apply to persons who are at present receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance.” Where Palestinians live outside of UNRWA’s areas of operation, UNHCR provides aid to these refugees, because the Convention then applies to them (UNRWA 2016). There are exceptions to this arrangement, however; in Egypt, for example, neither UNHCR nor UNRWA provides services or protection to Palestinian refugees. This is because the Government of Egypt explicitly requested that UNHCR not serve the Palestinians, and UNRWA is not permitted to operate as a full service-provider in Egypt.

Some of the services UNRWA provides to Palestinian refugees include emergency assistance (including food aid provision, shelter provision, and employment assistance), education, health care, social services, and the safeguarding of Palestinian refugees’ rights (UNRWA 2016). In recent years, UNRWA has attempted to increase its involvement in development projects as a means to overcome Palestinians refugees’ material suffering (Gabiam 2012, p. 98). Given the humanitarian crisis in the West Bank and Gaza and despite the refugee crisis generated by the Syrian conflict UNRWA’s humanitarian assistance is still heavily utilized.

There are roughly 450 thousand Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA currently in Syria, and over two-thirds of them are internally displaced (UNRWA 2016). Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, an estimated 90-100 thousand Palestinians went to Syria (Kodmani-Darwish 1997). The Syrian government granted Palestinians almost all of the rights enjoyed by Syrian citizens, but officially opposed the permanent resettlement of the refugees in Syria (Gabiam 2012, p. 97). UNRWA cooperated with the Syrian government in administering aid to Palestinians in the country, and therefore had already established infrastructure that allows it continue administering emergency relief, education, and health services in Syria during the current conflict (Gabiam 2012, p. 97; UNRWA 2016).
Palestinian refugees from Syria have fled the country since the beginning of the Syria crisis in great numbers, and they often fall into gaps in service provision and legal protections in countries of asylum. An estimated 42 thousand fled to Lebanon, while more than 17 thousand went to Jordan (UNRWA 2016). If they are able to enter the country of asylum at all, most Palestinians from Syria are unable to access basic social services or implement civil registration procedures due to their irregular legal status and recognition as stateless persons (UNHCR 2016; Karasapan 2015). In many cases, Palestinian refugees from Syria have different entitlements from aid providers like the World Food Programme (WFP) than other Syrian refugees (Skype interview with UNRWA employee, Amman, Jordan, 6 August 2016). For example, when Syrian refugees received WFP coupons, Palestinian refugees from Syria were not eligible to receive them (Skype interview with UNRWA employee, Amman, Jordan, 6 August 2016). Further, guarantees of the 1951 Convention regarding the Status of Refugees exclude Palestinian refugees who are registered with UNRWA (UNRWA 2016). Thus, they are often entirely dependent upon UNRWA. In countries where UNRWA does not operate, such as Egypt, Palestinians from Syria face even greater material and legal challenges.

In light of the Syrian conflict, some UNRWA service providers believe the international community has shifted its focus away from Palestinian refugees’ needs (Skype interview with UNRWA employee, Amman, Jordan, 6 August 2016). Further, the agency has implemented austerity measures in the last few years due to a reduction in funding and donations (UNRWA 2016). With 5 million Palestinian refugees eligible for UNRWA registration, however, the agency’s services will most likely be necessary for many years to come.
Appendix C: Stakeholder Interview Guide

Introduction:

We are researchers at Georgetown University working on a project funded by the Swedish government on international responsibility sharing for the protection of and provision for refugees—primarily Syrian refugees. We are doing so through a series of interviews with three groups of stakeholders: the organizations and other actors responsible for supporting refugees in countries of asylum, policy-makers in countries of asylum, and finally, refugees themselves.

This is not unlike a service mapping exercise to some degree, but with more of an aim to identify the primary actors, decision-makers, and where “de-facto” responsibility for refugees falls.

Regarding on-the-record / off-the-record matters, we recognize that working on refugee issues can be quite sensitive. When we write this report up, we will do so in narrative form and do not anticipate making any direct quotes by name of employee or organization (unless given. You are welcome to specify which information you would like to be attributed to your organization, and which information you would like to remain “off-the-record;” meaning that we may include it in the report but anonymously, without any identifying information about you or your organization.
General Questions:

- Can you give us a sense for the kind of work your organization does with Syrian refugees?
  - Who: Are all the beneficiaries of your program Syrian? Can you comment on service provision for refugees of other nationalities?
  - What: What are the services that your organization provides?
  - When: When did your organization first begin this work? How has your work changed since the beginning of the Syrian displacement crisis?
  - Additional follow-up: What are the main challenges to your work? How have these challenges changed over time?

- Something we have heard a lot is that local organizations should be engaged more in the humanitarian and development activities of international organizations. Can you comment on that?
  - Follow-up: How does this play out in the context in which you work? What is the importance of engaging local organizations? What are some of the challenges? How can those challenges be addressed?

- We have also heard from other stakeholders that there is a move from humanitarian response to more development-oriented programming. Can you comment on this in context of your organization’s work?
  - Follow-up: Is the distinction between humanitarian and development work even a viable division in this context?

- A main aim of the project is to produce concrete recommendations to governments in the so-called “West,” primarily Europe, for better supporting work like your organization does. How do you think the international community / governments can best support?
  - Suggested areas:
    - Funding
    - Coordination of activities
    - Coordination (among other service providers, with government actors, with local organizations)
• Is there anything else you would like to add?

Jordan-specific Themes to Cover:

• Cross-border operations
• Deportation of Sudanese refugees in December 2015
• Non-Syrian Refugees: Iraqis, Sudanese and Somalis
• Palestinian refugees and Palestinians Displaced from Syria (PDSs)
• How did Jordan's experience with the Palestinians inform its treatment of subsequent refugee populations, especially PDSs?

Egypt-specific Themes to Cover:

• Migrant smuggling from Egypt's north coast and at the Sudanese border
• Non-Syrian refugees (Ethiopians, Eritreans, Sudanese, Somalis, Iraqis); how were these groups impacted by the arrival of Syrian refugees?
• Effect of political shifts (2011, 2013) and general fluid political environment on refugees

Turkey-specific Themes to Cover:

• EU-Turkey deal
• New asylum law and creation of DGMM
• Reduced role of UNHCR
• Non-Syrian refugees (primarily Iraqis, Afghans, Iranians, some Palestinians)
• Cross-border operations
• Operating in Turkey as an international / Syrian-led organization

Iraq-specific Themes to Cover:

• Interaction of IDPs and refugees; “lay of the land” of service providers assisting IDPs and refugees
• Impact of the fluid security situation for refugees and IDPs
• Entry policies for Syrian refugees in the KRG
Lebanon-specific Themes to Cover:

- Importance of the Municipalities versus Central Government
- Effect of the current political situation on state policy (or lack thereof) towards refugees
- Expanded role of UNHCR
- Entry policies for Syrian refugees
- Cross-border operations (unofficial)
- Non-Syrian populations: Iraqis and Palestinians
Appendix D: Fieldwork Description: Refugee and IDPs Interviews

The interview material for Chapter 6 was conducted in 2010, 2011, 2013, and 2014 in Jordan and Lebanon. A total of 328 interviews were conducted with respondents from nine different backgrounds/national origins, being Syrians and the largest groups interviewed Iraqis (see chart below for details).

The interviews were conceived of as an innovative participatory research project. The lead researcher on the project provided training in Arabic to eight groups over the four-year period, made up of refugees and members of the host communities living in Jordan and Lebanon. Using a participatory research method developed for this research, the questions were brainstormed, trialed, and translated by the research team along with researchers from Iraq and Syria.

The interviewers were trained in a half day-long workshop that included human subjects’ protection, how to ask and elicit answers in qualitative interview questions, and practice interviews with each other. The trainer then reviewed their work and offered suggestions. They returned after completing 2 interviews and the transcripts were reviewed and feedback given. The interviewers could ask questions, discuss who they were going to interview, and raise any other issues. Each interviewer conducted between 4 and 6 interviews each, and they were delivered to the lead researcher on flash drives (and occasionally hand written in notebooks).

Open-ended, semi-structured questions were asked of all participants. The questions were asked in an easily understood colloquial (represented in both English and Arabic) to not alienate the interviewees with overly formal questions.
Sampling

Because finding diverse groups of refugees in urban areas (not in camps) is logistically difficult (and random sampling not possible due to safety issues, both for researchers and the refugees), the sampling consisted of a targeted snowball sample. The goal was to diversify the interviewers such that they would have different networks of potential interviewees to draw from. In Amman, those chosen to be interviewers were living in different neighborhoods and in the surrounding areas, including the more distant outlying areas of Sahhab and Zarqa. They ranged in age from their early twenties to late sixties, and consisted of equal numbers of men and women. In Irbid, Jordan, those chosen to be interviewers were men and women in their 20s from Syria. In Beirut, Lebanon, the male and female interviewers were in their 20s and 30s and were Palestinians living in refugee camps.

The result of the interviewer diversification as well as the instructions to them to choose interviewees of different age groups and national origin resulted in a broad selection of refugees interviewed. In each group, the interviewees’ ages ranged from 18-70 (with a larger number of youth and middle aged people), with 134 women and 194 men. The largest number of interviewees were Syrians and Iraqis, complemented by Palestinians from Syria and Iraq. Additional interviews were conducted with Somalis, Sudanese, and a few Egyptians, and a Yemeni.

Interviews conducted during this four-year period in Jordan and Lebanon were along the following countries of origin and sex breakdowns.
Table D.1 Refugee Interviews in Jordan and Lebanon by Country of Origin and Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian from Iraq</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinians from Syria</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>134</strong></td>
<td><strong>194</strong></td>
<td><strong>328</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These numbers are neither a representative nor random sample. Instead, the interviewees were chosen by a targeted selection of research assistants from the represented refugee communities as well as from the host community.

The team drew as well on other work undertaken during the past four years that illuminate issues related to responsibility-sharing. For example, Rochelle Davis conducted supplemental informational interviews in Turkey in 2015. Susan Martin was principal investigator for a study of forced migration in the Arab region that focused upon health, education, environmental sustainability, labor markets, human capital and remittances, and social cohesion (ESCWA and IOM 2016). Grace Benton founded an evening education for Sudanese and Somali refugees in Jordan in 2011 and worked with refugees, asylum-seekers, and vulnerable migrants in Cairo in the resettlement legal aid office of St. Andrews Refugee Services for several years. Although the information from these projects were not analyzed as systematically as the Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq interviews, they were important in forming our understanding of refugees and displaced persons in the region.
Analysis

The interviews were translated into English and coded based on the following topics:

- Life in previous country;
- Reasons for leaving;
- Role of conscription;
- Life situation in host country;
- Current interactions with aid community;
- Communication with others; and
- What they miss from their home country.

Additional questions that asked about the refugees’ opinions and perspectives were coded based on these topics:

- What needs to happen for stability to return in their country;
- Under what conditions will they return;
- Role of international community;
- Views of the future.

Coded topics were then read closely and analyzed to find themes that were relevant to the topic of responsibility-sharing. The themes that were most commonly touched on and that related directly to the topic were then divided and analyzed. The themes that emerged as most relevant and most addressed were

- Hardship and change;
- The process of learning how to be displaced;
- Experiences with uneven aid distribution;
- Difficulties of education;
- Search for livelihoods;
- Refugee views of the future;
- Institutional challenges.

Selections from each of these topics were used to illustrate 1) the most commonly raised responses, 2) to show the diversity of responses, and 3) to bring up con-
tradictory responses and thereby address the reasons for the different responses. From this material, the chapter was constructed.

The case study on social cohesion used data from the joint Georgetown-IOM longitudinal study on IDPs access to durable solutions, ongoing since March 2016. See the Methodology section (chapter 2) for more details.


**INTRODUCTION**

[[ We want to know what you think and feel about your country, and what you think about your present and future. ]]

[[The material that we gather is anonymous (without names or identifying information). We will use this to create material for people to understand what it is like to be a refugee. We fear that the politicians and governments will create your countries without asking you and without listening to what the people have to say. Thus, we will write reports and make material, in English and Arabic, to help put your voices into the conversation and so that your thoughts and experiences are better known in the world.]]
Questions:

Where are you from and about how old are you?

Why did you and/or your family decide to leave [[your country]]?

Where do you live now and why did you come here?

Tell me about your life in your country before you left?

Tell me a little bit about your life here now … and what are the biggest challenges you face and what or who is helping you with those challenges.

What do you think needs to happen for [[your country]] to be stable again?

Do you think you will return to [[your country]] one day? And to the same place? Or?

IF YES, they will return:

What will the conditions be that will make you able to return? Why?
Appendix D: Fieldwork Description: Refugee and IDPs Interviews

What might [[your country]] look like when you return?

What do you think will need to be done when you return?

How will you rebuild your home? Your neighborhood? Your town/camp? [[your country]]?

IF NO,

Why do you not think you can or want to return?

What do you hope to do?

EVERYONE:

In what way is your life in Jordan/Lebanon different to life in [[your country]]?

What is it that you miss the most about [[your country]]?

Who do you miss most and why?

What do you think about regularly? And why?
How do you stay connected with relatives and friends still living inside [[your country]]?

What do you talk about with your friends here?

What is your greatest hope for the future?

What is your greatest fear for the future?

What do you think the international community can do for the people of [[your country]]?

What do you think your politicians can do?

What do you think your government can do?

Is there anything else you’d like us to know or you want to tell us?
Appendix E: Fieldwork description: IDPs in Iraq

(This Appendix is derived from the Davis R. et al 2017, pp 45-50

The study is based on a mixed methods approach, relying on both quantitative techniques and qualitative methods for collecting data on IDPs, and qualitative methods for collecting data on host communities and stakeholders, as detailed below. The design of both the quantitative and qualitative questionnaires was informed by a comprehensive review of the literature, including academic research and open-source and grey literature.

Data collection included the following components:

1) Family surveys with IDPs (quantitative component).

2) Semi-structured in-depth interviews with IDPs (qualitative component).

3) Interviews with members of host communities (qualitative component).

4) Stakeholders’ interviews (qualitative component).

The research was conducted in the four Iraqi governorates of Iraq, namely Baghdad, Kirkuk, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah. Of the total of 532,000 displaced families in Iraq, 180,000 IDP families live in these four governorates. Other factors influencing their inclusion in the study include: the fact that they could be accessed with reasonable safety; the presence of IOM sub offices; the heterogeneity of the displaced population with respect to governorate of origin and religious background; and variation in the numbers of IDPs hosted by each governorate.
Quantitative / Household Study:

Using IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) system, the sample was selected from the population list of IDPs displaced by ISIL after December 2013, with a one stage stratified design that considers governorate of displacement and governorate of origin as stratification variables. This design generates a sample that is representative of the IDP households living in four governorates which have experienced particular displacement due to the activities of ISIL (Basrah, Baghdad, Sulaymaniya, and Kirkuk) and originating from seven governorates (Anbar, Babylon, Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din). As such it is representative of a total of 180,485 families across the two domains of stratification, with a margin of error ranging between 2.8 per cent and 6.0 per cent, and 95 per cent confidence interval. This design generates four independent samples, one per governorate of displacement, or seven independent samples, one per governorate of origin. Representativeness is not guaranteed in the 28 cells.

The sample size was allocated to the different strata by fixing the margins of the distribution and imposing some restrictions on less numerous groups (namely IDPs from Babylon living in Basrah and Kirkuk, and IDPs from Baghdad and Diyala living in Basrah) to ensure their presence in the sample. Data is collected by enumerators from each governorate who were hired and trained by IOM. A particular innovation of this study was the use of the TextIt System which is a text-messaging platform that allows the enumerators to maintain monthly contact with IDP families participating in the study and to track their movement. Each enumerator programs text message flows into the TextIt program in order to send a text message to all of the families for whom they are responsible. A monthly mass SMS is sent to the families to verify their current location. If the family responds that they have moved, the field team then follows up with the family to verify the new location and to update the database. The enumerators also ask a short set of questions about the reasons for the family’s move. The TextIt flow of questions and answers with each monthly contact with each family is extracted from TextIt and stored in database format. The family receives a monthly phone allowance of 10,000 IQD (~8 USD) to facilitate their participation in the study.
For the purpose of this study, the unit of observation is the “family,” comprised of a family head (male or female), his/her spouse, children, and other relatives attached to the family just prior to its fleeing. The quantitative questionnaire is comprised of two sections:

- The Family Survey: This section featured 106 questions organized in sections roughly corresponding to the IASC’s Framework on Durable Solutions.
  - Migration and movement history
  - Employment, source of livelihood, and financial security
  - Ability to enjoy adequate standard of living without discrimination
  - Ability to enjoy without discrimination long-term safety, security, and freedom of movement
  - Family separation and reunification
  - Loss and replacement of documentation
  - House, land, and property
  - Social capital
  - Preferences and intention for resettlement
  - Perception of stability
- The Roster: The roster is a shorter survey with demographic information at the individual level for each member of the family. Questions include basic demographic information such as sex, age, place of birth, marital status, as well as religious/ethnic identification, education, and employment status. A second roster tracks individuals who left with their families as of January 1, 2014 but who are no longer with the family due to death, migration, kidnapping, or some other change in location.

There is also a text box at the end of the questionnaire so that the enumerators may record additional information not captured in the questions and indicate their general impressions of the family’s story. The survey was answered by the head of family, often with the input of his/her spouse or adult children, and sometimes in the presence of other family members. In March 2016, the enumerators shared their preliminary field experiences, provided feedback on the qualitative and quantitative questions, and were trained on TextIt and research methods. Over the two-week training and following the pilot test of the data collection tools, the enumerators’ feedback was incorporated into a working document used to adjust the question-
naire as well as to develop a field manual that detailed basic definitions and explanations of the questions. The sample design targeted 4,000 families, and, once in the field, 3,854 or 96 percent were captured for the final sample. The data presented here are the 3,854 sampled family responses merged with the individual roster data which generates a sample of 20,636 family members. In order to estimate the population of IDP families and persons, probability weights were constructed of the ratio of the DTM target families over the number of sampled families in the matrix of 4x7 governorates of residence/origin discussed above. Applying the weights to the sample observations yields the 180,485 target families and an estimated 945,086 individuals. The estimated number of individuals, or the IDP population, is a little smaller than that reported for the four governorates in IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix. This is primarily because the DTM’s population estimate is derived by multiplying its count of IDP families by 6, which is the average size of all Iraqi families, whereas there are 5.2 persons per family in this sample of IDPs.

Table E.1 shows the Round 1 and Round 2 results.

Table E.1 Casebook Rounds 1 and 2 of IOM-Georgetown Joint Study of Internal Displacement and Durable Solutions in Iraq

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Round 1: 12/1/20</th>
<th>Round 2: 12/1/2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Moved within Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Returnees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dropped out of Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>1052</td>
<td>948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basrah</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirkuk</td>
<td>1116</td>
<td>826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulaymaniyah</td>
<td>1086</td>
<td>848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>3854</td>
<td>3107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Qualitative interviews

At the end of the quantitative interview, the enumerators asked the respondent if he/she is willing to engage in a longer, in-depth interview, part of the qualitative component of the study. The inclusion of qualitative methods in this longitudinal study provides more details about forced migration dynamics over time, through tracking the choices and changes in IDPs’ lives. In addition, the qualitative interviews express, in their own words, the experiences of those most deeply affected and thereby provide much needed detail and explanations to the trends seen in the quantitative study. Qualitative interviews conducted with members of the host communities allow for an understanding of how the presence of IDPs is perceived in various locations and by different members of the host community, including neighbors, merchants, laborers, educators, and professionals.

The qualitative questionnaire is comprised of 24 open-ended questions that both expand on themes addressed in the quantitative section and cover topics not covered in the quantitative section, including memories of IDPs’ home governorates before displacement, detailed accounts of IDPs’ displacement experiences, and specific incidents of interactions with the host community. As with the quantitative component, there was a final text box for notes in which the enumerators could record additional information not captured in the transcript of the interview, such as the family’s overall demeanor, particular issues, etc. The enumerators were asked to provide basic demographic information about the respondent and submitted the qualitative interview transcripts to the analysis team through a secure data storage server.

Four ISIM researchers first translated the interview transcripts from Arabic to English. The ISIM data analysis team then used Dedoose, a secure qualitative data analysis program, to code and analyzed the qualitative material in both Arabic and English. The Arabic language output was used in a qualitative data analysis workshop with the Iraqi enumerators in September 2016, which marked significant involvement of the Iraqi enumerators in the analysis process. The Georgetown team utilized the Iraqi teams’ qualitative thematic reports to form the basis of the qualitative analysis of the first round of data collection.
Stakeholder Interviews

Stakeholder Interviews: The research team, including the IOM enumerators conducted individual, face-to-face interviews with 30 stakeholders, such as MoMD employees, representatives from the UN Country Team, local and provincial government authorities, national and international humanitarian and development organizations, local Iraqi aid organizations, and international donors. Stakeholders were identified from the study team’s mapping of the organizations with knowledge of IDPs and their needs, as well as from other information collected by the study team. Additionally, information on local Iraqi organizations was collected through the household study, as well as via the NGO Coordination Committee of Iraq for Iraq (NCCI). These small organizations are often highly localized and they provide a large amount of assistance to IDPs. Assistance at this level often takes place under the radar of large international service providers, so particular attention was devoted to learning more about these organizations. The enumerators will be responsible for locating representatives of these organizations and conducting interviews with them.

Host Community Interviews

Additionally, each study team identified 20 host community members and conducted an approximately hour-long interview with 21 questions, for a total of 80 host community interviews per data collection cycle. The enumerators ask local host populations to talk about their perceptions of IDPs, the extent to which IDPs are settling into their new communities, and their perceptions of both IDP and host community access to basic services, including education, employment, housing, and healthcare. Ten of the interviews are conducted with neighbors of IDPs, and are identified by the enumerators as they visit the IDP families for the in-depth qualitative interview or other follow-up. The other 10 interviews are conducted with host community members working in professions that have been impacted by the IDP influx: this includes but is not limited to doctors, pharmacists, teachers, local business owners, etc. The host community interviews are conducted in Arabic in Baghdad and Basrah, but in Sulaymaniyah and to some extent in Kirkuk, these interviews are conducted in Kurdish. Obtaining host community perspectives can significantly inform design of future programs to address the needs of IDPs in a way that is also sensitive to host community needs.
List of previous publications


Kunskapsöversikt 2017:1, *De invandringskritiska partiernas politiska inflytande i Europa*, av Maria Tyrberg och Carl Dahlström.


This Delmi report focuses on responsibility sharing for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region. In the New York Declaration adopted at the High Level Meeting Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants on 19 September 2016, governments reaffirmed their commitment to the notion of responsibility-sharing. However, the High Level Meeting did not arrive at a Global Compact on Responsibility-Sharing for Refugees, leaving its consultation for a second summit to take place in 2018. Better understanding the perspectives of governments, stakeholders and refugees in the MENA region as to the meaning and component of such a compact may help ensure greater success in crafting an effective agreement.

This qualitative study is based on multi-level analyses of the perspectives of policymakers, other stakeholders, and refugees and IDPs. It identifies seven areas requiring greater international cooperation: efforts to address the underlying causes of displacement within and across borders; efforts to find durable solutions, including resettlement of refugees from host countries to third countries; initiatives to identify and implement intermediate solutions, including greater focus on livelihoods and education; initiatives to enhance legal and physical protection; innovative approaches to the financing of programs for refugees, IDPs and the communities in which they reside; operational improvements to aid programs; and technical assistance and training for host countries, local organizations, and diaspora- and refugee-led organizations.